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By

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ABSTRACT

Core Values and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

Dukhong Kim

In this dissertation I examine the impact of core values on foreign policy opinion, the dynamics of value change, and the differences between elites and the mass public in their values change. I find that two core values - humanitarianism and democracy - strongly affect citizens' support for various anti-terrorism measures in the second chapter. For the study I use the survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in 2004. Once I establish the central role of the two core values, I proceed to address the question of how individuals adjust their values in a changing political environment. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq are similar in that they both can be described as international political crises. They differ in that the former event drew unified support for dealing with external threats, while the latter event resulted in sharp divisions over the unilateral assertion of U.S. military power in world affairs. Combined with the characteristics of these events, individuals' partisanship and sophistication simultaneously define the way that they adjust their values. For this study, I use 3 surveys conducted by the CCFR in 1998, 2002, and 2004. Finally, I assess the proposition that elites and the mass public show differences in

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changing their values in response to the events by using the surveys of elites conducted in those years by the CCFR surveys. I found that elites' partisanship and their role in decision making play a significant role in changing their values in response to events. In adjusting their values, elites respond to the events with stability and sensitivity while the public tend to follow their own partisan elites. These findings suggest that citizens are competent in that they employ values to organize their foreign policy choices and update their beliefs in values by incorporating new information. However, this competence is limited in that they employ values that are salient and easily accessible but that are also potentially contradicting to the value choices themselves. Furthermore, the ways in which they react to the events in modifying their values reveal that they depend on partisanship and tend to follow their partisan leaders.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

How do Americans make sense of politics and organize their policy preferences? Recent developments in both foreign affairs and domestic politics lead us to ask the well trodden question of whether American citizens are competent enough to participate in a democratic political process. In his famous article on mass belief systems, Converse (1964) suggested that many - or even most - ordinary citizens fail to develop consistent and stable opinions, a fact which has negative implications relative to the competency of the citizenry. Others (e.g., Feldman 1988; Kinder 1983; Kinder and Sanders 1996) looking beyond simple liberal-conservative structures have found core values influencing policy preferences. Still others (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) attempt to understand the structure of belief systems, the impact of values on policy preferences, and the way that citizens utilize heuristics to compensate for their lack of knowledge and information processing capacity. As an alternative to ideology, values become a prominent element with which individuals organize their belief systems and make sense of politics despite their lack of political interest and knowledge. Studies on foreign policy opinion (e.g. Wittkopf 1986; Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Richman, Malone, and Nolle 1997) also propose that the mass public organizes its foreign policy attitudes by depending on such values as internationalism, isolationism, and militarism.

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Although the optimistic views on the competence of citizens are supported by the mainstream of public opinion studies, we do not know much about the characteristics of values that render individuals competent in forming their opinions and attitudes, the potential effects of this adoption of values on decision making, and the types of values that play a significant role in defining individuals' policy preferences. Furthermore, we still need to know whether individuals modify their attachments to those values according to new experiences or information and how the mass public and elites differ in accepting specific values (cf. Feldman 2003). In an effort to answer some of these questions, this project attempts to address the following questions: What types of values explain public support for various foreign policies? How are core values transformed by events and in specific political contexts? How are the average citizens' values different from those of the elites? This project will build upon what previous studies have found regarding the structures of the mass public's belief systems.

I focus critical attention on the sweeping claim that the mass public is rational. The main theme of this dissertation is that it is necessary to be more cautious in making that judgment. By examining the effects of core foreign policy values, the ways that the mass public responds to major political crises, and the comparative responses of elites and the mass public to the events in terms of espousing values, I want to make a case for making a more carefully nuanced assessment of the "rational public" claim. I argue that individuals' dependence on values in making decisions does not always result in choices that support their chosen values. Even if the mass public can make a connection between means and ends by employing values, it can be misleading to argue that the decision always lead to an appropriate policy choice. While I agree with those scholars who emphasize the central

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role of values in explaining individuals' opinions and attitudes, I want to point out that individuals' use of values to justify their choices does not necessarily make such a choice identifiably rational. If we accept the statement that values are heuristics or information short cuts, it is necessary to pay attention to the side effects of these heuristics in the decision making process. As studies from psychology (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) have suggested, employing heuristics involves the risk of getting inaccurate or misleading choices.

The study of values change also provides support for an appeal for a balanced approach to the "rational public" claim that individuals are rational and competent, in that they update information according to objective conditions, but that the way they do this reveals the strong effect of political predisposition, partisanship. Furthermore, sophisticated individuals are more likely than the non-sophisticated to filter the new information through their partisanship. Finally, the comparative examination of values change between elites and the mass public adds supporting evidence to the proposition that the mass public's competence is limited, in that segments of elites lead the mass public into supporting certain values. Furthermore, the significant gap that exists between elites and the mass public in their espousal of core values implies that the mass public lags behind elites in responding to relevant events. In the following sections I lay out relevant theoretical discussions and an overview of the chapters.

1.1. The State of Studies on Belief Systems and Values

In studying public opinion, a major theoretical issue is whether individuals can participate in the political process as competent citizens who have organizing principles (e.g., ideologies

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and values), the ability to grasp the complexity of issues, and the capability to make decisions based on their knowledge. Early studies (e.g., Lippman 1955; Almond 1950; Converse 1964) argued that citizens' opinions and choices are generally inconsistent and unstable. Converse (1964) found that large portions of the public do not possess necessary information and fail to apply ideology to organize their attitudes and preferences. Consequently, significant portions of the public do not have a meaningful belief system – especially ideological constraints– on which they can rely in making political decisions or expressing their preferences coherently and stably. Since his study, the existence or non-existence of a belief system (or attitude) has become a hotly debated topic.

Ensuing studies have attempted to counter Converse's argument by calling attention to methodological weaknesses of his study (e.g. Achen 1975) or by conducting new studies (e.g. Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). Achen (ibid) points out that if we correct the measurement error which underestimates the correlation over time, we will find public opinion over time is strongly stable. Similarly, Nie and others (ibid) found that the public is capable of using ideology to grasp politics and to evaluate candidates. They claim that this is the case regardless of the public's education level. In the same vein, Jacoby (1991) and Knight (1990) demonstrate how individuals' different political sophistication levels interact with their dependence on ideology in organizing their opinion. Although there are also studies which support pessimistic views (e.g. Converse 2000; Converse and Markus 1979; Markus 1982) and middle-ground perspectives(e.g. Zaller 1992) on the public's ability to make consistent and stable opinions and the lack of constraints in their belief systems, the majority of studies

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have shifted their focus to seeking to understand public opinion with more positive perspectives.[1]

In elaborating what explains the public's choices for candidates and policies, many studies (e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1983; Feldman 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Inglehart 1990) have supported the idea that such core values as egalitarianism, individualism, democracy, capitalism, materialism and post-materialism play an important role.[2] Their findings open a new possibility for those who seek alternatives to ideology as an organizing principle in belief systems. According to them (see also Sears 1993), individuals learn prevalent social values when they are young through the socialization process, and the impact of the values learned is rather permanent. Moreover, political choices of parties and policies are defined by these principles and values. Consequently, these values as guiding principles exert a fundamental power on the public's attitudes toward specific policies and candidates. Individuals learn how to organize and judge political phenomena according to social values which include strong normative aspects.

For example, Feldman (1988) proposes that, although individuals do not use ideology as a major organizing principle, they consistently form their political preferences by depending on core values and beliefs, such as equality of opportunity, economic individualism, and a belief in free enterprise. Among these, at least two values–equal opportunity and

[1]This shift does not mean that Converse's ideas fail to provide any meaningful questions. Instead, his ideas on the lack of information among the public, the impact of this on belief systems, and the strong influence of social and psychological constraints among the mass public have provided a critical starting point for further research.

[2]Emphasis on values does not mean that the values are the only major elements which explain the public's policy preferences. Kinder and Sanders (1996) demonstrate that group interests and sentiments toward groups also contribute to shaping public opinion.

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individualism–play a significant role in constraining policy preferences and evaluating presidential candidates . In their study of what explains white Americans' policy preferences, Kinder and Sanders (1996) also present that equality and individualism, along with racial affect, play a prominent role in explaining why whites oppose various policies designed to benefit African Americans. Similarly, Feldman and Steenbergen (1999) draw our attention to humanitarianism. According to them, humanitarianism has broad appeal among the public and has a significant impact on people's social welfare preferences.

1.1.1. Rational Public

While the above mentioned studies focus on the role of normative values as an important organizing principle of belief systems, other studies (e.g., Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991; Lupia 1995) more directly address the issue of how individuals organize their policy preferences and choices for candidates given that they lack relevant political information. They start their study based on the assumption that individuals are rational. Sniderman and others (1991) do not make this assumption explicitly, but they build their theory based on Simon's bounded rationality idea. According to Simon (1972, 1985,1995,1997), there are two forms of rationality: substantive rationality and bounded rationality. In economics, individuals are considered rational as long as they choose alternatives which will maximize utility (or subjective expected utility) under a given set of alternatives and utility functions. Simon denotes this as substantive rationality. On the other hand, bounded rationality is "behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed *both* by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker"(ibid 1985, 294). To decide whether a decision is procedurally rational or not, we need to know a decision maker's goals, his/her

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cognitive capacity and perception of the situation, and his/her ability to draw implications from the information. Thus, we can judge a person to be rational if he/she uses a reasonable process for decisions or arrives at a reasonable choice. This implies that almost all human behavior is rational.[3] Based on this definition of rationality, Sniderman and others(1991) show that individuals can make sense of politics and come to rational decisions, even though they are only minimally involved in politics and lack knowledge.[4] They particularly emphasize that individuals compensate for their lack of knowledge and cognitive capacity by using different simplification mechanisms and tools -i.e., heuristics or information short cuts. Taking advantage of these tools and cues, individuals still reach a reasonable decision.

Sniderman and others (1991) make a significant contribution to answering the following question: How can a politically ignorant and inattentive public make sense of complex political situations and reach reasonable decisions? According to them, people overcome their lack of information by applying readily available judgmental shortcuts. They assert that heuristics are efficient because they require little information and allow people to reach reasonable decisions. They go on to suggest two such heuristics – likeability heuristics and desert heuristics. A likeability heuristic is measured by people's feelings toward groups or candidates. Thus, knowing individuals' feelings toward judgment objects or evaluations of whether recipients of policy benefits are deserving of those benefits, we can predict their policy preferences. In addition, they found that sophistication level makes a difference in terms of using ideology and likeability heuristics–the more educated an individual, the more

[3]See Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin (2000) for the criticism on this definition and their alternative definition of rationality.

[4]Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) demonstrate that the public's knowledge of politics is limited. Other studies (e.g., Zaller 1992, Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991) begin their study based on the assumption that the public has limited knowledge and information.

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expert in applying heuristics and ideology. On the other hand, the less educated citizens are more likely to adopt likeability heuristics alone (ibid 91).[5]

In the same vein, Popkin (1991) proposes a low information rationality thesis to explain how citizens who lack knowledge and information about politics can work out their decisions on political candidates and policies. Developing Downs's (1957) argument that citizens lack incentives and resources to procure information about politics and that they depend on information shortcuts like partisanship, Popkin (ibid) suggests that voters with little information can make rational decisions. According to him, citizens can act rationally by engaging in daily activities like associating with their neighbors and going to the market and by utilizing low cost information provided by political party campaigns and the mass media. In this process, citizens compensate for their lack of political knowledge and information by taking cues from elites, from interest groups, or from others whom they trust. Brody's (1991) study on people's high support for the President even after a failure demonstrates that citizens take cues from elites. Similarly, Lupia (1994) illustrates how voters who know little about auto insurance policies can reach similar decisions to those of well-informed voters by getting help from interest groups who are perceived to be experts on the issues. It is a prime example of cue taking from other political actors.

If these studies are mainly concerned with how individuals can compensate for their lack of information and knowledge by using simple rules of thumb or heuristics, subsequent studies were mainly interested in how the public as an aggregate body can form rational, consistent and stable opinions on policies. Page and Shapiro (1992) proposed that, as a collective body

[5]They take an ambivalent attitude toward the role of emotion and cognition in explaining citizens' policy preferences. Although at the conclusion of the chapter they admit that highly sophisticated citizens also use emotion as heuristics, their findings do not support this conclusion.

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of individuals, the public can reach reasonable decisions and maintain stable policy choices. This is possible because the errors or noises that individual opinions have will be canceled out by aggregating them together. Thus, stability is guaranteed, and divergent opinions cancel each other out. An assumption is that the errors should be randomly distributed. In line with this logic, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) present their study of how the American political system works by examining aggregate level (or macro-level) behavior. In the study, they argue that there exists a surprisingly high level of sophistication of the collective electorate in responding to governmental policy, evaluating governmental performance, and in turn, expressing their preferences on policies. Although their major focus is on public opinion on national policies, their study shows that electorates at the collective level respond rationally to their governments' policies.

In the area of public opinion on foreign policy similar arguments have been made. Most studies (e.g. Wittkopf 1986; Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Richman, Malone, and Nolle 1997; Holsti 1992) focus on the basic question of whether belief systems exist which the mass public uses in making their judgments or decisions on foreign policy. Although they differ from each other in identifying the major components of the belief systems, they agree that citizens rely on some kind of belief system when they express their political preferences. These studies indicate that the public frequently depends on such values or orientations as isolationism, internationalism, militarism, anti-communism, global altruism, global interest, domestic interest, and military security.

Despite the fact that these studies have contributed to identifying belief systems with which the mass public grasps domestic and international politics and forms its opinions on

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complex and sometimes remote issues, important questions remain. If values are heuristics, they will share similar risks of misleading judgment. In other words, employing heuristics does not always guarantee the intended results.

1.1.2. Values as Heuristics

I agree with the assumption that, since human beings' cognitive capacity is limited, they adopt a means to compensate for this fact. To compensate for this lack of capacity and economize their information process, people, regardless of their sophistication level, usually use heuristics or shortcuts. Studies (e.g. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991; Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group 1999) emphasize the positive role of heuristics. They argue that individuals' usage of heuristics contributes to making reasonably good decisions. For example, Gigerenzer and others (ibid) propose that "fast and frugal" heuristics, which people usually adopt, enable them to reach good decisions. According to them, people make relatively good decisions by using the "recognition" and "Take the Best" heuristics.[6] Without knowing much, ordinary persons can arrive at decision results similar to those of persons who use statistical decision making rules.

On the other hand, others (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kuklinski and Quirk 2001) point out that heuristics can lead to erroneous decision making or judgment. Kahneman and Tversky (ibid), who conducted a series of studies to elaborate upon the information process, show that three general purpose heuristics – availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment – lead to biased judgments. Although the biases or errors do not

[6]The "Take the Best" heuristics includes three properties of decision making: limited search using step-by-step procedures, simple stopping rules, and one-reason decision making (Gigerenzer 1999, 81).

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automatically mean that citizens are irrational, dependence on heuristics can lead to errors.[7] Based on this study and their own, Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) point out that citizens can use information effectively and make good decisions only under favorable conditions. Citizens usually resist accepting corrections of information, are influenced by easy arguments, interpret information with bias, and overly react to policy positions of candidates or elites. Thus, they warn against the optimistic view of citizen competence and for the possibility that public opinion sends a wrong signal to political elites. Similarly, Bartels (1996) expresses doubts about the positive impact of cognitive shortcuts among a poorly informed public.

All these studies agree on the important role of heuristics. However, they disagree as to whether employing heuristics results in efficiency or in bias. I take a more balanced stance toward the impact of heuristic usage. As the above studies point out, there are risks in adopting values as heuristics. In addition, it is better to approach the impact of heuristics by elaborating under what conditions they lead decision makers to errors or to relatively economical and effective choices.[8] As individuals use values as heuristics, there is the possibility of committing the error of making a mis-match between the values and the means to achieve them under certain conditions. To understand fully the central role of values in shaping citizens' opinions, it is necessary to examine the possibility of bias and the conditions under which that potential bias occurs.

1.2. Values Change

Another question related to values is whether individuals modify their beliefs in values and, if they do, how they do so. While those studies emphasize the central role of values,

[7]It is important to note that their study was intended to criticize the substantive rationality argument.
[8]The standard for "right" or "good" decisions is hard to come up with, since mostly we are interested in policy preferences which do not have easy criteria to define "right" preferences.

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little attention has been paid to values change. A reason for this apparent lack of interest comes from one particular characteristic of values: stability. As individuals learn social and political values through socialization and the values remain stable through a lifetime, values can hold other elements of belief systems and contribute to organizing them and maintaining stability and consistency. But if individuals are reasonable, they should be able to update their beliefs in values according to new information. It will be harder to change values than other types of attitudes because of value stability, but still the change should occur if there are proper conditions. Studies (e.g. Chong 2000; Sears and Valentino 1997; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Inglehart 1981; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989) suggest the conditions under which individuals will adjust their values. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley(1987), who studied the impact of the collapse of the former Soviet Union on individuals' beliefs on anti-communism, argue that individuals do adjust their values according to changed international politics. Similarly, Sears and Valentino (1997) argue that, when information flow is intense during the presidential elections, young adults' partisanship changes; but this transformation occurs only in a limited time period.

Although these studies open a new direction in studying values change by elaborating the conditions under which individuals adjust their values, they tend to consider individuals as homogeneous groups and assume that external conditions exert relatively significant influence in defining the way individuals experience values change. I propose an integrative model to capture the dynamics of values change which emphasizes both objective conditions and individuals' characteristics. Theories of values change suggest that external political events or social economic conditions affect citizens' attachment to values collectively. The impact of events will be stronger on values that are prominent and relevant to the political events

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themselves. Thus, if political events make a certain value salient, citizens' adherence to that value is affected most strongly. In addition, a change in values occurs at the individual level as a result of interaction between events and the individual. Thus, the same political events have differential effects on individuals, depending on their political dispositions (e.g. Goren 2001; Murray 2002; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). I argue that the influence of events on their attachment to values is also affected by these political dispositions. Even if citizens experience wars, the impact of wars differs because they interpret the events subjectively, and during this process their own political predispositions intervene in the internalization process. For example, individuals' political partisanship filters how they process the experience of wars and, in turn, their attachment to values. Furthermore, theories of information processing (e.g. Fiske and Taylor 1991; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989) propose that sophisticated individuals are more likely to engage in theory-driven information processing. Individuals who are highly motivated and knowledgeable tend to stick with their predefined perspectives in interpreting external events and new information. Thus, the level of sophistication will differentiate the interaction effect of events and political predispositions on individuals' acceptance of values. More importantly, the integrative theory of values change stresses that these characteristics of events and of individuals work together to define citizens' values.

1.3. Elites and the Mass Public on Values Change

Studies on public opinion cannot be complete without including elites in the comparison. Scholars suggest contrasting perspectives on elites' belief systems and values. A group of scholars (e.g. Putnam 1976; Key 1961; Lippmann 1955; Dye and Zeigler 1981; McClosky and

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Zaller 1984) argues that elites are different from the mass public in their social, economic, and political background. They are more educated, tend to come from the middle class or above, are politically active, pay great attention to politics, and know how the political system works. Owing to these differences, elites maintain well organized belief systems and make consistent and stable opinions. Furthermore, elites educate and inculcate social and political values through social institutions. Thus, they lead the mass public in sharing values and disseminating them to the public. In contrast, another group of scholars (e.g. Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983; Holsti and Rosenau 1990) suggests that elites and the mass public share similarities in their acceptance of values and structure of belief systems. As elites are a general representation of the mass public, they share and reflect the characteristics of the public. Although elites pay more attention to politics, actively participate in the political process, and hold information, they are not different from the mass public in their opinions.

This study sides with the proposition that elites and the mass public are different in their cognitive ability, motivation, and role in the political process. Furthermore, I argue that even among elites, who are considered as a homogeneous group compared to the mass public, the difference in political predisposition and role in the political process at the individual level will affect the way that they update information and modify their beliefs in values. Thus, this study departs from previous studies in that it refuses to accept the assumption of elite homogeneity. To capture the effects of these components in explaining elites' values, the integrative model of values change will be applied to elites. With the differences among the elites and between elites and the mass public, the way that elites and the mass public respond to the same political events will vary . By applying the integrative theory of values change, I elaborate how these elites' characteristics can differentiate the effects of political events

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on their values. Especially elites' role and their political predisposition will simultaneously condition the effect of the events on values.

1.4. Overview

Chapter 2 identifies two core foreign policy values - humanitarianism and democracy - and examines their impact on Americans' support for anti-terrorism measures. These two values share a similarity in that they represent traditional internationalist ideals, but they also represent substantial differences. While democracy promotion puts more emphasis on ideals in the political realm, humanitarianism stresses compassion for human beings apart from political considerations. The Bush administration's emphasis on democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal and its pursuit of this goal through militant measures give us a chance to examine whether citizens can connect the proper means (i.e., policies) with the relevant ends (i.e., values). I expect that these two values reveal differential influences on anti-terrorism measures unlike the previous studies' assumptions. Finally, studies have suggested two competing theories on the effect of sophistication on using values to form attitudes toward policies. I examine the hypothesis regarding the effect of sophistication. Those who argue that values are heuristics also assume that individuals' cognitive abilities will make a difference in their employing the values. This chapter will test this hypothesis. Based on the findings I will discuss the following question: Do citizens successfully choose the policy instruments that most effectively achieve the ends they desire? Or are they easily misled by elite rhetoric to support foreign policies that actually contravene those values?

In chapter 3, I assess the impact of political events on individuals' acceptance of values. Do individuals change their values in response to new information and environments? If they

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do, how do the characteristics of external events and individuals affect citizens' attachment to values? Studies suggest potential sources of values changes both at the collective and at the individual level. They show that social and economic changes induce values changes at the collective level. Similarly, values change when individuals face internal cognitive discrepancies. In addition, routine political events influence individuals' adherence to values and political predispositions (e.g., partisanship). In line with these studies, I examine the way political crisis (e.g., war) affects individuals' adoption of values using surveys conducted by the CCFR in 1998, 2002, and 2004. These three surveys collectively straddle key crises: the 9/11 attack in 2001 and ensuing counter attack on Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Thus the surveys capture the effects of external events on citizens' adoption of values. This is not exactly an experiment but is closer to a quasi-experiment, in that the two events are the major political crises which occurred during the time period under study. Previous studies on values change were mainly restricted to experiments with limited respondents or examination of the influence of routine political events (e.g., political campaigns) on values. This study takes advantage of a naturally occurring quasi-experiment by using three surveys that would allow us to examine the impact of significant events on values. In addition, it contributes to our understanding of the impact of political events on values by extending the types of events that affect values. Previous studies focused on one-time events in exploring the impact of external conditions on values. They were mostly limited to simple dichotomous conditions of experiencing events or not: external stimulation, political campaigns, economic conditions, or wars. The surveys I use include two different types of wars that help more fully understand the effects of external events on values.

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Based on the aforementioned integrative theory of values, I draw three hypotheses and test them in this chapter. The first hypothesis is that these two events will have differential effects on individuals' adoption of values at the collective level, because the events will make certain values more prominent. Second, the change in the adoption of values at the individual level will be differentiated by individuals' political orientations. The susceptibility to change depends on individuals' partisanship and ideologies. Finally, sophistication and political predisposition will work together to define the effect of events on individuals' values.

Chapter four explores how political events affect elites' belief in core foreign policy values in comparison with the mass public. Like the study on the mass public, this study use the surveys conducted in 1998, 2002, and 2004. They all include the same questionnaires as the mass public survey. Thus, I can take advantage of quasi-experimental design to compare over time and subjects. As the integrative theory of values change emphasizes the characteristics of events and elites, I draw expectations regarding the role of these elements in explaining elites' attachment to values. First, elites tend to be stabler than the mass public in accepting values. Second, elites' partisanship will filter the effect of external events on their values. Third, elites' role in decision making will define the effect of external events on their values. Finally, elites' partisanship and role in decision making will condition simultaneously the effect of the external events on their values. These expectations will be tested by examining elites' response to the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq in forming their beliefs in the core values - humanitarianism and democracy. This chapter will provide a better picture of what types of elites behave differently from other segments of elites and the mass public, and lead the public in espousing core values. In the final chapter I will summarize the findings, discuss

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the implications, elaborate some caveats from the findings, and suggest future directions for study.

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CHAPTER 2

Core Values and Support for Anti-Terrorism Actions

The attacks by Al Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building on September 11, 2001 drew America's attention to the realities of terrorism. This event led the Bush administration to change its foreign policy in a fundamental way. In response to these attacks, the Bush administration invaded both Afghanistan - to capture Osama bin Laden and destroy Al Qaeda - and Iraq - to remove Saddam Hussein in 2003. The rationale for the two invasions was to secure Americans from terrorist attacks and establish democracy in the Islamic countries of the Middle East. A majority of Americans supported President Bush's decision to go to war with Afghanistan and Iraq. What made the public support the Bush administration's militant anti-terrorism measures? How much impact did values have on Americans' support for sending troops to attack terrorist camps or to topple an unfriendly regime in another part of the world?

Scholars (e.g.,Lippmann 1955; Almond 1950) argued that the mass public is unable to form consistent, coherent, and stable policy preferences and attitudes due to lack of political interest and information. While these scholars describe the mass public as a collective group who are influenced by emotional appeal and mood in making policy preferences and attitudes, it was Converse(1964) who emphasized the lack of constraints in the belief systems among individuals. According to him, except for a few sophisticated segments of the citizenry, most citizens fail to organize their attitudes with coherence and consistency because of lack

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of ideological constraints. In a similar vein, Zaller(1992) proposes that citizens form their opinions "as they go along" by sampling attitudes from off the top of their heads.

Despite this pessimism, a majority of studies of public opinion on foreign policy have shifted toward taking positive views on citizens' abilities to form coherent, structured, and reasonable opinions (e.g.,Holsti 1992; Wittkopf 1990; Richman et al.1997; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). These studies propose such values – internationalism versus isolationism, and militarism versus cooperative internationalism - as important elements of belief systems that help the public to organize their attitudes and preferences. Furthermore, others (e.g., Jentelson 1992, Jentelson and Britton 1998) suggest that citizens taken into account national interest and engage in rationally weighing cost and benefits in sending troops. Agreeing with such views on the abilities of the mass public, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) go further by asserting that citizens not only adopt such dispositions as isolationism (or internationalism) and cooperative (or militant) internationalism in support of war in various situations but also take into account situational factors (e.g., U.S. interests, the relative power of the potential adversary, the possession of nuclear weapons, the attacker's motivation, the political culture, or a respect for sovereignty) when they support going to war. According to their findings, Americans are almost perfectly rational in making decisions to intervene militarily in world affairs. Some scholars (Mueller 1994; Page and Shapiro 1992) also stress that mass public attitudes on foreign policy are consistent and coherent across time and that they are rational.

These studies have contributed to enhancing our understanding of how the American public understands and makes decisions on foreign policy by employing heuristics, values, beliefs, and taking into account objective conditions and national interests. However, they

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leave open questions regarding what types of values citizens adopt to shape their opinions on foreign policy; whether value dependency always leads to consistent opinions and judgments; and how citizens' political knowledge fosters or constrains their use of values in forming foreign policy opinions. This chapter attempts to answer these questions by examining Americans' support for militant anti-terrorism measures.

The current situation has given scholars a natural condition for capturing Americans' opinions about military intervention in time of war with the unprecedented 9/11 attack on American soil by Al Qaeda and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Up to now most public opinion studies have not been able to examine how Americans would react to foreign attacks on American soil due simply to the absence of such events. Most studies that have contributed to our understanding of how Americans form their opinions on sending troops or taking militant actions were conducted under the scenarios in which American allies were attacked by potentially hostile nations. These studies examined how Americans reacted to wars when American security and interests were not directly threatened. Thus, the examination of the sources of public opinion on anti-terrorism measures in light of recent circumstances might provide a different picture from the ones developed in previous studies based on simulated situations.

2.1. Values

Previous studies offer two different hypotheses in terms of the role of core values in shaping Americans' policy attitudes. One group of scholars (e.g., Feldman 1988; Conover and Feldman 1984; Sears 1993) argue that values have a *direct* impact on Americans' attitudes toward domestic policies due to the characteristics of affective attachments, salience, and

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guiding principles. Rokeach (1973) emphasizes direct and close relationships between values and attitudes by drawing attention to the universal character of values. According to him, values are "standards that guide on-going activities" (ibid, 12). Thus, values would have a direct effect on behaviors and attitudes in general. On the other hand, Hurwitz and Peffley(1987) suggest an indirect relationship between core values and policy preferences. According to them, political postures mediate the influence of core values. Similarly, most studies (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Wittkopf 1986; Holsti 1992; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) on public opinion on foreign policy pay exclusive attention to the structure and influence of dispositions or postures - e.g., militarism and internationalism – which they distinguish from core values in shaping citizens' foreign policy opinions. In line with traditional studies of public opinion on domestic policies, I expect that values will have a *direct* impact on Americans' formation of opinions and attitudes.

What types of values are prominent in understanding Americans' choices regarding anti-terrorism measures? Although major theorists of international politics do not show an interest in explaining the mass public's behavior, they provide examples of values that may play a pivotal role in determining citizens' opinions on foreign policy. Realists (e.g. Morgenthau 1973; Morgenthau 1952; Kennan 1984) criticize such values - humanitarianism, democracy, international cooperation, and world peace - as "Utopian" ideals and believe strategic national interests are a more important basis for foreign policy. Even though they do not apply strictly dichotomous notions of "values" and "national interests", they emphasize the priority of national interests in making foreign policy. According to Morgenthau (1952), national interests (e.g., a nation's physical security, the protection of economic interests, and the maintenance of superior military power) should be the most important

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standards for foreign policy decision making. He warned that citizens are easily motivated and persuaded by utopian ideals.

Liberalists, on the other hand, (e.g. Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000; Doyle 1986) believe that values – human rights, democracy, permanent peace – should be the primary goal of the U.S. foreign policy. Although there are important differences among liberalists, they all agree on the preeminence of values in foreign policy and argue that they can be achieved by international cooperation under international laws and institutions. The debate between these two main theoretical groups suggests what types of values we should consider as those that occupy a central place in forming Americans' opinions on foreign policy. We examine two prominent values – humanitarianism and democracy.

A major reason for using these two values comes from the historical, social, and political contexts that bring these values to the forefront in American foreign policy. The centrality and salience of values is closely related to the historical and political contexts of American foreign policy. How these two values are deeply rooted in American culture and tradition will be examined briefly in the following section. Before I begin to explore the importance of these two values, I will lay out the concept of values that I follow for this study.

Previous studies adopted different definitions and measures to study values and their effects on political attitudes. Rokeach(1973, 7) defines a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence." Similarly Schwartz (1992, 4) notes that values "(1)are concepts of beliefs, (2) pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (5) ordered by relative importance." As they both share similar characteristics of values

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Rokeach(ibid) and Schwartz (1992, 1994) use the question, "What is the most important goal for your life?" to measure the values. However, other scholars (e.g., Feldman 1988; Conover and Feldman 1984) construct a measure for a value using questions that tap citizens' beliefs on abstract ideas or policies. Peffley and Hurwitz(1987) employ a still different standard for building a measure for value out of their concern to separate core values from political postures. They suggest that if questions are pertinent to individuals' priorities and concerns, they measure a value; but if questions mention individuals' normative beliefs on government, then they measure postures.

I used the definition of a value based on Rokeach(ibid) and Schwartz(1992;1994). But I modify the definition and define a value as "an enduring belief that a specific end state is morally or normatively preferable to an alternative end state for a person or society." By adding abstract moral aspects of values I want to distinguish values from personal or national self-interest. If we do not distinguish between values which have moral and evaluative characteristics and material interests, it is impossible to undertake the task of testing theories of values and rational choice which is based on material interests. In this sense, Rokeach's definition of values does not serve the purpose without modification. Also, it is necessary to note that the measures of two values – democracy and humanitarianism - are categorized as "national identity" by Richman and others (1997) in their study of the structure of belief systems of the mass public. I separate them because they represent two different aspects of the "national identity" of the United States. Thus, a value can be defined as a belief in normative and abstract goals that serves as a guiding principle for a person or a society. Furthermore, I follow Staub's (1989) distinction between values and goals. Values and goals are connected, but they differ, because values reflect moral implications. Goals, instead, are

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more "self-related" and "refer to desired outcomes that have no direct relationship to others' well being" (ibid, 46). The survey questions that I used for constructing values asked about goals, but the content of the questions reflect abstract and moral ideas of helping others and of the realization of democracy.

2.1.1. Democracy and U.S. foreign policy

As scholars (Tocqueville 1966; Myrdal 1944; Hartz 1955) have pointed out, liberal democracy and democratic ideals are at the core of American culture, which differentiates America from Old Europe and sets it apart from other parts of the world.. Tocqueville (ibid) characterizes America as a society in which equality of conditions prevails. He suggests that geographic isolation, ample economic opportunities, favorable social conditions, and an intellectual heritage from England that also included Enlightenment ideals contribute to supporting an American democracy in which equality, freedom, and property rights are guaranteed. Similarly Myrdal (ibid) asserts that America differs from other countries in that it is unified under an American Creed which represents the combined the ideals of "the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity" (ibid,4). Myrdal goes further by stressing that "the American Creed is identified with America's peculiar brand of nationalism, and it gives the common American his feeling of the historical mission of America in the world"(ibid,5.)[1]

Studies (e.g. Encarnacion 2005; Osgood 1953; Hunt 1987) on the nature and history of American foreign policy suggest that Americans engage in wars in the name of freedom

[1]He emphasizes this point by saying that "American nationalism is permeated by the American Creed, and therefore becomes international in its essence." (Myrdal 1944, 6)

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and democracy. Protecting democracy in America and spreading it to other parts of the world was a critical mission for the nation throughout its history, although this tradition of messianic missionary ambition has fluctuated over time. President Wilson's efforts to spread democracy in Mexico by sending troops in 1914 is an exemplary case of a crusade for ideals (Encarnacion ibid). Although this tradition of idealism faced severe criticism during the Cold War period from realists (e.g., Kennan and Morgenthau), still Presidents Carter and Reagan stressed the importance of democracy and human rights as defining elements of American national identity and primary foreign policy goals.

The call for putting democracy as of the utmost importance on the foreign policy agenda peaked after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Scholars and pundits from liberalists (e.g. Diamond 1992; Allison and Beschel 1992; Talbott 1996) and neoconservatives (e.g. Kristol and Kagan 1996), who observed this collapse and a series of newly independent countries struggling to establish democracy in Eastern Europe, argued that promoting democracy should be the centerpiece of the United States' foreign policy. For example, Diamond (1992), like other liberalists, suggested that promoting democracy should be the major foreign policy goal of the United States, because democracy is a morally justifiable choice and that fostering democracy would guarantee the security of the United States. Unexpectedly the same call came from neo-conservative pundits (e.g., Kristol and Kagan 1995), who also argued that spreading democracy in the world should be the most important foreign policy goal. They argued that, in light of the radically changed international political situation, it would be consistent with the national interests of the United States to spread democracy into other parts of the world. To them, there is a convergence between pursuing a universal moral principle and national interests, a position with which many liberalists agreed after the end of

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the Cold War.[2] This theoretical perspective is a departure from that of the classical realists (e.g., Morgenthau 1952, Kennan 1984). However, each group takes a different path in terms of how to achieve the goal of establishing democracy. Liberalists (e.g., Diamond 1992; Allison and Beschel 1992) do not support a unilateral approach and are very cautious to exert American influence in the promotion of democracy, while the neo-conservative theorists opt for unilateral methods and seek the goal more aggressively.

Despite the central role of democracy as a major American foreign policy goal, studies on public opinion provide little information on whether and how interest in the pursuit of democracy influences mass public opinion on foreign affairs. In studying Americans' opinions on various foreign policy goals, Holsti (2000) points out that Americans' support for promoting democracy is lower than other foreign policy goals, even now that the Cold War has ended and the conditions are favorable for pursuing this goal. Although this result informs us of the level of popularity of pursuing democracy as a foreign policy goal before 9/11, it cannot tell us whether this tendency has continued since the incident. Also, the study leaves unanswered the question of how much impact the passion for democracy will have on citizens' foreign policy attitudes.

2.1.2. Humanitarianism and U.S. Foreign Policy

While democracy is an important political value that Americans are proud of and a critical component of the American ethos, humanitarianism is another core value that is deeply rooted in American society. As Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) note, studies suggest that humanitarianism was a strong source for abolitionist movements (Haskell 1985a; Haskell

[2]See Cox and others (2000) for a discussion of different theoretical perspectives on the promotion of democracy as the most important foreign policy goal.

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1985b), charity and philanthropy (McCarthy 1989), and communal efforts to help the needy through charity (Boorstin 1987) in the history of the United States. The sense of responsibility for human beings who suffer or are in need also was been stressed by early settlers' religious beliefs (e.g., Winthrop). Also Tocqueville (ibid, 571) observed that humanitarianism, which is represented as voluntary and mutual help for the needy, is prevalent in the United States.

In addition to the historical and cultural roots of humanitarianism in American history, a number of studies have noted the importance of humanitarianism in understanding Americans' attitudes and opinions. In their study of Americans' attitudes toward welfare, Feldman and Zaller (1992) assert that citizens justify their support for welfare policies with humanitarian motivations. Furthermore, in a more extensive study of the role of humanitarianism in explaining Americans' policy preferences, Feldman and Marco (2001) argue that humanitarianism, which they distinguish from egalitarianism, is a major source for Americans' support for welfare policies. Hewett (1997) claims that humanitarianism accounts not only for citizens' support for domestic social welfare policies but also for providing international aid and humanitarian interventions in other parts of the world during the 1990s.

The characteristics of humanitarianism that are separate those of from democracy or other political values originate from its pro-social orientation (e.g. Feldman and Marco 2001; Staub 1989; Eisenberg, Reykowski, and Staub 1989). According to Staub (1989, 50) values can be categorized into two groups: a person-oriented morality and a rule-oriented morality. The person-oriented morality is called "pro-social orientation," which consists of "a positive evaluation of human beings, concern about their welfare, and feelings of personal responsibility for people's welfare." As Feldman and Steenbergen (ibid, 660-661) have pointed out,

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humanitarianism reflects the substantial characteristics of pro-social orientation in that it requires a sense of responsibility for the hardships of other human beings and necessitates "personal reactions" to the problems of people. Furthermore, these personal reactions are closely linked to emotional feelings toward people who are in need. This sympathy toward the needy plays a strong role in explaining Americans' foreign policy preferences.

Humanitarianism is related with democracy. But democracy entails political institutions and norms while humanitarianism relates to non-political values.[3] In line with previous studies (Feldman and Marco 2001; Gibney 1999), I define humanitarianism as a moral principle that reflects a sense of responsibility for human beings who are in need, under stress, or suffering, even though they are strangers. They should be assisted because they are human beings, regardless of their political orientations and national identity. The emphasis on sensibility and need-based help appeals to broad the population and distinguishes humanitarianism from other political values. This definition of humanitarianism is close to that of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which emphasizes humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and universality as principles of humanitarianism and humanitarian acts (Chandler 2001; Barnett 2005).

2.2. A Theory of Sources of Public Support for Anti-terrorism Measures

The major theoretical questions that I attempt to answer in this chapter are these: What is the impact of the values of humanitarianism and democracy? How does their impact change relative to political sophistication? In examining the impact of values, we expect

[3]The debate on the definition of human rights shows that it is very difficult to distinguish humanitarianism from human rights, since human rights include an array of rights, from basic rights – economic and social– to political rights (e.g., freedom from torture or the right to free expression). See Donnelly (1989) for a theoretical discussion and history of human rights.

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that democracy and humanitarianism will each have a substantial and distinct influence on public support for militant anti-terrorism measures. These two core values will have a *direct* impact on anti-terrorism measures but the *direction* of their respective impacts on anti-terrorism measures will be different.

According to realists (e.g., Morgenthau 1952; Mearsheimer 2001), the appeal for the promotion of democracy will have a significant influence on public attitudes regarding retaliatory anti-terrorism measures. It is far easier to mobilize citizens' support for going to war or attacking enemies by appealing to ideals and universal values. Similarly, some scholars (e.g. Lieven 2004; Pei 2003; McCartney 2004) argue that the pursuit of the spread of democracy is a revelation of American nationalism and of a missionary vision in world politics, which leads to support for an imperialistic approach to international affairs. Furthermore, this passion will be combined with patriotism when America engages in war with its enemies and will foster more aggressive attitudes toward other countries and peoples. According to this argument, we should expect that Americans who are inspired by the idea of spreading democracy would support hawkish anti-terrorism measures.

Humanitarianism will reduce support for hard-line anti-terrorism measures due to the characteristics inherent in this particular value. As humanitarianism reflects sympathy toward the needy, the hungry, refugees, and the poor, those who are committed to humanitarianism will opt for measures that are consistent with their concern for relieving human suffering and that could avoid endangering civilians. This expectation is consistent with the policies and activities of some humanitarian groups that attempt to focus on substantial human rights, both social and economic, and that emphasize the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. By focusing its attention on relieving people's social and economic

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hardships, those who cherish humanitarianism will be averse to supporting anti-terrorism measures that could afflict large numbers of civilians. Especially when the terror threats from external groups or individuals are not so imminent as in the 9/11 attacks, those who care about humanitarianism will not support forceful and unilateral measures in dealing with terrorism.

The second hypothesis that I am examining is the impact of these two values according to the level of political sophistication. There are two competing views on how the public uses values in policy preference formation. One group of scholars (e.g., Feldman 1988, 1983; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) assumes that most citizens adopt core values and beliefs to determine their policy preferences. According to this group, citizens who may lack political sophistication and knowledge can still form stable and consistent policy preferences and attitudes by depending upon values. Since core values have heuristic characteristics of easy accessibility, emotional attachment, and salience, most citizens are easily able to use them to form their policy preferences. Thus, according to them, Americans will employ democracy and humanitarianism to form their attitudes toward anti-terrorism measures regardless of their level of political sophistication.

However, the other group (e.g. Zaller 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001) emphasizes the heterogeneity of the masses in the level of political sophistication. They assert that individuals who are equipped with political knowledge are more likely to maintain well organized belief structures and are able to use heuristics of reasoning effectively. More sophisticated individuals are more likely to be capable of employing values and other political dispositions to explain their policy preferences than the less sophisticated individuals. But, Goren (2001) finds mixed results: while citizens

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deduce their policy preferences from core values and beliefs in many cases, their political expertise interacts with their use of values (e.g., egalitarianism, individualism, or moral conservatism) in explaining their policy preferences only in limited cases. Such studies revealing the conditional effects of political knowledge, leave open some questions about the relationship between values and policies or the objects of political judgments. While sophisticated citizens are more likely to use values to form their opinions and attitudes, they are not always different from those held by less sophisticated citizens.

The interaction of values and levels of sophistication may depend on the characteristics of the questions upon which citizens make decisions and the values at stake. For example, both democracy and humanitarianism share the characteristics of universal and "terminal" value – moral and normative goals – but they differ in their level of appeal. Although it is difficult to set them in a clear hierarchy with one another, humanitarianism would seem to hold a more fundamental appeal than democracy. Like Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs, values can be ranked. If that is possible, humanitarianism would rank higher than democracy given its characteristics of neutrality and humanity. Thus, humanitarianism may hold a stable influence over different levels of sophistication, while a passion for democracy may vary in its effects across sophistication levels. Further variability of the interaction may come from the characteristics of the objects of judgment. If citizens have to make decisions that are more contentious, their sophistication levels will make a greater difference in terms of using values. In this case, the more sophisticated individuals may hold on to values to justify their choices (e.g., Deli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 235-38). Alternatively, knowledgeable individuals may be able to give up their attachment to values or dispositions, since they can process information more appropriately (e.g. Mueller 1973). The interaction

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between political sophistication and values is not simple and homogeneous but depends on the characteristics of the values involved and the judgment tasks required. We will examine a hypothesis regarding the interaction between political knowledge and the use of values.

Two hypotheses are drawn from these discussions. *The first hypothesis* notes that both humanitarianism and democracy promotion will have a direct significant impact on militant anti-terrorism measures. Given that the Bush administration combined national security with moralism by emphasizing democracy and freedom, it is expected that both humanitarianism and democracy promotion will affect specific anti-terrorism measures; but the direction of the two values will be different. As humanitarianism represents sympathy toward human beings, if anti-terrorism measures demands costly actions, those who cherish humanitarianism will oppose the actions. However, those who champion democracy promotion will be more likely to be supportive of militant anti-terrorism measures because of the characteristics of values and political context.

The second hypothesis tests the proposition that political knowledge will differentiate the adoption of values in defining individuals' anti-terrorism measures. If values play an important role in explaining policy preferences as heuristics, politically knowledgeable individuals should be able to adopt them more aptly than less knowledgeable individuals. Thus, there will be an interaction between knowledge and the values in explaining anti-terrorism measures. The relationship between humanitarianism and support for anti-terrorism will differ by knowledge level. Similarly, the relationship between democracy promotion and support for anti-terrorism measures will differ by knowledge level. Among the less knowledgeable individuals the relationship between these values and support for anti-terrorism measures will be weaker than among the more knowledgeable individuals.

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In addition to values, two groups of independent variables should be noted for their contribution to accounting for Americans' support for anti-terrorism measures. One group of variables includes political dispositions that have been discussed in previous studies. In addition to political ideology and partisanship, militarism, internationalism versus isolationism, and concern for national interests are the major variables that have been noted by scholars. Some studies (e.g., Wittkopf 1986; Holsti 1992; Richman et al., 1997) assert that Americans' belief systems are organized with distinctive dimensions along the lines of these dispositions. As Peffley and Hurwitz (1987) have proposed, these postures will directly guide citizens' attitudes toward anti-terrorism measures. People who believe that maintaining superior military power in world politics will be more likely to support hard line policies against terrorism. However, those who believe in cooperation with other countries and international organizations will be more likely to be reluctant to support hard line policies. Similarly, those who are concerned about national economic interests are more likely to be supportive of militant anti-terrorism measures.

Another source of support for anti-terrorism measures may be citizens' perceptions of threats of future terrorist attacks. Several studies (Herrmann et al.1999; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998) show that Americans are more likely to support sending troops to other parts of the world if they feel that American interests are threatened by foreign aggressors. Similarly, Leonie, Stanley, Charles, and Gallya (2005) demonstrate that Americans who feel threatened are significantly more likely to support a variety of types of anti-terrorism measures, which range from sacrificing civil liberties to the adoption of anti-Arab policies to taking military action in Afghanistan. Other control variables include age, gender, political knowledge, party identification, and ideology.

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2.3. Data and Measures

The survey was conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations through the Internet. Knowledge Networks (KN) administered the survey between July 6 and July 12 in 2004 to 1,195 adults aged 18 or older. The respondents were selected randomly from KN's panel and answered the questions on their computers at home. In the random selection process, KN employed list-assisted Random Digit Dialing (RDD) sampling techniques from the entire United States telephone population. Once the telephone numbers were selected with equal probability, an advance mail was sent to respondents informing them that they had been selected to participate in the KN Panel. A sample was selected randomly from active panel members.[4]

2.3.1. Anti-terrorism Measures

As theorists and policy makers suggest, there are no agreed measures of anti-terrorism. The debate on how to deal with international terrorism was at the center of the political arena following the 9/11 attack. This survey covered a range of policies. Respondents were asked whether they favored or opposed each anti-terrorism measure. The options included: using air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities; deploying U.S. ground troops to attack terrorist training camps and other facilities; toppling unfriendly regimes

[4]An Internet survey has the benefit of allowing respondents more time before they answers questions. Also it can reduce the possibility of respondents giving "socially desirable" answers. But this survey method is not exactly the same as the face-to-face interview. According to the Topline report from the CCFR (2004), there is a modal difference among the three surveys: telephone survey, face-to-face survey, and computer based survey. But the difference between face-to-face and internet surveys is not so great as between face-to-face and telephone surveys. Still, it is necessary to be cautious in comparing surveys. This possible bias will be addressed more fully in the Appendix B.

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that support terrorist groups threatening the U.S.; and assassinating individual terrorist leaders. These questions covered the real options for U.S. anti-terrorism measures.

2.3.2. Values and Dispositions

To measure democracy as a value, we ask whether respondents consider helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations to be a very important, somewhat important, or not important goal for the U.S. government. According to this survey, about 71% of Americans believe that spreading democracy - a universal political value - is a somewhat or very important goal in their government's foreign. Only about 28% of Americans think that democracy should not be an important goal in foreign policy.[5]

For the measure of humanitarianism, two questions were used: Should combating world hunger be an important goal? Should the U.S. help to improve the standard living of less developed nations? An overwhelming majority (89%) of citizens say that combating world hunger should be either a very important (48%) or somewhat important (41%) goal for the U.S. government. Similarly, a high percentage (78%) of Americans believe that helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries is an important goal for the U.S. government. The correlation of these two questions is .56, which shows the items are closely related.[6] The two items were added to construct a humanitarianism scale. Overall, Americans give higher priority to humanitarianism than to democracy, although the support for democracy is still a large majority. As we expected, the two values, democracy and humanitarianism, are related, but they reflect two different values. The correlation between the two is .35.

[5]The report of marginal percentages includes the respondents who said "don't know."
[6]A measure for scale reliability, Cronbach's alpha, is .71, which shows a decent level of reliability.

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2.3.2.1. Other political dispositions and perceived threats. To measure militarism, respondents are asked whether maintaining superior military power world wide is an important goal or not. The highest percentage (91%) of Americans believes that maintaining the status of super power in the world is a critical goal. Only about 7 percent of the people do not agree with maintaining super power status as a U.S. foreign policy goal. It seems clear that an overwhelming majority of Americans believe in the importance of military power. This may be a result of the experience of the 9/11 attack, which implies that concern for security is a fundamental motivation.

A traditional political disposition in international politics is isolationism versus internationalism. Respondents were asked "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" About 68 percent of Americans believe that actively engaging in world affairs will be best for the country, while 29 percent of Americans support isolationism.

For the instrumental consideration we construct a measure of material interests by using questions tapping respondents' concerns regarding jobs and energy. When respondents were asked whether "protecting the jobs of American workers" should be an important foreign policy goal or not, almost 97% of respondents said that it should be a somewhat important or an important goal. Only 1.5% of respondents said it is not an important goal. Similarly, about 96% of respondents believe that "securing adequate supplies of energy" should be an important foreign policy goal. Along with "militarism," these two questions address people's basic needs: physical security as a nation and economic security. Although Americans believe in high end values like democracy and humanitarianism by a large margin, their concerns for their own self-interest realized in national and economic security is significantly higher

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than those for values. In this sense, realists' concerns for Americans' lack of consideration of national interests in supporting foreign policies may be unfounded.

To measure the perception of threat, we used the question regarding whether international terrorism is a critical, an important but not critical or not an important threat to the vital interests of the United States over the next 10 years. As we expected, 98% of Americans believe that international terrorism is either a critical or an important threat to the vital interests of the U.S. Partisanship is a 7 category variable: low values stand for Republicans (strong, not so strong, leaning Republicans), middle values for Independents, and high values for Democrats (leaning, not so strong, strong Democrats). Ideology is measured on 7 scale ranges from low (extremely conservative, conservative, slightly conservative) to high (slightly liberal, liberal, and extremely liberal). Age ranges from 18 to 95. Male is measured as 1 and female 0.

Two items were used to measure political knowledge. Respondents were asked whether they knew the name of a common currency that the European Union has introduced and the name of the current Secretary General of the United Nations. About 28% of the respondents answer correctly and 72% gave a wrong answer (this includes those who said they didn't know or who refused to answer) for the name of the Secretary General of the UN. Respondents who correctly named the currency of the EU numbered about 56%, the remaining 44% of respondents answering wrong. Since the questions were open-ended questions, the percentages of respondents who answer correctly are low compared to other political knowledge questions that had been used in other studies (e.g., Deli Carpini and Keeter 1997). Two items were combined linearly.[7] The added variable has three categories: low, middle, and

[7]The correlation of the two items is .39 and the alpha scale of the two was .549. This shows that both items are moderately correlated to construct a measure.

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high. Those who fail to give any correct answers are placed in the low (about 42%); those who correctly answer any one of two questions, in the middle (38%); and those who give correct answers for both questions, in the high knowledge category (20%).[8]

2.4. Findings

2.4.1. Values and Support for Military Anti-terrorism Measures

We expected that humanitarianism and support for democracy will have substantial but different impacts relative to hard-line military anti-terrorism measures. As the core of humanitarianism is in sympathy and compassion for the needy and the weak, the effect of humanitarianism on hard-line anti-terrorism measures will be negative. On the other hand, as the championing of democracy is based on both universal principles and active moral superiority, it will increase the support for a variety of hard-line anti-terrorism measures. Among the militant anti-terrorism measures, using air strikes to counter international terrorism was the most popular. An absolute majority of Americans (82.8%) favored attacking terrorist training camps and other facilities by air strike. The second best option for the respondents among the military measures was sending ground troops to attack terrorists' facilities and camps. About 75% of the citizens supported the option of dealing with terrorists by deploying ground troops. The percentage of those who supported assassinating individual terrorist leaders was high, too (67 %), although it is not as high as other military options. Americans' support for an option which was at the center of the debates before the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq – toppling an unfriendly regime that supports terrorist groups threatening the US – is quite high (67%). Given that the survey was taken

[8]In the interaction models, the political knowledge variable is dichotomized instead of using the ordinal level variable.

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almost a year after the Iraq invasion and that President Bush had already shifted the rationale for the invasion from the Hussein regime's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction - which turned out to be wrong information - to building a democracy in Iraq and spreading democracy in the Middle East, this high level of support for the option may not be such a surprise.[9]

The probit model estimation results in Table 1 show that while traditional dispositions in international politics (e.g., militarism and internationalism), concern for national interest, and threat exert strong impacts on Americans' attitudes regarding militant anti-terrorism measures, humanitarianism and democracy maintain their substantive effect. A higher level of humanitarianism reduces support for the options of assassinating terrorist leaders, sending ground troops to attack terrorist training camps and facilities, adopting air strikes to bomb the camps and facilities, and toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups threatening the U.S. As the core characteristic of humanitarianism is sympathy for the needy who suffer from hunger, wars, and natural disasters, those who have higher level of humanitarianism will be less likely to be supportive of policies that may hurt innocent civilians and involve politically debatable options. This salient role of humanitarianism may be the result of the invasion of Iraq, as the war did not unfold as the Bush administration had planned. The high causalities among civilians and chaotic situations in Iraq may actually increase the effect of humanitarianism. On the other hand, a higher level of concern for democracy is associated with higher support for sending ground troops and employing air strikes to attack terrorist training camps and facilities, assassinating terrorist leaders and toppling unfriendly

[9]There is a study which shows that misinformation on the WMD is the major source of support for Bush (Kull, Ramsay, and Evan 2003). They argue that those who watch Fox news are significantly more likely to believe in the existence of the WMD in Iraq and to support the invasion.

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regimes that support terrorists. This substantive impact of democracy is consistent with scholars'(e.g., McCartney 2004; Lieven 2004) concerns that a passion for democracy has the potential danger of ignoring the sovereignty of a nation and could lead to the pursuit of imperialistic policies.

Table 2.1: Sources of Support for Retaliatory Anti-Terrorism Measures

	Air Strike	Send Troop	Assassination	Toppling Regime
Humanitarianism	-0.63**	-0.33*	-0.89***	-0.78***
	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Democracy	0.57**	0.55***	0.31*	1.27***
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Militarism	1.03***	0.94***	1.08***	0.63***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
National Interest	0.70**	0.44*	0.76**	0.39+
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Internationalism	0.10	0.19*	0.02	0.25**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Party (high=Demo.)	-0.22	-0.24+	-0.43**	-0.62***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Ideology (high=liberal)	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	-0.44*
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Gender(1=male)	0.31**	0.09	0.08	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Knowledge	0.09	-0.18+	-0.13	-0.79***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	-0.64**	-0.47*	-0.57**	-0.39*
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Threat	0.35**	0.40***	0.07	0.29**
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)

Continued on next page...

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... table 2.1 continued

	Air Strike	Send Troop	Assassination	Toppling Regime
_cons	-0.77*	-1.09**	-0.21	-0.26
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.35)
N	1,070	1,068	1,059	1,062
Log Likelihood	-348.42	-477.36	-561.75	-511.71
Pseudo R^2	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.21

Table entries are Probit estimation coefficients with estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
$***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1$; one-tailed

The influence of humanitarianism and democracy is substantial when we examine the size of coefficients and significance levels. All the coefficients are statistically significant at a level of at least .10. A way to compare the relative impact of the two variables in the probit estimation is to examine the estimated changes in probability. The predicted probability change for humanitarianism in explaining support for toppling unfriendly regimes that supports terrorists is -.24. This means that the support for toppling unfriendly regimes will go down by .24 as the humanitarianism level moves from low to high while all other variables are set at their mean.[10] Similarly, the impact of democracy on support for toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorists is significant and substantial. The marginal effects of democracy on the support for toppling unfriendly regimes go up by .37 as the level of democracy moves from low to high. Among all the variables, the impact of democracy on

[10]The changes of probability were calculated by using the CLARIFY (Tomz, Jason, and King 2001; King, Michael, and Jason 2000). The predicted probability for each variable is obtained by setting all other variables at their mean.

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support for toppling unfriendly regimes is the largest. The implication of this finding will be discussed more fully in the discussion section.

Table 2.2. First Difference for the Sources of Support for Anti-Terrorism Measures

	Air Strike	Send Troop	Assassination	Toppling Regime
	change in probability	change in probability	change in probability	change in probability
Humanitarianism	-.10	-.08	-.29	-.24
Democracy	.09	.14	.10	.37
Militarism	.24	.29	.39	.22
National Interest	.17	.14	.28	.14
Interanationalism	.02	.05	.01	.09
Party (high=Demo.)	-.04	-.06	-.14	-.19
Ideology (high=liberal)	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.14
Gender(1=male)	.05	.02	.03	.03
Knowledge	.01	-.05	-.04	-.26
Age	-.12	-.19	-.19	-.12
Threat	.12	.03	.03	.11

Changes in probability were computed holding all other variables constant at their mean. Changes in probability are differences in the probability of supporting the polices as each predictor variable varies from low to high. CLARIFY(Tomz et al., 2001) was used for the calculation.

Regarding the support for assassinating terrorist leaders, the differential effect of humanitarianism is large and substantial. The probability drops by .29 as humanitarianism moves from low to high on the choice when all other variables are at their mean. Although the impact of democracy on this issue is less influential than on toppling unfriendly regimes,

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it is still significant. The support for assassinating terrorist leaders goes up .10 as passion for democracy moves from low to high. While the effect of humanitarianism on sending ground troops is insignificant, its influence on employing air strikes is somewhat significant. As we change the level of humanitarianism from low to high, the support for sending troops and employing air strikes will decrease by .08 and .10 respectively. Similarly, the support for these two options will increase by .14 and .9 respectively when we move the passion for democracy from low to high. The impact of humanitarianism is strong in the negative direction for the relatively unpopular policies, such as toppling regimes and assassinating terrorist leaders, while its influence is reduced in such policies as sending ground troops and bombing facilities.

Also there are other factors that account for the support for the various military options in question. As previous studies (e.g., Peffley and Hurwitz 1987; Hurrmann et al., 1999) have shown, the traditional international political postures like militarism play a significant role in shaping public attitudes toward militant anti-terrorism policies. The power of militarism is strong consistently across the four options. All the coefficients of militarism are statistically significant at a .05 level, and they are positive. Its impact is the greatest in support for assassinating terrorist leaders, which is the least popular option overall. The probability of support for assassinating terrorist leaders goes up by .39 as the level of militarism changes from low to high. Those who believe in maintaining military superiority as a necessary condition for survival in world politics are far more likely to support any type of retaliatory actions to deal with international terrorism assuming other factors are constant.

The effects of age, political knowledge, national economic interests, and the perception of threats of future terrorism are also significant and substantive in explaining Americans'

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support for toppling unfriendly regimes that help terrorists, assassinating terrorist leaders, sending troops and employing air strikes. A significant generation gap exists among Americans in their attitudes toward militant anti-terrorism measures. The older generations are far more likely to have concerns about supporting militant and retaliatory actions. For example, the level of support for assassinating terrorist leaders would drop by .19 if we change the range of age from low to high. The effects of political knowledge are negative and statistically significant in two estimations. The more knowledgeable citizens are the more likely to oppose using troops to attack the training camps and overthrowing an unfriendly government. Also the finding of a positive and substantive effect of the perceived threat of future terrorism on the approval of militant anti-terrorism measures is consistent with a previous study (Huddy et al. 2005). The more concerned about future terrorism citizens are, the more likely they are to support retaliatory anti-terrorism measures – adopting air strikes, sending troops, and subverting an unfriendly regime. Psychologically alerted citizens are substantively more likely to react to terrorism with antagonistic measures. In accordance with previous studies, the role of group interest is prevalent in influencing Americans' support for militant anti-terrorism measures. Those who are more concerned about national economic interests are significantly more likely to support toppling unfriendly regimes, assassinating terrorist leaders, sending troops and employing air strikes to deal with terrorism. The significant role played by a concern for national economic interests implies that citizens are motivated not only by abstract moral principles but also by their concerns for group-interests.

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2.4.2. Knowledge and the Use of Values in Forming Opinions

The effect of values on Americans' decisions to support retaliatory anti-terrorism measures is significant. Both passion for democracy and humanitarianism substantively affect how Americans react to militant anti-terrorism measures. A theoretical question that arises from the findings is whether these values are conditioned by political sophistication. As has been discussed above, two different predictions are suggested. Supposing that values are easily imbued through education and socialization and are central components of social culture that guide individuals' attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Sears 1993; Feldman 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 1987), we expect that political knowledge will not have a differential effect. Alternatively, politically sophisticated individuals will be able to adopt values more aptly due to the characteristics of values as heuristics and a differential level of expertise in reasoning (e.g., Lau et al., 2001; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). I attempt to answer the question by examining the interaction model. Specifically, it looks at how political knowledge levels influence the way citizens use values.

The results of interaction models are presented in Table 3. The differential effect of political knowledge fails to show up in 3 out of the 4 antagonistic anti-terrorism measures. But there is a differential effect in explaining the support for overthrowing an unfriendly government. The effect of core values – humanitarianism and democracy – on hard line militant anti-terrorism measures remains the same over different sophistication levels relative to support for using air strikes and troops to attack terrorist training camps and the assassination of terrorist leaders. Regardless of the level of political knowledge, those who are committed to humanitarianism are less likely to support any of the four anti-terrorism

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Table 2.3. Interaction Model of Support for Anti-Terrorism Measures

	Air Strike	Send Troop	Assassination	Toppling Regime
Humanitarianism	-0.84**	-0.25	-0.92***	-0.58*
	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Knowledge high *	0.36	-0.14	0.00	-0.39
Humanitarianism	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Democracy	0.49+	0.42+	0.53*	0.74**
	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Knowledge high *	0.12	0.20	-0.38	0.84**
Democracy	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Knowledge	-0.04	-0.18*	-0.15+	-0.54***
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Militarism	1.03***	0.92***	1.07***	0.61***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
National Interest	0.71**	0.46*	0.75**	0.48*
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)
Internationalism	0.11	0.20*	0.04	0.22*
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Party (high=Demo.)	-0.24	-0.24+	-0.44**	-0.60***
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Ideology (high=Lib.)	-0.05	-0.08	-0.04	-0.43*
	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Gender (1=male)	0.32**	0.09	0.08	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	-0.65**	-0.46*	-0.56**	-0.36*
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Threat	0.35**	0.41***	0.08	0.30**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
_cons	-0.84*	-1.03**	-0.54	-0.22
	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.36)
N	1,070	1,068	1,059	1,062
Log Likelihood	-347.95	-476.42	-560.29	-510.71
Pseudo R2	0.17	0.14	0.13	0.21

Table entries are Probit estimation coefficients with estimated standard errors are in parentheses. $***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1$; one-tailed test.

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Figure 2.1. Predicted Probability for toppling regime by democracy



measures. Similarly, those who cherish democracy as a foreign policy goal are more likely to support air bombing, sending troops to attack terrorist training camps, and assassinating terrorist leaders across different political knowledge levels. However, the effect of passion for democracy on support for overthrowing an unfriendly government is conditioned on political knowledge. The coefficient of the interaction between political knowledge and democracy is positive (b=.83) and statistically significant at a .01 level.

This demonstrates that the slope of democracy among the knowledgeable segment of citizens is significantly and positively related to support for invading a country and overthrowing an unfriendly government. The slope of democracy for the knowledgeable group is significantly steeper than the slope of democracy for the less knowledgeable group (see

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Figure 1).[11] An interesting finding is that the difference of the slope of democracy between the two groups is great when the level of support for the idea of spreading democracy is low. But as we move from a low to a high level of support for the idea of spreading democracy, the probability of endorsing the option of toppling unfriendly regimes converges for the two groups. Among the less knowledgeable group, the impact of democracy on the probability of supporting the option of subverting a regime does not change much with variations in the level of the advocacy for the idea of spreading democracy. Thus, the high level of support for the option remains almost the same as the strength of the advocacy of democracy changes from low to high. In contrast, the impact of democracy on the probability of support for overthrowing a regime does change significantly within the more knowledgeable group. Among knowledgeable group members, the support for toppling a regime by democracy was low, about .43 at the low level of democracy advocacy, but the support goes up to .8 at the high level of the advocacy of democracy. The effect of democracy increases but the rate of increase differs according to the level of political knowledge.

2.5. Conclusion and Discussion

The public support for retaliatory anti-terrorism policies depends significantly on its attachment to values. As has been demonstrated in this analysis, Americans' beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy play a central role in shaping their attitudes toward militant anti-terrorism measures. In accord with studies showing that core values play a significant role in forming attitudes and preferences in domestic policies, this study provides substantial evidence that values also *directly* define how Americans react to international affairs. The

[11]The effect of democracy on supporting for the regime change depends on whether political knowledge is "low" or "high." The predicted values for support for toppling a regime are derived from the estimates in Tale 3, holding constant all other variables at their mean.

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effect of the two core values considered varies according to political choices. Humanitarianism engenders significant opposition for the measures that ensure militant and retaliatory measures. In contrast, passion for democracy leads Americans to be supportive of air strikes, sending ground troops, and even assassinating terrorist leaders. More importantly, Americans who believe in the mission of spreading democracy seem to incline to ignore the sovereignty of a targeted nation and are willing to overthrow a government friendly to terrorists.

The two values – democracy and humanitarianism – are core columns of liberalist ideals in American foreign policy. But they engender contrasting reactions to terrorism. The idealistic passion for spreading democracy is one of the driving forces among the public for the support of overthrowing a government. When the Bush administration continuously emphasizes the grand and messianic idea of spreading democracy to other parts of the world as a major reason to invade Iraq, it strikes a chord with the public.[12] Like previous presidents, he followed the same route to justify his decision to invade Iraq. While President Bush repeatedly delivers addresses that justify the invasion as a means for spreading democracy, he scarcely mentions humanitarian aspects of the invasion. This study demonstrates that if he had emphasized pure humanitarian concerns (e.g., hungry children or inhuman treatment of captured soldiers, or innocent civilians' death by bombings), the administration's drive toward the invasion of Iraq is likely to have failed to gather public support.[13]

[12]The debate about the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is still going on, although it has officially been announced that there are no WMD in Iraq. The Bush administration shifted its focus on the reason behind the invasion of Iraq from the WMD threat to spreading democracy in the Middle East.
[13]President Bush clearly mentioned "human rights" as another goal of his foreign policy in a speech in 2002. But as we have discussed, that concept stresses political rights.

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Advocacy for democracy is a powerful source of public support not only for a radical measure, such as overthrowing a political regime by violating national sovereignty, but also for revengeful measures. This result is consistent with the scholars' view that passion for spreading democracy is a representation of American nationalism and patriotism (e.g., Lieven 2004; Pei 2003; McCartney 2004). As these scholars point out, patriotism and nationalistic pride expressed in the idea of spreading democracy drives people to ignore the major norms and principles of international politics, such as cooperation with other countries through international organizations and institutions, and respect for national sovereignty. On 9/11 the United States experienced unprecedented terrorist attacks and massive loss of civilian life, which unleashed such intense patriotic fervor that any criticism of the Bush administration was almost untenable. Under such circumstances it might not be surprising to find strong effects for nationalistic motivations in the name of democracy in making decisions to punish terrorists and to tackle problems of terrorism.

An alternative explanation for the strong effect of democracy in support for the overthrow of an unfriendly regime is that citizens and elites both want to justify the decision to engage in a war with other countries in the name of democracy or other idealistic values. Studies (e.g. Peceny 1999; Peceny 1995) show that presidents, who had to wage war against other countries, justified their decisions in the name of democracy. Similarly, realists (e.g., Morgenthau 1952; Mearsheimer 2001) argue that moral and abstract ideals always have a strong appeal for the public and that political leaders adopt rhetoric full of moralistic passion to justify their decisions to engage in wars. Thus, a moralistic passion or crusade for spreading democracy might simply be a rationalization for the decision to invade a country and topple its government.

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But this explanation makes sense only when we assume that the public as a collective body is homogeneously influenced by the rhetoric of political elites. The evidence from the interaction model suggests otherwise. The impact of passion for democracy on support for overthrowing an unfriendly regime is stronger among the more knowledgeable members of the public. This result suggests that citizens' support for overthrowing an unfriendly regime is not due to foreign policy decision makers' well orchestrated rhetorical appeal. The examination of the survey of political elites shows a similar tendency. Elites who believed in spreading democracy as a foreign policy goal are more likely to support subverting an unfriendly regime.[14] Thus, it is fairly conclusive that pursuit of a messianic dream of democracy, which may be considered a benign goal, is a prominent source of support for overthrowing an unfriendly regime as a way to protect American from terrorism.

In sharp contrast to passion for democracy, humanitarianism fosters opposition to most retaliatory military measures – using air strikes to bomb terrorist camps, assassinating terrorist leaders and subverting an unfriendly regime. This finding shows that it may be possible to dissuade Americans from supporting retaliatory anti-terrorism measures by appealing to humanitarianism. However, this appeal will be constrained in situations in which fear of terrorist attacks is high. The inhumane aspects of the invasion of Iraq have rarely been mentioned in the mass media and by elites. The salience or impact of a value on Americans' foreign policy attitudes can be influenced by elites and policy makers.

One important implication of the study of the role of values is that values as guiding principles do not always lead citizens to choose means which are consistent with the values held. In particular, support for the choice of overthrowing a government in the name of

[14]The CCFR survey of 2004 included a survey of elites. The correlation between democracy and support for overthrowing a regime is positive and significant.

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democracy is self-contradictory. Liberal internationalists (e.g., Cox et al., 2000; Ikenbery 2000) who supported the idea of spreading democracy in the 1990s were very careful not to intervene in domestic politics with force, so as to avoid self-contradiction and having charges of hypocrisy leveled at them. In this case, values perform their symbolic role in the manner that scholars (e.g., Sears 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996) of symbolic politics suggest. According to them, values constrain how individuals form their opinions, but they neither function instrumentally nor lead to optimal results. In this sense, values may function like prejudice, which will produce biased reasoning. However, this conclusion should be accepted only with qualification, since at least humanitarianism engenders opposition to retaliatory anti-terrorism measures, which is consistent with the characteristics of that value. At the very least, this study sounds a note of caution on the overwhelmingly optimistic views on the role of values in assisting citizens to make consistent opinions or attitudes.

Finally, an examination of the influence of political sophistication in differentiating how individuals adopt values suggests that individuals' use of values depends on the characteristics of those values (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1). For humanitarianism there is no substantial and significant difference in explaining support for retaliatory anti-terrorism actions between more knowledgeable and less knowledgeable groups of citizens. This universal effect of humanitarianism supports the proposition that citizens adopt values to deduce their policy preferences regardless of their knowledge level and is consistent with findings from previous studies (e.g., Feldman 1988; Conover and Feldman 1984).

The only exception to this pattern is the interaction between democracy and knowledge level in explaining citizens' support for overthrowing a regime. This particular case illustrates more than the simple expectation that sophisticated individuals are more likely to be able

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to use values as a guiding principle. The way in which knowledgeable individuals connect advocacy of democracy to their support for subverting a regime is significantly different from the way less knowledgeable individuals do. The change of probability of support for overthrowing a regime is larger along the change of the level of advocacy of democracy among the knowledgeable group. This exceptional interaction between democracy and knowledge in explaining support for subverting a regime may be due to the characteristics of the task. Because the option of overthrowing an unfriendly regime is the most demanding, difficult, and unusual choice, individuals' knowledge plays a significant role in how they link with their values and the choice (cf, Alvarez and Brehm 2002). As we can note in the Figure 1, among the less knowledgeable individuals the probability of support for the option by advocating the spread of democracy was high from the beginning and does not change much, even if we move from the low to high level of such advocacy. By contrast, the differential power of democracy with regard to support for toppling a regime was large among the knowledgeable individuals (e.g., Mueller 1973; Hermann et al. 1999). In sum, the pattern of interaction between the two values and knowledge suggests that knowledge does not differentiate the impact of values, except in cases of explaining a demanding choice.

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CHAPTER 3

The Impact of 9/11 and the Invasion of Iraq on Foreign Policy Values

Studies have suggested that values play a significant role in citizens' belief systems by constraining the elements of their belief systems and organizing and structuring their attitudes and behaviors (Feldman 1988; Kinder 1985; Conover and Feldman 1984). Furthermore, individuals who lack political knowledge, motivation, and resources can come up with reasonable choices and form consistent opinions by using values as heuristics or information short cuts (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Sniderman et al 1992; Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994). All of these studies are attempts to counter Converse's(1964) non- attitude thesis, which holds that the majority of citizens have inconsistent and unstable attitudes because they lack political information and ideological constraints. While these studies have enhanced our understanding of how Americans can organize their opinions and attitudes around core values and principles, they have not focused on how values relate to other political dispositions and social and political conditions. More important, we know little about how individuals' attachments to values change over time at both the macro and micro levels. In this chapter I examine the question: how do political events influence individuals' attachments to values?

3.1. Theories of Values Change

Do individuals' attachments to values change? If so, what is the driving force and pattern of change over time? Studies suggest that, although values are relatively stable, they change

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over time due to changes in socio-political conditions as well as personal motivations. The change can be at the collective level (e.g., Inglehart 1981; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1981) or the individual level (Rokeach 1973). Rokeach (1973) elaborates on the mechanism of changes of values and attitudes at the micro level. According to him, individuals change their values if they find contradictions between their self-conception and the values in which they believe. His experimental studies show that individuals who realize a discrepancy between their self-conception and their values (e.g., freedom and equality) are more likely to modify their values, value-related attitudes, and behaviors.

Inglehart (1981) proposes that, when the socialization process due to economic change influences individuals to pursue higher order needs rather than lower order needs, they shift their values from materialistic to post-materialistic. Similarly, Inglehart and Abramson (1994) suggest that post-materialistic values are prevalent among the younger generations in advanced countries as the countries experience significant economic development. While Inglehart and others examined the causes of values changes at the collective level, Sears and Valentino (1997) explored how political events influence the socialization process of preadults at the individual level. They suggest that political events – e.g., presidential election campaigns – can generate changes in preadults' long-standing and stable predispositions, but the effects of events on the attitudes of preadults is selective and limited to salient attitude objects. Also the socialization of preadults occurs periodically rather than continuously, because such potentially socializing events tend to happen only periodically. This finding shows a modified result from the traditional symbolic politics theory and demonstrates a potential mechanism of changes of political predispositions.

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Focusing on value changes at the individual level, McCann (1997) demonstrates that voters' candidate choices during election periods define the types of values to which individuals adhere; in turn, these values determine their policy attitudes. For example, if voters are mobilized to support George W. Bush, they became less likely to adopt the value of egalitarianism. The study implies that individuals shift their beliefs in various values through their choice of candidates during the election campaign processes.

Similarly, Chong (2000) proposes a dynamic model of values change which captures the role of individuals' instrumental considerations of individual and social benefits in adopting values. Individuals not only learn norms and values automatically through the socialization process, but they also adopt norms and values according to their evaluation of the benefits of these norms and values. Social, legal, and political change can induce a change in the evaluation of benefits, resulting in the following of new norms and values.

These studies suggest that citizens change their values according to new information, socio-economic changes, or routine political events. The changes can be short-term or long-term. The degree of change depends on how powerful the impact of external events and conditions are on the individuals. As a theory of information processing (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1991) suggests, individuals' adoption of values and beliefs depends on both theory-driven and data-driven processes. On the one hand, citizens' adherence to values are firm and stable because they learned these values in early childhood and codified them through their adult life. On the other hand, individuals do not fail to respond to new information and changed conditions. Thus a question arises as to whether political events like the 9/11 attacks and Iraq war influence citizens to modify their values and, if so, whether the adoption of values is influenced universally or in a fragmented way?

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This study will contribute to our understanding of values that play a significant role in shaping public opinion and behavior by looking at values change over time. Specifically, the way in which international events and the President's decision to go to war with other countries affects individuals' adoption of values will provide a better picture of how individual characteristics define values adoption in different political contexts. Unlike previous studies that elaborate the impact of routine external events – e.g., elections or manipulated conditions in experiments – on values, this study will shed light on the differential effects of war and crisis on values. In addition, this study will examine how values which political elites and leaders make salient draw differentiated reactions from various segments of the population. Such actions will modify the patterns of values changes among the public according to external changes of context.

3.2. Theory of the Impact of Political Events and Values Change

Inglehart (1981; 1987) examined values change at the aggregate level. He found that when economic conditions or lower level needs are satisfied, individuals or society modify their values to accord with higher level needs or values. This perspective incorporates the theory of socialization and points out that the change of values happens mostly among the younger generations who, having experienced economic affluence while they were young, are yet influenced to change their values by overwhelmingly powerful external events and conditions. On the other hand, another line of study pays attention to individuals' internal conflict that drives their values change. Specifically, Rokeach(1973) lays out the process of values change. When individuals become dissatisfied with themselves through comparing themselves with others in their social context, realizing they are immoral or incompetent,

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they feel a self-contradiction which becomes a driving force for change. Individuals also develop dissatisfaction through being exposed to new information, processing their own experience of events, or having their consciousness raised by an external agent (1989, 782).

These two major theories of values changes capture parts of the whole process of values change. Both theories are missing an important element of values change, in that while individuals respond to external conditions (e.g., economic conditions or other events), the ways in which they react to those conditions are not homogeneous. As studies on attitude changes and persuasion in social psychology suggest (e.g., For reviews of dual process theory see Fiske and Taylor 1991; Chen and Shelly 1999) , citizens' information processing varies according to the characteristics of the evaluation objects and their levels of motivation or knowledge. Similarly, studies on attitudes and attitude changes (Zaller 1992; McClosky and Zaller 1984) have suggested that citizens' political dispositions, cognitive abilities, motivations, and elites cues influence changes of their attitudes. Thus, it is too simple to assume that individuals will respond to external conditions or experimental manipulations in a uniform manner.

I propose a theory of values change which incorporates both objective conditions and individuals' subjective perceptions. The external events or conditions influence how individuals process the information. At the same time, individuals' characteristics – e.g., cognitive capacity, motivation, and political dispositions, – affect the way individuals internalize events. In other words, individuals' adherence to values is influenced by the interaction between external events and individuals' political predispositions.

The previous theories and the interaction model have implications for the effects of events on values changes. First, the values change occurs when the external political events provide

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substantially intense information that can shake individuals' attachment to values. Characteristics of political events – the strength and intensity of information – will influence values change among citizens. Previous studies focus mostly on the collective level of values change (e.g., Rokeach 1973; Inglehart 1981). The way that individuals shift their value attachment at the collective level depends on the characteristics of events. For example, Sears and Valentino(1997) argue that political campaigns affect preadults' socialization by making certain issues salient. Furthermore, they note that the socialization of preadults happens only during the campaign period but not pre or post campaign. Thus, the effect of political events on values varies according to the substantive characteristics of external events. The events should be able to provoke significant reactions from citizens in order to be able to nudge them to change their attachment to values. Because values tend to remain stable and consistent over time, routine political events which have low intensity information and emotional attachment fail to force people to rethink their commitments to values. The object value that the events make salient would be the value which will change over time. Only when political events effectively touch upon the values that citizens and society espouse do changes of values occur.

Second, as the theory of interaction suggests, individuals' motivation, political orientation, and other social demographic conditions filter the effects of external events in defining their attachment to values. Prominent factors that condition the effects of external events on values are partisanship and ideology. Studies suggest that citizens' partisanship or ideology influences their information processing of candidates (e.g. Rahn 1993), opinion changes (e.g. Bartels 2002), acceptance of values (e.g. Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1983), and attitude changes (e.g., Zaller 1992). Strong partisanship, like stereotype, colors the information that

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individuals receive from external conditions (e.g., either from elites or direct experiences). For example, it is difficult to change the opinions and attitudes of a person who has strong partisan orientation unless the new information overwhelmingly shakes the person's belief. The expectation that these political dispositions condition the effects of external events on values is consistent with socialization theory (e.g. Rokeach 1973; Sears 1993), in that individuals learn values in a social context and through social and political institutions. Schools, political parties, and families are the major institutions through which individuals learn social and political values. Thus, these political dispositions condition the effects of events.

Finally, the interaction theory of values change suggests that not all individual characteristics play a role in filtering external events. There are different ways that the effects of political events and individuals' characteristics on values can be conditioned by sophistication level. Studies differ on the role of sophistication and political disposition in information processing and opinion formations. On the one hand, partisan disposition can dominate the information process regardless of sophistication or knowledge level. According to Bartels (2002), Democrats and Republicans perceive the same events in markedly different ways regardless of their knowledge level. Partisanship causes substantially biased judgment on evaluations among the less-informed and the well-informed respondents. His study is in line with that of scholars (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Stokes 1966) who emphasize the prominent role of partisanship in defining various types of political attitudes and choices. At the same time, it suggests that there are no significant differences between more sophisticated and less sophisticated partisans in their information processing. Sophistication level does not differentiate the effect of partisanship in forming opinions. On the other hand, Zaller(1992) has argued that more sophisticated

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partisans will perceive events and evaluate information differently from less sophisticated partisans. Although partisanship plays an important role in defining the way that individuals accept and respond to external events and information, its effect depends on their sophistication level. The more sophisticated partisans are "better able to resist persuasive communications that are inconsistent with their basic values" than are the less sophisticated (ibid, 148). Less sophisticated individuals are unable to discern information or messages that are inconsistent with their own predispositions because they lack cognitive ability or interest. Thus, they may easily form opinions inconsistent with their dispositions. But as more sophisticated partisans can interpret information with their own partisan eyes they can resist information that is inconsistent with their partisanship. While the basic dynamic of attitudes change varies according to the intensity of messages and freshness of issues, the level of sophistication conditions the effect of partisan disposition in defining the patterns of attitudes change. Consistent with Zaller's model of attitudes change, the integrated model of values change expects that sophistication level will condition the effect of partisanship in filtering the effect of political events on values. Thus, a question arises as to under what conditions the sophistication level differentiates (or does not) the effect of partisanship on values change.

I draw three hypotheses from the theoretical implications. The first hypothesis is that change of values happens when the events are relevant to individuals' values. Specifically, the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq will undermine citizens' attachment to humanitarianism and democracy promotion, since both events would evoke isolationist tendencies. Although both values share a similarity as internationalist values, they differ in their salience during

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these periods. Thus, citizens will be more likely to detach themselves from democracy promotion which has been salient and used to justify the invasion of Iraq. Second, individuals' political predispositions – partisanship and ideology – condition the effect of political events on their attachment to values. Partisanship and ideology will affect how individuals interpret political events and, in turn, change their adoption of values. For example, Democrats will differ from Republicans in interpreting the invasion of Iraq and, thus, in adoption of values, specifically, democracy promotion. Especially this will be the case because the invasion of Iraq and subsequent developments of the war resulted in polarization among and between elites and the public. Finally, not only partisanship dictates the interpretation of events independently, but also it will have an interaction effect with sophistication level on individuals' acceptance of values. Specifically, individuals who are strongly partisan and have a higher sophistication level are more likely to filter external information, e.g., events, differently from those who are less partisan and less sophisticated. I expect that the more sophisticated Democrats and Republicans are different from both the less sophisticated partisans and each other in interpreting divisive events – e.g., the invasion of Iraq – and changing their values. This effect will be found for the salient value– democracy promotion.

3.2.1. Characteristics of Events

As theories of values change suggest, the characteristics of political events will have a varying influence on the relationship between the sources of values and the acceptance of values. Two events that I examine in this chapter are 9/11 and the Iraq war. These two events share similarities in that they both provoke citizens to pay attention to the importance of American national security. Heightened fear of additional attacks by external enemies would

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push Americans more toward concern for their own safety than for the welfare of others. Although there is a possibility that if citizens perceive that the effective way to deal with international terrorism is to expand American idealism along with active intervention in world affairs, they would support those ideals. But this possibility is slim because of the graveness of the events and the almost non-existence of proper deliberation between and among elites and the mass public on what are the effective ways to address the terrorism problems.

But they also manifest some important differences. First, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent events reflect the fact that America reacts to external threats in defense of its own national security. This perception was widely accepted among Americans. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent swift reactions to deal with the terrorists are based on international cooperation with support from a large majority of the public and elites. These events can be described as "unifying", "legitimate", and "successful" actions. But the Iraq war and ensuing unfolding events can be described as "polarizing", "weakly legitimate," and "unsuccessful" actions. As the Bush administration initiated the preemptive attacks against Iraq with low support from the UN, created discord among both the elites and the public, and faced serious problems in controlling Iraq, opinion became more polarized as events raised questions of the legitimacy of the war and gave the impression that the U.S. was failing to achieve its goal. Furthermore, there was a significant division regarding the characteristics of the invasion. While those who initiated and supported the war considered the invasion as a defensive measure, this perspective was debated and provoked partisan divisions. Thus, these contrasting characteristics, especially polarizing characteristics of the events, will affect citizens' acceptance of values over time.

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Three particular surveys span across critical periods of American foreign policy. Since each survey reflects its own political context, it is necessary briefly to lay out the domestic and international context before I state my expectations regarding the effects of the events on values. The survey from 1998 captures the time when the U.S. became the sole superpower after the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and subsequent international events demanded the active involvement of the U.S. to handle such complex and costly affairs as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and political unrest and massive refugee problems in Somalia. As domestically political polarization arose through the 1990s, Republicans and Democrats did show some differences on foreign policy issues. Especially, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to support sending troops to Bosnia and Kosovo to stabilize the region.[1] The general direction of the Clinton administration's foreign policy was cautious engagement in world affairs to improve human rights and work through international organizations and cooperative relationships with other nations.

This foreign policy direction faced some criticism from Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush in the presidential campaign in 2000. At that time candidate Bush proposed to withdraw from the Clinton administration's internationalism and to pay more attention to domestic politics while increasing spending on defense. However, this isolationist approach to foreign policy shifted dramatically after the September 11 attacks in 2001. The Bush administration drew up a new doctrine in which preemptive attacks, unilateralism, and pursuit of idealism are the key elements. The survey of 2002 captures public opinion in

[1]Gallup poll show that Democrats' support U.S. troop presence in Bosnia is 27% greater than Republicans in December 1995 survey. Similarly they are more likely to support U.S. troop presence in Kosovo (17% higher) in July 1999 survey. The surveys are recited from Holsti (2004, 169-70).

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the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when fear, anxiety, and patriotism were high and counter terrorism measures were a strongly supported. Partisan differences were muted by the attacks on America by foreign agents. A large majority (91%) of Americans supported the Bush administration's choice to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002.[2] Even international communities were sympathetic to the suffering of Americans and supportive of counter measures against terrorism. Thus, the events that are captured by the survey of 2002 reflect the characteristics of the conditions that can be described as unifying, legitimate and successful events.

By 2004 when the third survey was taken, the political context had undergone another dramatic turn due to the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the consequent troubles from the continuing war. The process leading to the invasion of Iraq created serious political divisions domestically and internationally. The full-blown application of the Bush doctrine alienated many traditional allies as well as other foreign countries. Unlike the military action against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. had very limited support from major allies. It also aroused significant resistance from within the U.S., although the resistance was rather muted at the time of the survey. The partisan division over the invasion of Iraq was large already. As a poll shows the difference between Republicans and Democrats who support the war against Iraq is about 42% in October 2002.[3] Furthermore, since the Bush administration's justification of the invasion of Iraq was that it would prevent potential

[2]When the Gallup Organization asked respondents "Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S. (United States) military action (in Afghanistan) in the war on terrorism?", nine out of ten respondents approved the military action. The survey was conducted by the Gallup Organization, March 8-9, 2002 and is based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 802. The survey is available from the Roper Center.
[3]The about 40% Democrats support for invading Iraq and 82% Republicans do the same. The survey are conducted by the Hart-Teeter Research companies sponsored by NBC news and the Wall Street Journal during October 18-21, 2002. It is based on a national random sample of 1,012 registered voters. The data are available at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

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terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which he claimed Saddam Hussein possessed and would give to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, the subsequent failure to find WMDs delivered a serious blow to the administration.

As one of the rationales of the war against Iraq turned out to be baseless, the administration emphasized the need to succeed in Iraq to be able to prevent Iraq from becoming terrorists' base and to spread democracy in the Middle East. The war did not progress as the Bush administration expected. Even after president Bush declared that "mission accomplished" in May 2003, the political stability in Iraq was not achieved. Casualties arose, establishment of democratic government in Iraq was delayed, and the news on torture leaked. The survey of 2004 was conducted in the context of this turmoil, arising partisan division about the Iraq war, and slow progress in Iraq. Thus the events that the survey of 2004 captured can be described as polarizing, weakly legitimate, and unsuccessful. Although these two events show differences, they share similarity in that both events made American citizens that their national security is in danger and needs to pay attention to potential dangers. Under the condition which national security is the most urgent issue, the public tend to focus on it.

Thus, the idealistic goals will be less likely major issue for them. I expect that these two different events will have different effects on individuals' acceptance of values. First, they will be more concerned about national security which will lead to decreased support for idealistic values. So both values will suffer from these two events. Second, the way that these two events affect the values also depends on the specific characteristics of the events. As it was explained above, the 9/11 attacks and following reactions are considered as legitimate, unifying, and successful events in protecting the U.S. national security. But the invasion

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of Iraq and failure to stabilize Iraq and the Bush administration's emphasis on idealism in driving for the war will further undermine the support for ideals. In addition, the salient justification of the war with democracy promotion lead citizens to move away more from the ideal.

3.3. Data

The surveys were conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, 2002, and 2004.[4] The surveys straddle the significant political events which would affect values and attitudes. A comparison of the surveys of 1998 and 2002 would reveal the effects of the September 11, 2001 attack by Al Qaeda and the subsequent counter attacks on the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Americans' opinions on humanitarianism and democracy promotion. The survey of 2002 was conducted during June 1-June 30. Similarly the survey of 2004, which was conducted during July 6-July 12, will show how the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq and the failure to secure Iraq influenced Americans' beliefs in these values.[5]

3.3.1. Measure of Variables

The main values that are explored in this study are humanitarianism and democracy. As the measures of these two values are the same as in Chapter 2, I will explain only the measurement of the independent variables.[6]

[4]The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations changed its name to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on September 1, 2006.
[5]See the Appendix B for detailed information about the surveys.
[6]Refer to Chapter 2 for the detailed theoretical explanation of humanitarianism and democracy promotion as important foreign policy values and the way the concepts were measured. As in Chapter 2, I will use "democracy promotion" and "democracy" interchangeably for the remainder of the paper unless it is necessary to distinguish them.

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Political dispositions include partisanship and ideology. Although studies show that partisan divisions have upsurged recently in the politics of America, and although partisanship and ideology converge (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 2005; Evans 2003), , these two capture different aspects of the dispositions in question. Partisanship is a categorical variable and has three traditional party identifications: Republican, Independent, and Democrat. Republicans are the base category for group comparison. Ideology is measured according to 5 scale ranges, from strong conservatives to strong liberals. The range of the ideology variable in 2004 was originally in a 7-point scale, but it was adjusted to make it consistent with the scales of the other years.

The measure of racial and ethnic identity is constructed by specifying minority groups. Since the survey of 1998 does not have a racial category for Asian Americans, this group is combined with the rest of the major minority groups (e.g., native Americans). Thus racial and ethnic identity includes four categories: non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic others, and Latinos. As a measure of sophistication, education level is used. Education is ranged from less than high school to post graduates on a 5-point scale. Other control variables are age, gender, income, and religiosity. Age ranges from 18 to 98. Income is scaled by 6 points, from less than $20,000 in family income to more than $100,000. And gender and religiosity is a categorical variable. Male is coded into 1 and female, 0. Those who have religion is coded into 1 and otherwise, 0.

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3.4. Findings

3.4.1. Aggregate changes

The aggregate level of change in citizens' acceptance of humanitarianism and democracy shows an interesting pattern. Citizens' support for both humanitarianism and democracy changes from 1998 to 2002. The mean of humanitarianism decreased from .69 in 1998 to .63 in 2002. Similarly, the mean for democracy promotion goes down from .57 to .52. The magnitude of change for both values is statistically significant.[7] Consistent with the expectation from the hypothesis, the 9/11 attacks and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan influenced citizens' beliefs in these two core internationalist values. Although the events made Americans united and obtained legitimacy in dealing with Taliban and Al Qaeda and successful in addressing the problem, their experience of these events led citizens to detach themselves from the idealism. It is natural for citizens to respond to external threats and crises with caution. Especially when the nation witnessed the massive casualties from the attacks and heightened fear of additional attacks from outside enemies, it was difficult for them to maintain their commitment to humanitarianism and democracy in the international arena.[8]

[7]The variables are scaled into 0 and 1. Since we have large numbers of respondents in each survey, a small amount of mean change leads to significant change. For the significance test, the t test is used because the samples are randomly drawn. Mean test for two populations is based on the formula: t= $\mu_2 - \mu_1$ / $\sqrt{\sigma_1^2/n_1 + \sigma_2^2/n_2}$, where μ and σ^2 are mean and variance, and 1 and 2 are two populations. Thus the t value depends on mean, standard error, and number of observations. If the number of observations is large and the standard error is small, a small change in mean will lead to a statistically significant change. There is a question as to whether that statistical change means substantial change. Other studies (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992) argue that more than a 10% change is meaningful. But still this number could be arbitrary depending on the number of observations.

[8]See Appendix B for the explanation of the potential problems stemming from different survey methods.

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Table 3.1. Mean and Mean Changes of Values in the Mass Public

	1998	2002	2004	diff:02-98	diff:04-02	diff:04-98
Humanitarianism	0.69	0.63	0.57	-.06	-0.06	-0.12
Democracy	0.57	0.52	0.42	-.05	-0.10	-0.15

Similar to the impact of the 9/11 and following events on citizens' beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy promotion, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and unfolding events induced more decline in beliefs in these values among the public. The mean value of humanitarianism had decreased from .63 in 2002 to .57 in 2004. Similarly, the mean of support for democracy had slid from .52 in 2002 to .42 in 2004. In both cases, more than 5% of the mean shifted down, and they are statistically significant. Citizens' support for democracy promotion decreased more than twice as much as that for humanitarianism after they experienced the Iraq war and unrest in Iraq.

Figure 1 shows the change of support for humanitarianism and democracy promotion over the years. In general the slopes go down over time, which means that as Americans experienced the 9/11 attacks, the following retaliation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq and ensuing events, their commitment to these values dwindled. While the slopes for both ideals decline significantly, the slope for democracy declines more steeply than that for humanitarianism. The attack on America by Al Qaeda in 2001 led to reduced support for these values among citizens. But the administration's preemptive invasion of Iraq resulted in significantly less support for these values. This change stems from the characteristics of the two events. As the attack by Al Qaeda was an unprecedented event and inspired a strong emotional reaction and fear among Americans, it affected how Americans perceived their values in foreign policy. The existence of external threats and the

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Figure 3.1. Change of Values



experience of them reduced the support for liberal idealism. Reactions to the terrorist attacks did not provoke significant divisions among Americans regarding American options in dealing with international terrorism and in pursuing foreign policy goals. In addition, the magnitude of change is very close: 5% for humanitarianism and 4% for democracy promotion. Thus, although the experience of threats contributed to a move away from both values, the unified reaction to deal with the threats and successful military actions might have undergirded the steep decline of support for those values.

After the swift attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2002, the Bush administration shifted its attention to Iraq. In the State of the Union address in February 2002, President Bush laid out his new doctrine which emphasized the adoption of preemptive

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attacks as a way to deal with international terrorism. Combined with a unilateralist approach in fighting terrorists, the Bush administration's preemptive strike doctrine sparked debates and divisions among the elites and the public. Moreover, the justification of the invasion of Iraq – Hussein's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a critical threat to U.S. security – was proved groundless as time went on. By early 2004, the reports that there were no WMD in Iraq began to come out, and the administration shifted the justification of the invasion from WMD to the promotion of democracy.[9] While the Bush administration mentioned freedom and democracy as U.S. foreign policy goals right after the 9/11 attack, they became far more prominent in the justification of the invasion, and the rationalization resounded in the mass media. The promotion and aftermath of the invasion of Iraq can be described as "dividing and weakly legitimate". Although the Bush administration's attack on Iraq initially drew support from a majority of the public, the level of support among various partisan groups differs sharply. By October 2002, about 40% of Democrats supported invading Iraq but an almost absolute majority (82%) of Republicans supported the war.[10] The overall support for the war was 59.5% before the war, although it went up once the war started. Americans' beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy after the invasion of Iraq

[9]The final report by top U.S. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer on the non-existence of WMD came out on October 6, 2004. Also, *the New York Times*, which reported and emphasized the danger and existence of the WMD in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, confessed that it had made a mistake in reporting the existence of the WMD and the link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda in its editorial of July 16, 2004. Although these reports came after the survey of 2004 was conducted, there were ample reports prior to the survey that suggested the claims of the existence of WMD in Iraq were false. The Senate Intelligence Committee report was issued on June 9, 2004 stating there was no substantive evidence of WMD in Iraq (Jehl 2004). Similarly, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, who presented to the U.N. in 2003 the sample of WMD and the mobile trailer that was said to be making biological weapons to make a case for the invasion, declared on May 16, 2004 that he and the C.I.A. were misled about the WMD information (Sanger 2004). In addition, the administration failed to find any hard evidence of plans to develop WMD until June 2004, almost a year after President Bush declared "mission accomplished" in May 2003.

[10]The percentages originate from the survey conducted by the Hart-Teeter Research companies sponsored by NBC news and the Wall Street Journal during October 18-21, 2002. It is based on a national random sample of 1,012 registered voters. The data are available at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

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reflect this political context which produced divisions among the public along partisan lines, lacked consensus on the legitimacy of the preemptive war, and experienced the prolonged war efforts in Iraq without substantial progress.

In addition to the characteristics of external threat and rather offensive war, the Bush administration strived to link security with idealism by emphasizing democracy promotion in Iraq and the link between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks. Although the administration placed more emphasis on these moral obligations to save Iraqis from brutal dictatorship and spreading democracy in the Middle East after it failed to find the WMD, those rationales were already presented before the war started. As Friedman (2003) pointed out, the administration used the WMD as an easy justification for the war.[11] While the failure to find the WMD might have contributed to forcing the administration to justify the decision by basing it on removing a dictator, building a democracy in Iraq and preventing Iraq from becoming a basecamp for Al Qaeda as important goals to fight against terrorism, these justifications were already presented and salient before the war. A Time/CNN poll shows that 83 percent of respondents considered that removing the dictator Saddam Hussein, who killed so many Iraqi citizens, to be "very convincing" or "convincing" reasons to engage in war with Iraq. In contrast, about 72 percent of respondents answered that the war would help "eliminate the weapons of mass destruction." [12] While these multiple motivations for the war were suggested, the public began to observe that the proposed goals of the war – both security and moral ideals – were difficult to achieve. The increased casualties of American soldiers,

[11]Other commentators (e.g., Hoagland 2003; Melloan 2003) made similar arguments, that the failure to find the WMD does not undermine war efforts which aim to achieve democracy in Iraq and in the region.
[12]This survey was conducted by Harrison Interactive during February 19-21 in 2003 with telephone interviews. The sample size was 1,299. Retrieved October 27, 2007 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>

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leaks of news on torture which undermined American legitimacy in the international arena, and prolonged political unrest and resistance from Iraqis contributed to increasing the costs of war.

As the public began to observe the costs of war go up, public support for the administration's handling of the war began to drop significantly. Right after the fall of Saddam Hussein, about 70% of the public thought that the war was worth fighting.[13] But the rate went down to 40% by June 2004[14]

These political events made citizens withdraw from international involvement. Thus, the public detached itself from both ideals. As America got bogged down in Iraq and the costs of war went up, citizens were more likely to be self-centered and isolationistic. Thus, the experience undermined even their commitment to humanitarianism, which was not closely related to the rationales for war. When they observed the mishandling of the war, citizens were more willing to distance themselves from one of the justifications for war against Iraq - spreading democracy. Although citizens reduced their belief in humanitarianism because of the general concern for their own security after they experienced the dragging situation in Iraq, they began to detach themselves more from democracy promotion. They became more

[13]The exact question is as follows: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?" The survey was conducted by ABC News/Washington Post, April 27-April 30, 2003. It was based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1,105. Retrieved October 27, 2007 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>

[14]The question asked respondents "When it comes to the war in Iraq, do you think that removing Saddam Hussein from power was or was not worth the number of U.S. (United States) military casualties and the financial cost of the war?" The Survey was conducted by NBC News, the Wall Street Journal and the Hart and Teeter Research Companies, June 25-June 28, 2004. It was based on telephone interviews with a national registered voters sample of 1,025. Retrieved October 27, 2007 from the iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html>

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sensitive to the moral justification of the war- removing a brutal dictator and establishing democracy.[15]

In sum, while two political events made a significant impact on Americans' lives in general, they affected Americans' attachments to humanitarianism and democracy differently. Regarding the first hypothesis, the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan led Americans to move away from both values, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing failure to find WMD and unfolding events further shook Americans' commitments to humanitarianism and democracy. While both values suffered loss, it was democracy promotion that lost more significantly at the collective level. In the following sections I will test the hypotheses of differential effects of partisanship and ideology and the 3-way interaction among political predisposition, events, and sophistication level.

3.4.2. Political Dispositions and the Impact of Political Events.

This section will explore the second hypothesis which notes the interaction between political events and political dispositions in explaining Americans' espousal of humanitarianism and democracy. To test the hypothesis I pooled the three surveys and estimate models for two core values.

[15]It is possible to argue that the Bush administration raise humanitarian concerns in Iraq by pointing out the sufferings of Iraqi citizens. But the content of the sufferings were mainly political aspects of human rights: freedom and liberty. As I clarified in the previous chapter, the humanitarianism that I use in this dissertation mainly focuses on non-political aspects of human rights. In this sense, the administration's emphasis on Iraqi citizens' sufferings was more closely connected to democracy promotion than to humanitarianism.

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$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Support for values} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{years} + \beta_2 \text{partisanship} \\
& + \beta_3 \text{ideology} + \beta_4 (\text{partisanship})(\text{years}) \\
& + \beta_5 (\text{ideology})(\text{years}) \\
& + \beta_6 (\text{partisanship})(\text{years})(\text{Sophistication}) \\
& + \textit{controls}
\end{aligned} \tag{3.1}
$$

The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2. After I explain the estimation results from the Table 3.2, I will use the graphs to elaborate the findings.

Table 3.2: Interaction Model of Support for Humanitarianism and Democracy

	Humanitarianism	Democracy
year2002	-0.07**	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)
year2004	-0.09***	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Independents	0.03*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Democrats	0.06***	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Indp*year02	0.02	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Indp*year04	-0.04	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Demo*year02	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Demo*year04	-0.07**	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education	-0.03	-0.20 **
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Indp*edu	-0.10	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Demo*edu	0.13+	0.15+

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... table 3.2 continued

	Humanitarianism	Democracy
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Edu*year02	0.08	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.15)
Edu*year04	0.06	0.23
	(0.08)	(0.11)
Ideology(high=lib)	0.01*	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideo*year02	0.03*	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Ideo*year04	0.02*	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Indp*year02*edu	0.02	-0.03
	(0.18)	(0.23)
Indp*year04*edu	0.07	-0.31**
	(0.11)	(0.14)
Demo*year02*edu	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.15)	(0.20)
Demo*year04*edu	-0.10	-0.30**
	(0.10)	(0.13)
Age	0.05**	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Gender (male=1)	-0.03 **	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)
Blacks	0.08***	0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latinos	0.07***	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Others	0.04+	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income	-0.08**	-0.01
	(.03)	(.04)
Religiosity (have=1)	.00	.01
	(.01)	(.01)

Continued on next page...

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... table 3.2 continued

	Humanitarianism	Democracy
_cons	0.67***	0.49***
	(0.02)	(0.03)
N	2,523	2,534
R Squared	0.9	0.07

$***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1$; one-tailed.OLS

3.4.2.1. Partisanship. The first column of Table 3.2 shows the results for humanitarianism. As the baseline category is Republican partisanship and the year 1998, the coefficients of years 2002 and 2004 shows the average level of humanitarianism in those years compared to 1998. Similarly, the coefficients of Democrats and Independents show the relative magnitude of those partisans compared to Republicans.

Democrats and Independents are significantly different from Republicans in their support for humanitarianism in 1998. The coefficients of Independents ($\beta = .03$) and Democrats ($\beta = .06$) are statistically significant (p<.05 for Independents and p<.01). This difference changes over time. The coefficients for the interaction terms between 2002 and Independent, and 2002 and Democrats are small (β = -.01 for Independents and β = -.03 for Democrats) and not significant. Independents and Democrats are not any more different from Republicans in 2002 than they were in 1998. It suggests that the 9/11 attacks and following events did not affect partisans' acceptance of humanitarianism. But this relationship between partisans and their support for humanitarianism changed again in 2004. The sign of the coefficients for the interaction terms for Independents and year 2004(β =-.04), and Democrats and year 2004 (β =-.07) are negative. While the former is not statistically significant, the latter one

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is significant ($p<.01$). This suggests that Independents and Democrats are more likely than Republicans to reduce their support for humanitarianism in 2004 compared to year 1998. Especially, Democrats are significantly less likely to do that in 2004.

Figure 3.2 shows the predicted values of humanitarianism.[16] It shows the change of humanitarianism over time by three partisan identifications. Consistent with the estimation results, there was a substantial difference between Democrats and Republicans in their acceptance of humanitarianism in 1998. Democrats were far more supportive of humanitarianism than Republicans during this period. Independents are located between Democrats and Republicans in their support for humanitarianism. They are more supportive of the value than Republicans but less supportive than Democrats. The strong support for humanitarianism among Democrats suggests that the political atmosphere contributes to their adherence on humanitarianism. Although the relationship between partisanship and support for the core values varies over time, Democrats tend to accept humanitarianism during the latter part of the 1990s.[17] This tendency has been strengthened since the dramatic change due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1990. In addition, ensuing world events pushed the Clinton administration's foreign policy agenda and goals toward a more cooperative internationalist approach. The removal of an arch enemy in world politics and the emergence of problems in other parts of the world provided fertile ground for adopting humanitarianism and democracy promotion as valuable and achievable goals among Democrats.

[16]All the figures are created based on the predicted values of dependent variables – humanitarianism and democracy. The predicted values are obtained by setting all other independent variables at their mean.

[17]The simple correlation between partisanship and support for humanitarianism in the survey from the CCFR in 1990 shows that Democrats are more likely to support humanitarianism than Republicans (the correlation was .10 and statistically significant). While the same correlation is not possible to obtain due to the omission of the variable "party identification" in the survey of 1994, a potential proxy of party identification – ideology – suggests that liberals are significantly more likely to support humanitarianism in 1994.

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By 2002 the political context had changed dramatically due to the 9/11 attacks. After winning by such a thin margin in the presidential elections of 2000, the Bush administration, like everyone else in America, was not ready for the Al Qaeda attacks on American soil in 2001. This attack was unprecedented in the magnitude of damage done to civilians and the stealth of the attacks, even compared to the British invasion of Washington D. C. in 1812 and the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. The fear and anger were high among Americans after the attacks. Although the survey was conducted in 2002, the tumultuous situation remained throughout the years. The ensuing military actions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda did not produce significant divisions among the public and the elites, nor even in the United Nations.

Figure 3.2. Predicted Values of Humanitarianism by Partisanship



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Figure 3.3. Predicted Values of Democracy by Partisanship



This political change did not affect the relationship between partisanship and the acceptance of humanitarianism. Still, Democrats and Independents are slightly more supportive of humanitarianism than Republicans in 2002. But the level of support for humanitarianism among Democrats is lower than that in 1998. The similar downward movement is observed among Independents and Republicans. Thus, the differences of support for humanitarianism among partisans are reduced by 2002. The experience of crisis in their own land undermined Democrats' altruistic passion. Even those individuals who are concerned about others' welfare during peacetime find it difficult to maintain the same magnitude of altruism when they themselves face serious crisis and hardship. Democrats who were enthusiastic supporters of humanitarianism during a relatively peaceful era detach themselves from commitment to

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humanitarianism in this time of high stress and anxiety. But this tendency also can be found among Independents and Republicans. Thus, there were not substantial differences among partisans in interpreting the events and changing their beliefs in humanitarianism, which was captured in insignificant interaction terms in the estimation.

The relationship between partisanship and the adoption of the values changed significantly in 2004. In reaction to the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq and the consequent failure to stabilize the country, Democrats and Independents further moved away from their support for humanitarianism. Similarly, Republicans' support for humanitarianism went down compared to their support levels in 2002 and 1998. Especially, Democrats' support for humanitarianism compared to Republicans in 2004 is significantly different from their position toward humanitarianism in 1998. While Democrats were more supportive of the value than Republicans in 1998, Republicans are slightly more likely to support humanitarianism than Democrats in 2004. This signifies that Democrats, who had been enthusiastic champions of humanitarianism, might began to see the potential dangers of abuse of the value in the administration's active involvement in international affairs. Although humanitarianism does not closely relate to the Bush administration's justification of the war against Iraq, Democrats become cautious and reduce their commitment to humanitarianism in 2004. In sum, it was Democrats who felt relatively strongly the negative impact of the invasion of Iraq and following failures to secure Iraq and in turn moved away from their original stance toward humanitarianism.

The estimation results for democracy promotion reveal that Democrats were more supportive of the ideal than Republicans in the baseline year, 1998; but Independents did not show much difference. The coefficient for Democrats (β=.09) is statistically significant

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(p<.01) and positive, but that for Independents is .02 and fails to pass traditional significance test. After the experience of the 9/11 attacks, the relationship did not change much. The interaction terms between Independents and 2002 and Democrats and 2002 should capture the effect of the events after the 9/11 attacks and following retaliation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The coefficients of the terms are close to 0 and not significant at all. This suggests that the experience of the events does not affect Democrats' and Independents' beliefs in democracy promotion in relation to Republicans in 2002.

Unlike the 9/11 attacks and the following events, the invasion of Iraq and ensuing events in Iraq did make a difference among partisans in their support for democracy promotion. The coefficients of the interaction terms between Independents and 2004 (β=-.10) and Democrats and 2004 (β=-.15)are statistically significant (p<.01). This means that Independents and Democrats were more likely to reduce their support for democracy promotion than Republicans in 2004. The events had a serious effect on Independents and Democrats in their belief in democracy promotion. As the invasion of Iraq and prolonged unrest in Iraq become polarizing events, Democrats and Independents became wary of the rationale for the war and began to detach themselves from the ideal of democracy promotion.

Figure 3.3 shows more intuitively how partisans responded to the events over time. Similar to their stance to humanitarianism, Democrats were more supportive of democracy promotion than Republicans in 1998. Independents were closer to Republicans in their support for democracy promotion in 1998. Even after the 9/11 attacks, this relationship did not change much, which is consistent with the estimation results. The experience of the 9/11 attacks and following anti-terrorism measures did not provoke different reactions from partisans, although all groups showed less support for democracy promotion compared to their

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support levels in 1998. But this decreased support level is statistically insignificant. Unlike the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Iraq and ensuing entanglement in Iraq significantly undercut Democrats' and Independents' beliefs in democracy promotion. The sudden shift of slope by 2004 among Democrats suggests that Democrats withdrew their support for democracy promotion by June 2004. Furthermore, Independents reacted to the political situation in a similar way to Democrats. While their level of support for democracy promotion in 1998 and 2002 was very close to that of Republicans, their experience of the invasion of Iraq and failure of securing the country set them apart from Republicans by 2004. The sudden plunge of support for democracy among Independents made them behave more like Democrats in 2004. The invasion of Iraq and the Bush administration's foreign policy shift from traditional realistic views to a neo-conservative perspective, in which the unilateral preemptive attack and democracy promotion were two wings of the Bush doctrine, made Independents and Democrats less supportive of the ideal than Republicans in 2004. In contrast to Independents and Democrats, Republicans' reaction to the events and stance toward democracy promotion reveals that they were less sensitive to these events in their support for the ideal. Although they were also gradually less supportive of democracy promotion, they did not change their stance toward it as sensitively as did Independents and Democrats.

The results relative to partisanship show that partisanship filters the way that individuals interpret the same political events and affects their beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy. Compared to Republicans, Democrats, who tended to support idealism in foreign relations during the 90s, shifted their stance toward this idealism once they experienced the Bush administration's unilateral policy drive, even when it pursued a similar idealism. In addition to Democrats who are expected to interpret the events differently from Republicans,

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Independents, who tend to locate themselves in the middle, responded to the invasion of Iraq and following failures to stabilize the country in a way similar to that in which Democrats reacted and changed their beliefs in democracy promotion. This suggests that political events can induce relatively neutral independents to behave akin to partisans. Politically polarizing events forced Independents to follow Democrats in forming their beliefs in democracy promotion.

3.4.2.2. Ideology. While the estimation results show that partisanship conditions the effects of political events in defining individuals' beliefs in values, the role of ideology is mixed. As Table 3.2 shows, liberals were more likely to support humanitarianism than conservatives in 1998. The coefficient of ideology (β=.01) is statically significant (p<.05). This relationship got stronger over the time. The coefficient of the interaction term between ideology and year 2002 is positive (β= .03) and significant (p<.10). It means that the events affected the relationship between ideology and support for humanitarianism compared to 1998. After the experience of the 9/11 attacks and following retaliation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, liberals were significantly more likely to support humanitarianism than conservatives compared to 1998. A similar relationship is found after the invasion of Iraq and ensuing failures to maintain stability in Iraq. The coefficient of the interaction term between ideology and humanitarianism (β=.02) is statistically significant (p<.05). As the magnitude of coefficient of the interaction term is a bit smaller than that of the interaction term for 2002, the relationship between ideology and support for humanitarianism in 2004 is slightly weaker than the relationship in 2002. But that relationship in 2004 is still stronger and larger than the relationship between ideology and humanitarianism in 1998.

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Figure 3.4 illustrates the changing relationship between ideology and humanitarianism over time. The relationship between ideology and humanitarianism in 1998 – liberals were more likely to support humanitarianism – persisted in 2002 and 2004. Moreover, the relationship got stronger as citizens experienced the 9/11 attacks and invasion of Iraq. Specifically, the difference between strong liberals and strong conservatives on their beliefs in humanitarianism got larger after the 9/11 attacks. This does not necessarily mean that liberals became more supportive than they were in 1998. Instead, the growing difference between liberals and conservatives with regard to their beliefs in humanitarianism mainly comes from the lowered support for the ideal among strong conservatives in 2002. There is a very limited downward movement among strong liberals, while there is visible downward movement among "fairly liberals" and "moderates". However, the invasion of Iraq and failure to stabilize it made strong liberals reduce their support for humanitarianism like other groups. Although the events – the invasion of Iraq and following failures – induced every group to withdraw their acceptance of humanitarianism compared to the year 1998, the relationship between ideology and humanitarianism got stronger in 2004 than it was in 1998. In other words, liberals were more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than conservatives in 2004 compared to 1998.

In contrast to the impact of political events on the relationship between ideology and humanitarianism, these events did not have a significant influence on the relationship between ideology and democracy promotion over time. The coefficients for ideology in explaining support for democracy (β=-.004) is close to 0 and insignificant. The interaction terms between ideology and 2002 and ideology and 2004 show a similar pattern. Although the sign of coefficients is consistently negative, the magnitudes of coefficients are very small.

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Figure 3.5 shows the change of relationship between ideology and democracy promotion over time. As it shows, there were limited differences between liberals and conservatives on their beliefs in democracy promotion in 1998. Liberals tended to be less likely to be supportive of democracy promotion than conservatives. This tendency is maintained throughout the examined time periods. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq did not change the relationship, while these events reduced support for this value among all the groups. The consistent downward movement of slopes for every group shows the tendency.

While Democrats were more willing than Republicans to adopt both values, liberals were more likely than conservatives to adopt humanitarianism but not democracy in 1998. The divergence between Democrats and liberals in adopting democracy contrasts with their convergence in accepting humanitarianism. The simple correlation between partisanship and ideology is .21, which is in the medium range. Thus, it is not so surprising to see the divergence, but liberals' strong attachment to humanitarianism is not noted in the case of democracy. Liberals tended to stick with their own principle of non-intervention in other countries' domestic politics and to understand the dangers of pushing democracy promotion as a goal. Although the coefficient of ideology in explaining for democracy is in the right direction, it fails to reach the conventional significance level in 1998.

Different reactions between Democrats and liberals again show up in 2002. The 9/11 attacks and following events reduced Democrats' support for humanitarianism, but they did not reduce that of strong liberals. In contrast to Democrats, who substantially decreased their support for humanitarianism, liberals still maintained their support even after the experience of the political turmoil.[18] Similarly, Democrats and liberals diverge on their

[18]Strictly speaking, the predicted values for strong liberals in 1998 and 2002 are not the same. There is a slight decrease from .71 to .70.

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Figure 3.4. Predicted Values of Humanitarianism by Ideology



stance toward democracy promotion in 2002. While Democrats did not move much from their stance toward democracy promotion in 1998, liberals began to move away from the value.

Finally, the divergence between Democrats and liberals is observed again in 2004. While Democrats have changed significantly their embrace of humanitarianism in the face of the Iraq war and the U.S. entanglement in the area, liberals lost their belief in humanitarianism to a limited degree. Liberals' relatively strong commitment to humanitarianism shows that they believe in the core of altruistic ideals regardless of the possibility of abuse by the Bush administration. Democrats and liberals tend to share their beliefs, opinions, and attitudes, but this result shows that liberals were more likely than Democrats to hold on to their belief

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Figure 3.5. Predicted Values of Democracy by Ideology



in humanitarianism despite the possibility of abuse by the Bush administration. Despite this divergence, the invasion of Iraq and following failures in stabilizing the country made Democrats and liberals move in a similar way in their belief in democracy promotion. As liberals further moved away from democracy promotion in 2004, they were joined by Democrats and Independents in 2004 in their stance toward democracy promotion. Humanitarianism and democracy represent two significant aspects of American idealism, but they are substantially and qualitatively different, as I noted earlier. They both assume the active involvement of the U.S. in world affairs and the belief that national interest is not always exclusive of universal norms and values. However, humanitarianism emphasizes non-political human rights, which include not suffering without relief from such things as hunger and natural disasters.

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In contrast, democracy represents a political aspect of human rights. Although there are debates on all sides about which should be addressed first or which is more effective in relieving people' sufferings and hardships, the two ideals draw different supporters. Liberals are consistently wary of the dangers in pursuing democracy in international politics, because it could violate one of the most important norms of international politics: sovereignty. As Figure 3.5 shows, liberals were more likely to oppose democracy promotion from the beginning in 1998, and they did not change their stance much over the years, although the difference between liberals and conservatives is not statistically significant.[19]

The findings on the role of partisanship and ideology supports the second hypothesis. Partisanship plays a significant role in filtering the effect of political events in defining citizens' belief in foreign policy values. Democrats were more likely to be responsive than Republicans to the invasion of Iraq and following events in changing their beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy promotion. The characteristics of the event – the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq and following failure to achieve the proposed goals polarize and divide citizens – made Democrats become more sensitive in interpreting the events and shift their stance toward both values. The invasion of Iraq and unfolding events influenced Independents to change their stance toward democracy promotion and to behave more like Democrats. Similarly, ideology conditions the effect of political events on beliefs in humanitarianism, although it has no differential effect on democracy promotion.

[19]The lack of interaction between ideology and political events in explaining individuals' acceptance of democracy promotion is not exactly consistent with my expectation and needs more analysis.

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3.5. Interaction Model of Values Change

In the third hypothesis, I note that there will be a three-way interaction among political predisposition, sophistication, and events in accounting for individuals' acceptance of values. The effect is identified only for their support for democracy promotion. The three way interaction terms between partisanship, events, and sophistication level in the model for humanitarianism do not show substantial effects. All the coefficients fail to pass the traditional significance test. But the model captures the three way interaction effects in explaining democracy promotion. The pooled regression outcome shows a couple of important findings in Table 3.2. The three way interaction term of Independents, year 2004, and sophistication level is -.31 and statistically significant ($p<.05$). Similarly, interaction term of Democrats, year 2004, and sophistication level is -.30 and statistically significant ($p<.05$). Since the interaction between partisanship and year 2004 has been established above, the three way interaction suggests that the two way interaction depends on the level of sophistication.

As Figure 3.6 provides the results more intuitively, I will use them to lay out the important findings. First, the results show that the more sophisticated Democrats were far more likely than their counterpart Republicans to withdraw their adherence to democracy promotion after they experienced the invasion of Iraq and subsequent failures of achieving the originally planned goals. The more sophisticated (e.g., college graduates and post-graduates) Republicans did not change their beliefs in democracy promotion much from 1998 and 2004. For example, the changes of slope for college graduated Republicans show a slow downward movement from 1998 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2004. But the downward movement is very limited over time, so that the predicted value of democracy in 2002 and in 2004 among the college graduated Republicans is almost the same as in 1998. The change of slope for

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Figure 3.6. Predicted Values of Democracy by Partisanship and Sophistication level



post-graduate Republicans shows a slightly different pattern. Their support for democracy promotion went up gradually over time from 1998 to 2004.

The movement of slope for the more sophisticated Democrats (e.g., college graduates and post-graduates) reveals very different pattern of change. They are far more sensitive than the more sophisticated Republicans in responding to the second event, the invasion of Iraq and following failures in stabilizing the country, in 2004. The slope for the more sophisticated Democrats moves downward slowly from 1998 to 2002; but it moves downward a lot quicker from 2002 to 2004. Furthermore, the direction of movement diverges sharply from that of Republicans: it moves toward the negative direction. Owing to this big change and negative reaction to the second events, the predicted value of democracy promotion

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among the more sophisticated Democrats decreased significantly from their level in 1998. As the more sophisticated Republicans either tended to retract very slowly from democracy promotion (college graduated Republicans) or to increase their support for the ideal slightly over the years (post-graduate Republicans) even after they have experienced the two political crises, the more sophisticated Democrats' sensitive reaction toward the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent failure to stabilize Iraq led them to withdraw their support for democracy promotion by 2004. This contrasting picture of stance toward democracy promotion among the sophisticated Democrats and Republicans shows that sophisticated Democrats were more perceptive in interpreting the invasion of Iraq and following failures as the result of the Bush administration's emphasis on idealism and unilateral push for this. Thus they were quicker than Republican counterparts in withdrawing their support for democracy promotion of which they were more supportive than Republicans in 1998. At the same time, the more sophisticated Republicans, especially post-graduate Republicans, gradually increased their support for democracy promotion, although the degree of increase is small. After the events they began slowly to step up their support for democracy promotion. It is evidence that sophisticated Republicans began to shift their stance toward democracy promotion after the 9/11 attacks and following retaliation against Al Qaeda. Although their reaction to the events and change of their stance toward the idealism is not exactly the same as that of neoconservatives and the Bush administration, the tendency among post-graduate Republicans is consistent with them.

The second finding is the way that the less sophisticated partisans and the more sophisticated partisans react to the events differently. Specifically, less sophisticated Democrats

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tend to be sensitive to the events in holding their belief in democracy promotion. As Figure 3.5 shows, those Democrats who have limited sophistication (e.g., less than high school education) are more sensitive to the 9/11 attacks than the more sophisticated Democrats. The less sophisticated Democrats responded to the external threats and retaliation with a substantial withdrawal from the ideal of democracy promotion, while the more sophisticated Democrats still held on to the ideal. The same events are interpreted differently due to individuals' cognitive ability among the same Democrats. This tendency of unstable or too sensitive response to the 9/11 attacks and following events can be observed in Republicans and Independents too. This is in line with the findings from Chong and others (1983), in that less sophisticated individuals' acceptance of values is not solid and is easily affected by external events.

As we examine the impact of the second set of events, this proposition – the less sophisticated individuals are more likely to be influenced by new information or stimulation – shows a limited validity. Specifically, sophisticated Democrats were far more sensitive to the Bush administration's initiation of the war against Iraq and developments in Iraq and changed their stance toward democracy promotion. The rate of drop from 2002 to 2004 among the sophisticated Democrats is significantly more than that among the less sophisticated Democrats. This suggests that while the sophisticated Democrats tended to stick with their original belief in democracy promotion even after the 9/11 attacks and invasion of Afghanistan, they began to withdraw their commitment to the ideal swiftly once they observed that the Bush administration abused the ideal. Thus, sophisticated Democrats were able to interpret the external events with their own principles, in this case, their commitment to democracy promotion. As long as the events did not provide enough evidence

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that their commitment to the ideal was going to be abused or was inconsistent with what they believed, they tended to hold on to their original beliefs. But once they found that the external events provided sufficient information that contradicted their beliefs, they switched or updated their commitment more swiftly than the less sophisticated Democrats. This finding implies that there are two modes of change among Democrats, depending on individuals' cognitive ability: the less sophisticated Democrats are more easily influenced by external events, but the more sophisticated Democrats are less so; but when the information is persuasive enough, the more sophisticated Democrats shift their stance more significantly.

A similar trend is observed among Republicans. The less sophisticated Republicans were far more responsive to the events and changed their beliefs in democracy promotion. Unlike the more sophisticated Republicans, the less sophisticated Republicans showed a similar level of commitment to democracy promotion to the less sophisticated Democrats in 1998. But the more sophisticated Republicans were a lot less supportive of the ideal than the more sophisticated Democrats in 1998. The more learned Republicans held their traditional realist stance in international politics. The less sophisticated Republicans were more likely to be less firm in their beliefs. As they experienced the external shock – i.e., the 9/11 attacks and counter terrorism attacks – the less sophisticated Republicans were quick to withdraw from democracy promotion in 2002. Furthermore, the less sophisticated Republicans kept their downward movement after the invasion of Iraq even though the Bush administration made explicit justification of war in the name of democracy. The post-graduated Republicans picked up their partisan elites' direction in foreign policy after the invasion of Iraq and began slowly to support democracy promotion. Although they did not change their stance toward the ideal after the invasion of Iraq, college graduated Republicans did not respond to the

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events as the less sophisticated Republican did. Sophisticated Republicans did not change much of their original stance under the changing environment, but the less sophisticated Republicans were more responsive to the new information at one point (the 9/11 attacks) and less responsive to the new information at another point (the invasion of Iraq). Even among Republicans sophistication level differentiated the way they interpreted the events and adjusted their beliefs according to them.

Finally, Independents revealed similar but somewhat different patterns of change. Those Independents who did not finish high school reacted to the political events in a random way. When they experienced the 9/11 attacks, they followed others in withdrawing their support for democracy promotion. But after they experienced the invasion of Iraq and failure to stabilize the country, they changed their stance toward the ideal and supported the ideal. While all other Independents reduced their support for democracy promotion in reaction to the invasion of Iraq and following failures in stabilizing Iraq, this group of Independents increased their support for the ideal. This exceptional response to the events stems from their lack of interest in political developments in Iraq. Thus, they increased their support for democracy promotion while all other Independents moved away from the ideal. Independents tended to follow Republicans regardless of their sophistication level in showing their support for democracy promotion. But this tendency changed when the more sophisticated Independents experienced the invasion of Iraq. The sophistication level decided when Independents break away from Republicans. The less sophisticated Independents except for the least sophisticated ones, revealed close movement with Republicans even after they experienced the invasion of Iraq in their stance toward democracy promotion. But the more sophisticated Independents departed from Republicans and behaved more like Democrats.

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These sophisticated Independents had the ability to interpret the invasion of Iraq and the following developments in Iraq and to modify their beliefs in democracy promotion.

Consistent with the interaction theory of values change, these findings suggest that the effect of political disposition and events depends on individuals' sophistication levels. Not only partisanship and characteristics of events matter in influencing individuals' attachment to values, but also the sophistication level conditions the interactive effects of the partisanship and characteristics of events. Although there is a slight variation, generally, the more sophisticated partisans respond to external events in a very different way from the less sophisticated partisans in terms of the direction and speed of change of their values. Furthermore, this observation also applies to Independents who are supposed to be located in the middle between Democrats and Republicans. The sophisticated Democrats and Republicans also reveal substantial differences in their changes of belief in democracy promotion in response to the events. They do not express a completely different reaction to the events and changes of beliefs in democracy promotion, although they show different patterns of change.

3.6. Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter, I explore the impact of political events on individuals' adoption of values. Two political events induce different reactions from the mass public in its support for humanitarianism and democracy. Although these two events can be described as crises, the 9/11 attacks and subsequent events do not produce significant changes of values. But the invasion of Iraq leads to a significant withdrawal from individuals' commitment to humanitarianism and democracy. Furthermore, the subsequent failures of the war plan undercut

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citizens' belief in democracy even more seriously. The characteristics of political events – e.g. whether they are unifying or polarizing - affects citizens' attachment to values differently.

While the characteristics of events influence individuals' acceptance of values on the aggregate level, the way that political events influence individuals' belief in values depends on their political predispositions: i.e. partisanship and ideology. The relationship between partisanship and the two values remains the same in the face of the 9/11 attacks and the swift counter to those attacks. Democrats are still more likely to hold on to humanitarianism and democracy promotion than Republicans. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the unfolding conflict following the invasion finally forced Democrats to reduce their commitment to humanitarianism and democracy. It implies that the invasion of Iraq undermined Democrats' willingness to support both values regardless of their substantively different characteristics. In contrast to the strong interaction between partisanship and events, ideology shows a limited interaction with political events. Liberals are more likely to support humanitarianism over the years but their acceptance of democracy does not change significantly. Liberals maintain their negative stance toward promoting democracy through the course of the political events noted.

In addition, this study shows that the interaction between partisanship and political events is further conditioned by sophistication level in their influence on individuals' acceptance of salient values. The way that the more sophisticated Republicans and Democrats respond to the same event is sharply different. While the event observed did not have much effect on the more sophisticated Republicans, the more sophisticated Democrats are far more sensitive to the same event and change their belief in promoting democracy. In general, less sophisticated partisans are more sensitive to the events at one point and less responsive at

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another point. Less sophisticated Democrats and Republicans share similar characteristics of a lack of cognitive ability to interpret external shocks properly. Thus, their change of beliefs in democracy promotion according to the events is substantially different from more sophisticated partisans. Another point to note is that the invasion of Iraq made the more sophisticated Independents depart from their closeness to the counterpart Republicans in their belief in promoting democracy and to become closer to the Democrats.

An important implication of this study is that individuals' adoption of values is influenced by the interaction between political events and their political dispositions. The differential impact of political events on values adoption suggests that, while political crisis or significant turmoil can move citizens' attachment on values collectively, the way that citizens react to external intervention differs. Studies on values change (e.g., Inglehart 1981) suggest that, when society goes through systematic change, citizens rather coherently and collectively respond to that change. This mechanism of value change reflects Maslow's (1954) theory of the hierarchy of needs and motivation. In addition, Rokeach (1973) proposes that when individuals confront self-contradiction due to either external conditions or self consciousness, they change their values. What I found here extends these studies by showing that external events do not automatically produce values change. First, the political events should be able to invoke salient values that could trigger individuals' perceptions of their own values. Furthermore, individuals' political predispositions interact with events in influencing their championing of values.

Most prominently, political partisanship defines how citizens filter political events through their own political dispositions. Citizens update their values with new information and experience, but they do so according to their own partisan orientations. The shift of commitment

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to humanitarianism and democracy occurred among Democrats only by 2004. Democrats observed the potential abuse of internationalists' ideals in the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration. As Rokeach (ibid) points out, they see the contradiction between what they believe in and what the Bush administration does. It is important to note that the Democrats' change came rather slowly and only after the invasion of Iraq had occurred. This shows both aspects of values change. As studies on values have argued, the inertial characteristics of values do exist; but also individuals change their values when the dominant aspect of events is salient to their values so that individuals can perceive potential conflict between what they believed and the current political situations. In this process, individuals' political predispositions condition the way that external events are interpreted in making judgments on values.

Furthermore, the strong 3-way interaction effect on values change suggests that individuals not only filter the effect of external events through their political predispositions but also with their cognitive abilities. The sharp contrast between the more sophisticated Democrats and Republicans in their acceptance of democracy promotion over the years demonstrates that individuals update their beliefs in values according to changing external events. But the way that individuals update their beliefs in values is not uniform or rational. Instead, their sophistication level and politically predisposed stance dictates individuals' interpretation of the new information (or events). Thus, this study extends previous studies on values change by pointing out that not only are individual agents able to adjust their beliefs in values but also their update is still influenced by prejudices such as political predispositions.

The Bush administration's decision to wage war against Iraq and its invocation of the value – democracy promotion – in justifying the war made the value a salient partisan

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value. Owing to these decisions and the unfolding events in Iraq, the support for democracy promotion was substantially undercut among the public. This is more the case for Democrats and Independents than for Republicans. The administration's war against Iraq undermined the hope of those who want to promote democracy genuinely with non-militaristic means and in cooperation with the international community. The question of how permanent might be the impact of events is one to be explored using more data; and the generalization of this finding needs to wait until we have full access to data that include other types of core values other than humanitarianism and democracy, and panel data which will give a more exact way to measure the dynamic change of values among individuals.

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CHAPTER 4

Elites and the Mass Public on Values Change

In the previous chapters I examined what explains the mass public's opinions on anti-terrorism measures and how political events influence citizens' attachment to foreign policy values. As a way to further our understanding of mass public opinion, in this chapter I explore how political events affect elites' beliefs in foreign policy values. The goal of this chapter is twofold: to understand how elites respond to external events and in turn, shift their values; and to compare their response to that of the mass public. A dramatically changing political environment and the salience of a specific value - e.g., democracy promotion - in recent years provides us with a good opportunity to address the question of how elites respond to these changing world politics. In addition, it gives us a good opportunity to compare how elites and the mass public respond to these events and adjust their beliefs in foreign policy values.

It has been established in the previous chapter that the way external events influence the mass public's acceptance of values varies according to citizens' political predispositions and sophistication levels. A consequent question is whether that theory of values change can be applied to elites, who actively participate in the political process with high knowledge and motivation. Specifically, this chapter examines how elites, who have relatively higher cognitive capacity and motivation than the mass public, accept core foreign policy values and interpret the events in shaping their beliefs in these values. This study elaborates how elites process information and form their opinions on values. Also it sheds light on the question of whether the public and elites share similarities or reveal differences in their acceptance

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of foreign policy values by comparing the ways that elites and the mass public react to the events and adjust their values. Finally, it gives us a chance to examine the gap between elites and the mass pubic in establishing their belief in the core foreign policy values and their implications.

4.1. Elites' Belief Systems and Values

Two different theories explain elites' belief systems. One theoretical camp argues that elites maintain significantly different belief systems from those of the public. Within this camp, there exists a variation in emphasizing the differences between elites and the mass public. On one end, there are scholars who stress the gap between them by heavily emphasizing elites' prominence in the American political system and the difference between elites and the public. According to Dye and Zeigler (1981) who proposes an elitist theory, American elites "share a consensus about the fundamental values" of liberalism (ibid, 133). This consensus on liberalism not only applies to domestic politics but also to international politics. In the area of foreign affairs, one of the elements of the consensus is a "desire to exercise influence in world affairs" by spreading " freedom" to "all the peoples of the world" (ibid, 135). Although elites believe that they can educate the masses and "instill dominant culture values in everyone (ibid, 134)", the mass public does not share this belief. Although elites reveal divisions among themselves over *means*, they share in a consensus on *ends*, and the "disagreement among various segments of the nation's elite occurs *within a framework of consensus* on underlying values" Dye (2002, 191). According to this view, there exists a significant gap between elites and the mass public in the levels of their power, ability to understand prevalent values, and motivation to participate in the political process.

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Although they do not take such an extreme position in accepting the prominent role of elites in the political system, other scholars who study elites and the mass public tend to share the idea that elites play a major role in maintaining the political system and that they are different from the mass public in their cognitive capacity, motivation, skills, and power. In a study on elites with a comparative perspective, Putnam (1976, Chapter 4) agrees with the observations that elites' belief systems are well organized, structured, and stable over time because of their cognitive capacity, knowledge on specific policy issues and high education level. He also points out that the direction of opinion flow begins with elites and goes down to the mass public. Especially when a society is "in the period of rapid change" and when new topics become "the national agenda", elite opinion is more likely to lead that of the mass public (ibid, 140).

In a similar vein, other scholars (e.g., Lippmann 1955; Almond 1960[1950]) suggest that, unlike the mass public whose opinion is moody, unpredictable, and easily influenced by emotional appeals, elites tend to make strategic decisions with better knowledge, interests, and the comprehension of complex political situations and choices. This is possible because elites pay attention to politics, have information and knowledge with which they can comprehend the complexity of world affairs, and have the motivation to make right decisions because they understand their responsibility to make choices. For example, Almond, who studied public opinion from the 1930s to the early 1950s by observing average citizens' reactions to world events before, during, and after World War II (including e.g., the Marshall plan, the emerging power of the Soviet Union, and the Korean war), characterized the reaction of the mass public as "one of mood" (Almond 1960[1950], 69). According to him, most Americans' foreign policy attitudes "lack intellectual structure and factual content" which is the result of

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"the extraordinary absorption of most Americans with the values of private material welfare (ibid)." Owing to this fact, "superficial psychic states" inevitably lead to "unstable" opinion on foreign policy. [1]

As political leaders are more knowledgeable, informed, and armed with experience on policy, they are more likely to be able to organize their belief systems tightly and in a structured manner. Furthermore, they can sustain stable and coherent belief systems over time. Converse (1964) clearly laid out the claim regarding the different structure and organization of belief systems between elites and the public. According to him, only a limited segment of society - i.e., elites or political leaders - possesses a high level of interest and knowledge on politics and is capable of maintaining stable, coherent, and ideologically constrained attitudes. Similarly, others (e.g., Putnam 1976; Key 1961; Lippmann 1955) indicate that elites differ from the mass public in their knowledge, interest, experience with politics, and participation in the political process.

Consistent with Converse's argument that elites or a knowledgeable public organize their belief system along ideological line, Murray (2002) claims that ideology plays a significant role in sustaining elites' foreign policy beliefs and attitudes. For example, even after such a dramatic change as the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, foreign policy leaders did not change

[1]Consequently, American attitudes toward foreign policy resulted in the swing between "withdrawal versus intervention" (Almond 1960[1950], 54), unstructured moods in peacetime versus oversimplification in periods of crisis (ibid, 56), optimism versus pessimism, tolerance versus intolerance, idealism versus cynicism, and superiority versus inferiority (62). But Almond modified these pessimistic views of public attitudes and opinions on foreign policy in the version of the same book published in 1960. He acknowledged that as the public becomes more interested in world affairs, the public mood becomes more stabilized, and there is a trend toward increasing homogeneity in American foreign policy opinion (ibid, xxii). Realists in international politics (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001; Morgenthau 1952; Kennan 1984) propose the similar view on American public's tendency to be emotional and moralistic in making foreign policy choices instead of pursuing strategic reasoning for balance of power or hegemony in world affairs.

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their traditional foreign policy postures - militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism - while they shifted their perceptions regarding Russia and the potential threat from that country. Furthermore, the relationship between ideology and these foreign policy postures remained stable between 1989 and 1992. According to Murray, elites maintain their policy beliefs and attitudes as they are able to organize and maintain a coherent belief system regarding foreign policy issues along ideological lines.

Scholars in the area of public opinion agree with the assumption that elites lead the mass public. McClosky and Zaller (1984, 8), who studied public attitudes toward two core elements of the American ethos – capitalism and democracy – explain the difference between elites and the public this way:

> While most members of the general public are preoccupied with the problems of daily life - earning a living, raising a family, recreation, and so forth - the political elite are characterized by a more intense and continuing concern with the affairs of the larger community. Hence they exert a disproportionate influence on the operation of the political system. By reason of their greater involvement in the public life of the nation, the elites also have a better grasp of how the system works and exhibit higher overall levels of support for its values than do members of the mass public.... Thus opinion leaders (or elites) become for most purposes the principal carriers and expositors of the nation's political creed.

While these scholars do not go as far as elitist theorists in arguing the differences between the elites and the mass public and the homogeneity of the elites, they emphasize that elites think, calculate, and decide differently from the mass public.

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In reaction to this line of emphasis on the difference between elites and the mass public in their opinions and attitudes, another group of scholars argues that elites and the public share a similarity in their structure and organization of belief systems. For example, Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983) argue that elites and the mass public have similar foreign policy belief systems in which two attitude dimensions - "cooperative and militant internationalism"- play a significant role in organizing their foreign policy attitudes. Similarly, Holsti and Rosenau (1990) suggest that four different types of opinion - hardliner, internationalist, isolationist, and accommodationist - derived from the two dimensions of foreign policy attitudes adequately account for variations in leaders' attitudes toward foreign policy. The studies are an extension of the argument that the mass public can organize their belief systems by depending on other elements of belief systems even though they lack political information, knowledge, motivation, and ideological constraints. Scholars who criticize the pessimistic views on the mass public's capacity to form reasonable, stable, and consistent opinions and attitudes toward policies contend that average citizens do maintain stable and coherent belief systems by depending on such "psychological constraints" as values (e.g. Kinder 1983; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Feldman 1988; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), foreign policy postures (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), and information short cuts and heuristics (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Lupia 1994; Popkin 1991). Some scholars (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999) argue that average citizens engage in strategic calculations in making their choices on foreign policy. According to these scholars, citizens can compensate for their lack of interest, motivation, and political knowledge by

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depending on these various types of information aids and, in the end, can form reasonable opinions and attitudes toward policies. [2]

4.1.1. The Interaction Model for Elites' Values Change

Although these studies suggest differences between elites and the mass public in their capacity of information processing, forming opinions and attitudes, and maintaining organized belief systems, they have limited insights into how elites would respond to a changing political environment and adjust their opinions and beliefs in values in response to these events. Would elites lead the public in espousing core foreign policy values in a changing environment? Will there be any individual differences in explaining elites' acceptance of values? If differences exist, what are the elements that affect elites' acceptance of values? What types of elites are more prone to change their attachment to values in reaction to changing political conditions? Will political predispositions dictate the way that the elites respond to the events and adjust their acceptance of values? Is there an interaction between political predisposition and an elite's status in decision making in defining their views on values? How will this relationship change in reaction to political crises?

The interactive model of values change can help us answer these questions. The general proposition that individuals' personal characteristics, political status, and political events will independently and interactively define their attachment to values is valid to explain elites' beliefs in values and the changes of values among elites. Studies on values, or changes of them (e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984; Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1983; Zaller 1992)

[2]However, these studies do not argue that the mass public can parallel with elites in their knowledge and attention to politics. Simply, they argue that the mass public can make reasonable decisions and form opinions so that they can participate in the political process as capable citizens.

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suggest that individuals' knowledge or (awareness) along with predispositions will dictate the way they process information. As individuals learn values through the socialization process in various social and political institutions, their cognitive capacity, motivation, knowledge, and participation in the political process will affect the ways that they adopt these values. Thus, elites who are highly motivated, actively involved in the political process, and armed with information and knowledge on their specialty would show patterns of accepting and changing their values that are different from the mass public. As McClosky and Zaller (1984) point out, elites will be more supportive of prevailing values (e.g., democracy and capitalism in their study) than the mass public. In line with this study, I expect that elites are more actively accepting core foreign policy values than the mass public and even the politically aware public.

The interaction theory of values describes the dynamics of values change. Consistent with previous studies that examine information processing or decision making, the theory predicts that elites will share similarities with and demonstrate differences from the mass public in reacting to political events and adjusting their commitments to values. Since the critical components of the interaction theory are the characteristics of individuals and external conditions, it is necessary to describe the potential differences or similarities at both levels. At the individual level, political sophistication and predisposition differentiates the reaction to the events. Elites' sophistication levels are generally higher than those of the mass public and the sophisticated public. Thus elites as a group will engage in a pattern of values change different from those other groups in reaction to events. Also elites tend to maintain stronger partisanship and ideology with which they interpret events and form choices than do members of the mass or sophisticated public. With these political predispositions elites

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are more likely to filter information and understand political events very differently. Thus, elites' partisanship colors their interpretation of events in deciding their support for values just as partisanship conditions the mass public's acceptance of values. What sets elites off from the mass public is the way that partisanship affects their interpretation of events and modification of their values. As elites make up a small segment of society that is highly knowledgeable in specific areas, their reaction to political events and, in turn, acceptance of values will be different from the mass public and even sophisticated citizens.

In addition, the theory of interaction includes the effects of the role elites play in the decision making process, which will influence the way that they perceive political events and adjust their beliefs in values. As studies (e.g. Tetlock 1981; Tetlock 1983; Suedfeld and Rank 1976) on elites' decision making or reasoning show, elites' role in the political system influences the way that they engage in thinking and reasoning. As the role of elites gives them a sense of greater responsibility for their decisions, they are more likely to be cautious and to engage in an integratively complex reasoning process in their decision making or statements. For example, Tetlock(1983) found that individuals who are put in positions of responsibility are more likely than others to engage in strategic and thoughtful information processing. In analyzing the statements of revolutionary leaders in other nations, Suedfeld and Rank (1976) argue that revolutionary leaders make more measured and reasoned statements once they are in power and become responsible for maintaining their power. In a similar study, Tetlock (1981) presents that, once American presidential candidates have won the election, they issue policy statements which reflect integratively complex reasoning as they become aware of the responsibility of governance. These studies give strong support to the idea that elites' role will influence the way they engage in information processing.

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The core of the interaction theory is its emphasis on the interactions between these individual characteristics and contextual conditions. Not only do political predispositions serve to filter individuals' interpretations of events independently, but also they affect the interpretations of events in combination with political contexts and other individual characteristics. For example, Tetlock (1984) shows that ideologically liberal and moderate senators demonstrated more integratively complex reasoning than conservative senators when Congress was under Democratic control, but this complexity declined when it was under Republican control. Consistent with other studies that explore the interaction between individuals' personal characteristics and contexts in defining their adoption of integratively complex reasoning, Tetlock, Hannum, and Micheletti (1984) argue that, although liberal and moderate elites are more likely than conservative elites to engage in complex reasoning, this tendency depends on political conditions. Especially, whether elites are in charge of decision making or not has a significant influence on whether they engage in complex reasoning. Liberals are more likely to present policies in integratively complex terms when they are responsible for decision making, but they do not so actively employ this type of reasoning when they are not in a position to take responsibility for the decisions. In contrast, conservatives show a relatively stable level of integratively complex reasoning within and across congresses. In line with this argument, the interaction theory stresses the effect of the interaction between elites' political predispositions and their role in the decision making process in defining their views on values. By taking into account the elites' role in policy making, the theory further details the conditions under which elites modify their values in reaction to political events.

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4.1.2. Hypotheses

Drawing from the theories of mass public opinion and values change among elites, I would like to test four hypotheses in this chapter. First, elites will react to external events and adjust their beliefs on values on the basis of them. In other-words, significant political events should lead elites to adjust their beliefs in values; but the way that they respond to the events will be different from that of the mass public. Consistent with scholars who point out the difference between elites and the mass public in regard to their cognitive capacity, interest, and participation in political process, I expect that elites modify their values differently from the mass public. Specifically I expect that, on average, elites will show more stability than the mass public in their acceptance of values in the face of political changes.

Second, when elites react to external events in adjusting their values, their political predispositions will define the way that they form their attachment to those values. Similar to the mass public, elites' partisanship will determine how they interpret the events. Specifically, the sophisticated public's reaction and that of elites will show some parallels, but still, elites' partisanship would play a more central role in defining their values.

Third, the elites' role in decision making will influence the way that they filter the impact of events in defining and adjusting their values. Specifically, those elites who participate in the decision making institutions - the administration, the House, and the Senate - will react more sensitively to external events than those elites who are outside of the decision making circle in showing their support for the foreign policy values. As they feel pressure to be responsible in their decision making and they know more about details on the events decision making, elites will increase their commitment to humanitarianism and democracy promotion in response to the events.

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Fourth, the elites' partisanship and participation in decision making will work together to define the influence of the political events on their attachment to values. In statistical terms, there will be three way interaction effect - partisanship, elites' role, and events - on values. The interaction between partisanship and events will be conditioned by elites' role in decision making. For example, I expect that Democrat decision makers and non-decision makers will interpret the events differently and, in turn, they will show different reactions in their varying espousal of values. Democrat decision makers will be more responsive than Democrat non-decision makers to the 9/11 attacks and increase their support for democracy promotion. But this increased support will not be maintained after they experience the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, Republican decision makers and non-decision makers will react to the events and show contrasting stances toward values. Republican decision makers will be more responsive than Republican non-decision makers to both 9/11 and the war against Iraq, and will strengthen their support for democracy promotion.

4.2. Data

For the analysis of elites' values, I used three surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in 1998, 2002, and 2004. Respondents to the surveys include foreign policy leaders from various institutions and organizations. They include policy makers (government officials from the executive branch and members of the Senate and the House), members of interest groups (business and labor organizations), educators from universities, members of foreign policy think tanks and private foreign policy organizations, members of religious organizations, and members of the mass media (newspapers, magazines, and TV). Although the foreign policy elites are not selected through randomization, the respondents

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represent members of major social and political organizations and institutions that are involved in and influence foreign policy making. The number of respondents in each survey varies: 379, 397 and 450 in 1998, 2002, and 2004 respectively. Compared to the previous surveys, the survey of 2004 includes more than the usual number of respondents from the House and Senate. Thus, whenever the statistical means are presented for 2004, the weight which takes into account the over-sampling of the members of the House and Senate has been used to make the statistics, mean, for 2004 is comparable to other years.

An important advantage of these surveys is that the elites were asked the same questions as the public on various foreign policy issues and values. Owing to this, it is possible to examine the effect of political events on elites' acceptance of values in comparative perspective. In addition, as the surveys were conducted before and after major political events - the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq - it is possible to examine the impact of these events on values. Although these surveys are not panel data, they provide us with an opportunity to capture the effect of these rare political events on elites' foreign policy values.

4.2.1. Measures

To maintain the parallel with the study of the public, this chapter uses the same process of analysis as the second chapter. Thus, the major variables are the same. The dependent variables are two core values: humanitarianism and democracy. To construct the humanitarianism measure, I used two items from the questionnaire. The questions ask respondents whether "combating world hunger" and "helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations" should be an important foreign policy goal. These two questions are

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strongly correlated, and their correlation remains strong over the years. The simple Pearson's correlations between these two items are .50, .51, and .48 in 1998, 2002, and 2004 respectively. The two items are added linearly to construct a scale of humanitarianism. To measure democracy, a question is used that asks respondents whether "helping to bring a democratic form of government in other countries" should be an important U.S. foreign policy goal. These two values represent core values that play a significant role in defining U.S. foreign policy directions.

As it has been established in the previous chapter, partisanship plays a significant role in defining the public's interpretation of political events. Similarly, it is an important political predisposition which would influence elites' beliefs and attitudes. The studies (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 2005; Evans 2003) suggest that there is a strong convergence between partisanship and ideology among political representatives. Although these studies suggest that partisanship can work like ideology because of the high correlation between these two prominent political predispositions, they do not measure the same concept in the American political system. Furthermore, the predispositions may be close enough that partisanship and ideology can be a proxy measure for each other in explaining domestic policy preferences among the elites that will not be the case in foreign policy. I measure partisanship by using the traditional question asking respondents what is their partisan affiliation.

Independent variables include political dispositions and social demographic variables. As previous studies have argued, elites or policy leaders tend to maintain consistent and coherent belief systems compared to the mass public. One of the critical differences between those groups is the role political dispositions play among elites in sustaining other elements

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of belief systems. Converse (1964) argues that sophisticated individuals can organize their belief systems according to ideological constraints. Other studies (e.g., Murray 2002) have suggested the prominent role of ideology in defining elites' foreign policy belief systems. Specifically Murray points out that ideology anchors elites' belief in traditional foreign policy postures (e.g., cooperative and militant internationalism). To measure ideology I used a question which asks respondents to identify their ideological stance on a 5 point scale from strong liberal to strong conservative.

As it is expected that the involvement of elites in government decision making will have a significant impact on their values and policy orientations, the variable which captures this distinction is included. Since the category of jobs or affiliations provides important information about whether elites are members of government organizations that directly participate in the decision making, that question is used. The question asks respondents to indicate their job categories. It includes elites from the administration, the House, the Senate, educators, private foreign policy organizations (e.g., labor organizations, business organizations, and religious organizations), the mass media, and think tanks. [3] A dichotomous variable, - participation in decision making - is created. If leaders are members of the administration, the House, or the Senate, they are included in the decision making group; otherwise they are coded as a "non-decision making" member.

Unlike the mass public, the sample of elites is fairly homogeneous in terms of education level. Although there is no data on education in 2002, the data in 1998 and 2004 reveal that all the elites have at least some college education. Thus, the variable - education- has

[3]Appendix provides detailed information about the categories.

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been excluded in the model. In addition, the information on racial and ethnic identity is not available. Thus, the basic demographic variables include only "gender," and "age."

4.3. Findings

4.3.1. Values Change in Aggregate Level

In this section, I examine whether political events have any impact on elites' adoption of values at the aggregate level. Policy leaders' support for humanitarianism and promotion of democracy as important foreign policy goals shows a couple of patterns to note. In general, elites' support for the two values is higher than that of the public in each year. While the mean support for humanitarianism and democracy among elites ranges from .71 to .82 (humanitarianism) and .57 to .61 (democracy), the same statistics for the public range from .57 to .69 and .42 to .58 for humanitarianism and democracy respectively. [4] This finding is consistent with that of McClosky and Zaller(1984). They found that political elites and sophisticated individuals are more likely than the mass public to accept core American values - liberalism and equality. According to them, elites internalize the values more readily through socialization and active participation in the political process and understand the utility of the values in persuading the public.

Table 4.1. Mean and Mean Changes of Values among Elites and the Mass Public

	Elites			Mass Public		
	1998	2002	2004	1998	2002	2004
Humanitarianism	0.71	0.73	0.82	0.69	0.69	0.57
Democracy	0.58	0.62	0.57	0.58	0.62	0.42

[4]The mean statistics are calculated by normalizing the scale of the dependent variables on a 0 to 1 scale.

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The aggregate mean of humanitarianism in 1998 is .71; it does not change much in 2002, when it is .73. However, the mean of humanitarianism in 2004 increased to .82. It increased about 11%, and the magnitude of change is statistically significant. The pattern of change in support for humanitarianism differs from that of democracy promotion. While elites' adoption of humanitarianism increases over time, their acceptance of democracy promotion fluctuates in that same period. The mean of promoting democracy in 1998 was .58; it increased about .04 point to .62 in 2002 and decreased to .57 in 2004. Although the magnitudes of change from 1998 to 2002 and from 2002 to 2004 are.04 and .05 point, they are statistically significant (t= 1.82 and t=-2.23). On the one hand, the experience of the September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda does have a mixed effect on elites' attachment to humanitarianism and promoting democracy. On the other hand, the Bush administration's new foreign policy initiative and invasion of Iraq do affect leaders' acceptance of humanitarianism and democracy promotion: it leads them to be more supportive of humanitarianism but less of democracy promotion. The Figure 4.1 shows this trend of change of over time clearly. While there was relatively little change in 2002, the change by 2004 was larger compared to 2002.

The mean support for democracy promotion among the elites increased slightly after the experience of the 9/11 attacks. It is important to remember that the idea of democracy promotion was not considered salient until 2004. Thus, this shift suggests that the experience of the attacks made elites pay attention to the promotion of democracy. But this internationalistic idealism encountered a serious hurdle when the Bush administration emphasized a new foreign policy doctrine right after the attack (i.e., preemptive strike) and justified the invasion of the Iraq with democracy promotion. The failure to find WMDs and to build a decent government in Iraq, the revelation of the torture of Iraqi prisoners, and a growing

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Figure 4.1. Changes of Values: Elites



number of American fatalities led to disillusionment regarding the administration's emphasis on the the promotion of democracy as an important foreign policy goal. Thus, elites began to withdraw their commitment to democracy in 2004. This pattern of change contrasts with the pattern of change toward humanitarianism. Elites' support for humanitarianism changed in a meaningful way only after they experienced the invasion of Iraq, when they became more active in espousing it.

The general pattern of aggregate means shows that political events have an impact on elites' beliefs in the core values of humanitarianism and democracy; but the effect of the 9/11 attacks is limited to the elites' adoption of democracy. While the effect is statistically significant, the magnitude is small. The invasion of Iraq and unfolding events have a substantial

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effect on policy leaders' espousal of both values, but the direction of the effect is different. While the events push elites to accept humanitarianism, they drive them to withdraw from democracy promotion. These findings suggest that the 9/11 attacks reminded elites of the importance of democracy promotion. In contrast, the invasion of Iraq made elites pay attention more to humanitarianism than to democracy promotion. The evidence supports the proposition that elites respond to external events in a more measured way than does the mass public. While elites respond to external events, they do so *selectively*. Unlike the mass public, who withdrew their support universally for both ideals after they experienced the invasion of Iraq, elites pay attention to the specific realities of events and the need to maintain or increase support for certain values -e.g., humanitarianism. In a situation which requires adjustment of their values, elites respond in a reasonable way rather than remaining with their previous commitment despite the new information.

4.4. Estimation of the Interaction Model of Values Change

To evaluate the effects of political events on values over the years in a single model, I pooled the three surveys. The hypothesis that this model tests is how two major variables -political dispositions and elite's affiliations- interact through the years in question. The theoretical expectation of the hypothesis is that elites' political dispositions and their affiliation with decision making will independently affect their acceptance of values in response to the events. Furthermore, the effect of elites' political dispositions on their adoption of the two core values depends on elites' role in decision making. These expectations are consistent with the effect of events on the mass public's attachment to the values, in that elites' adjustment for changing political conditions will be filtered through their political predispositions and

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their status of decision making. Regarding the comparison of the mass public and elites, I expect that there are similarities and differences in their forming values in reaction to the events. After I describe the findings of the elites analysis, I compare them to the mass public's reactions to the same events. To present the results of the estimation in a more intuitive way, I will use both tables and graphs. The graphs are based on the estimation results in the models. [5]

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Support for values} = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{years} + \beta_2 \text{partisanship} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{ideology} \\ & + \beta_4 \text{affiliation} \\ & + \beta_5 (\text{partisanship})(\text{years}) \\ & + \beta_6 (\text{affiliation})(\text{years}) \\ & + \beta_7 (\text{partisanship})(\text{years})(\text{affiliation}) \\ & + \textit{controls} \end{aligned} \tag{4.1}$$

4.4.1. The Political Dispositions and Values Change

4.4.1.1. Partisanship. The first column of Table 4.2 shows the estimation results of the model for humanitarianism. In this model, the base category is year 1998 and Republican partisanship. So the effect of the year dummy variable is the comparative effect of the years of 2002 and 2004. Similarly, the interaction terms should be interpreted in comparison to 1998 and Republicans.

[5]Each graph is drawn directly from the estimation results. The expected values of dependent variables are on the y-axis and the change of the specific independent variables is on the x-axis. The expected values of the dependent variables are obtained by changing the range of the interested independent variable (e.g., partisanship) while all the other remaining independent variables are held at their constant .

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Table 4.2: Interaction Model Estimation of Values Change

Variable	**Humanitarianism Coefficient** (Std. Err.)	**Democracy Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Ideology	.058**	.005
	(.009)	(.012)
2002	-.079*	-.085**
	(.037)	(.050)
2004	.028	.014
	(.038)	(.051)
Indep.	-.006	-.070†
	(.036)	(.049)
Demo.	.021	.029**
	(.036)	(.066)
Elite role	-.123*	.043**
	(.049)	(.067)
2002XIndep	.122*	.160**
	(.050)	(.063)
2002XDemo	.111*	.108**
	(.047)	(.068)
2004XIndep	.110*	.000
	(.051)	(.063)
2004XDemo	.094*	-.080
	(.047)	(.089)
2002XEliterole	.244**	.200**
	(.067)	(.091)
2004XEliterole	.204**	.131†
	(.068)	(.108)
IndepXEliterole	.175*	.094
	(.080)	(.086)
DemoXEliterole	.151*	.030
	(.064)	(.153)
2002XIndepXEliterole	-.275*	-.190
	(.114)	(.153)

Continued on next page...

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... table 4.2 continued

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
2002XDemoXEliterole	-.233**	-.087
	(.088)	(.119)
2004XIndepXEliterole	-.343**	-.206†
	(.106)	(.143)
2004XDemoXEliterole	-.258**	-.109
	(.089)	(.119)
gender(1=male)	-.037*	.064**
	(.018)	(.024)
age	.020**	-.026**
	(.001)	(.010)
Intercept	.633**	.517**
	(.043)	(.042)
N	1159	1159
R^2	0.194	0.082

$***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .1$; one-tailed.OLS

Democrats and Independents are not significantly different from Republicans in their attachment to humanitarianism in 1998, although Democrats are slightly more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than Republicans. The coefficients for Independent and Democrats (-.01 and .02) are small in their size and statistically insignificant. However, the difference on humanitarianism between Democrats and Republicans in other years grows larger. The coefficients for the interaction between partisanship and years are statistically significant. The interaction terms between 2002 and Independent, and 2002 and Democrats are .12 and .11 respectively. Both of them are statistically significant (p <.05). This suggests that Democrats and Independents are more likely than Republicans to support humanitarianism in 2002 than they were in 1998 when other variables are controlled. The

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same pattern persists in 2004. Although the size of coefficients get slightly smaller (.1 for Independents and .09 for Democrats in 2004), they are still statistically significant ($p < .05$). As the pooled model tests whether the interaction between time and partisanship is significant and meaningful, if the interaction is significant, that means the events have differential effect on the relationship between partisanship and humanitarianism compared to the baseline year. Thus, the model estimation suggests that the political events of the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq affected the relationship between elites' partisanship and humanitarianism. Figure 4.2 shows the result more intuitively. Democrats were more likely to support humanitarianism than Republicans in 1998, though the difference was not substantial; but as they experienced the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq, they were far more likely than Republicans to espouse humanitarianism in 2002 and 2004.

The model estimation for democracy shows a different result from the model for humanitarianism. The estimation results in Table 4.2 reveal that the main effect of partisanship is significant in the baseline year, 1998. In that year, Democrats were more supportive of democracy promotion than Republicans, but Independents were less supportive. The effect of the interaction between Democrats and years shows a mixed result. The coefficient of Democrats and year 2002 is .11 and statistically significant ($p < .05$). Similarly, Independents react to the 9/11 events as Democrats do. They increase their support for democracy in 2002. The coefficient of the interaction of Independent and year 2002 is .16 and statistically significant at .01 level. This result suggests that both Democrats and Independents became more supportive of democracy promotion after they experienced Al Qaeda's attacks. However, this increased attachment to democracy was not maintained after they experienced the invasion of Iraq. Especially Democrats did not respond to the event in a positive way. While

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the coefficient of interaction between Democrats and year 2004 fails to reach the significance level, it has an expected direction of coefficient i.e., negative sign. The invasion of Iraq and the ensuing failure of finding the WMD undermined Democrats' attachment to democracy promotion. Although Democrats increased their support for democracy promotion after the 9/11 attacks, they began to withdraw their support for the ideal once they observed the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq and unfolding events subsequent to that decision.

Figure 4.2. Predicted Values of Humanitarianism by Partisanship



The graph (Figure 4.3) shows a picture that is consistent with the estimation results in Table 4.2. Democrats and Republicans were not different in their espousal of democracy in 1998. But their difference grew after they experienced the 9/11 attacks. While Democrats

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Figure 4.3. Predicted Values of Democracy by Partisanship



pushed for democracy promotion as an important foreign policy goal after the events, Republicans were withdrawing from their support for democracy. This difference is substantial and significant. Republicans' reaction to 9/11 in withdrawing their support for democracy is consistent with their response toward humanitarianism. What we can learn from this result is that even Republican elites did not accept democracy promotion as an important foreign policy goal by 2002. As the graph shows, it is the invasion of Iraq that changed the partisan elites' stance toward democracy promotion. After the invasion of Iraq, Democrats and Independents became disenchanted with the idea of democracy promotion, while Republican elites shifted their previous belief and began to espouse it. Thus, by 2004 Democrats and Republicans shifted their beliefs in democracy promotion.

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4.4.1.2. Ideology. Ideology has a significant impact on elites' beliefs in humanitarianism in general. The coefficient is .06 and is statistically significant at the .01 level. This suggests that liberals are far more likely than conservatives to believe in humanitarianism as a U.S. foreign policy goal throughout the years. The interaction terms between ideology and years have been tested, but they fail to have any meaningful differential effect on humanitarianism. Thus the interaction terms were omitted from the original model. [6] What this result suggests is that the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq do not have a significant influence on the relationship between ideology and the support for humanitarianism. The impact of ideology does not depend on events at all, while the main effect of ideology is strongly significant on their attachment to humanitarianism. This means that ideology affects elites' belief in humanitarianism over the years *regardless* of the characteristics of political events: liberals are more likely to believe in humanitarianism than conservatives despite political turmoils that drew serious reactions from American citizens. As Murray (2002) pointed out, once elites form their beliefs in values or attitudes toward policies based on ideology, that relationship is difficult for external political events to shake. Liberals and conservatives do not change their beliefs in humanitarianism even after they experience political crises like 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq.

But, unlike the claims of previous studies (e.g., Murray 2002, and Converse 1964), ideology does not have a substantive influence on elites' belief in democracy promotion. Liberals and conservatives are not significantly different in their stances toward democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal. [7] In addition, the interaction terms of ideology and years are not

[6]The estimation result of the original model that includes the interaction between ideology and years can be obtained upon request. The basic results are the same as the current estimation results

[7]The simple correlation between ideology and "democracy promotion" is very weak and fails to pass any significance test. The correlation coefficients are .01, .07, and -.06 in 1998, 2002, and 2004 respectively.

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significant at all, and they were removed from the final estimation. Both magnitude of coefficients are small and insignificant. The political events do not differentiate the influence of ideology on elites' belief in democracy promotion. It suggests that ideology which constrains elites' belief systems fails to function in explaining their attachment to democracy. Elites' orientation in domestic politics does not provide a meaningful guideline for understanding their stance toward democracy promotion. Furthermore, two dramatic events have no effect on the relationship between ideology and belief in democracy promotion. The findings support the second hypothesis partially. While partisanship differentiates the impact of events in adjusting elites' beliefs in values, ideology does not have conditional effects.

4.4.2. Elites' Status in the Decision Making Process and Values Change

Elites' role in the decision making process differentiates the effects of events. The main effect of elites' affiliation on humanitarianism is strong. The coefficient is -.12 and is statistically significant ($p < .05$). Those elites who worked in the administration, the House, and the Senate are less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than those elites who were affiliated with private think tanks, universities, religious organizations, and the mass media in 1998. But this relationship began to change when the elites experienced the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. The interaction effect between elites' affiliation and years is larger and significant in 2002 ($\beta = .24$ and $p < .01$), which suggests that elites' participation in the political decision making made a difference in their attachment to humanitarianism in 2002 compared to 1998. In other words, the 9/11 attacks made those elites who participated directly in foreign policy decision making accept humanitarianism more readily than those elites who were not involved in the decision making process. The 9/11 attacks and the

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counter attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda played a significant role in influencing these groups of elites to adopt a more active internationalist stance; specifically, they pushed for expanding humanitarianism in international relations. This is an understandable reaction from the perspective of elites who are in charge of decision making. Those events required American decision makers to consider their commitment in international affairs to increasing the legitimacy of American leadership. One important way to enhance the image of America as a world leader is to employ an ideal not only on which Americans can easily agree but also which world citizens can readily accept as an important goal of foreign policy. Humanitarianism is an excellent candidate to fulfill that task in situations such as that in which America was attacked by international terrorists.

The effect of the invasion of Iraq on the relationship between elites' affiliation and their support for humanitarianism is strong. The coefficient of the interaction term between 2004 and the affiliation of elites is .20, which is statistically significant ($p < .01$). The interaction term means that the impact of elites' affiliation in 2004 is strongly positive compared to its impact in 1998. Thus, the elites who are in the circle of decision making are far more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism in 2004 than they were in 1998. The graph (Figure 4.4) clearly demonstrates the change of relationship between the elites' affiliation with government organization and their support for humanitarianism over the years. While those elites who were in government decision making organizations (i.e., administration, the House, and the Senate) moved toward supporting humanitarianism from 1998 to 2004, those who were not affiliated with the government were reacting to the events in a different way. The slope of the line for the governmental elites is increasing rapidly over the years. In 1998, elites in the non-governmental organizations were more supportive of humanitarianism than

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those elites in the government, but the 9/11 attacks made them retreat from their belief in humanitarianism. Only after they observed the invasion of Iraq and subsequently unfolding events did the non-governmental elites recover their support for humanitarianism.

Figure 4.4. Predicted Values of Humanitarianism by Affiliation



The main effect of elites' affiliation with government on democracy promotion is weak (β= .04) and insignificant. The elites who worked in the government (e.g., elites who work in the administration, the House, and the Senate) and dealt with foreign policy issues were not much different from those elites who were not in the government in their stance toward democracy promotion in 1998. But this began to change after the 9/11 attacks. The coefficient of interaction term between the elites' affiliation and year 2002 is .20 and statistically significant ($p < .01$). Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction action term for 2004 is .13 and significant

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Figure 4.5. Predicted Values of Democracy by Affiliation



($p < .10$). It shows that the relationship between elites' affiliation with government and their acceptance of democracy as foreign policy goal changed according to political events. The 9/11 attacks influenced the elites' attachment to democracy significantly. Experiencing the disastrous attack on America made the decision making elites embrace democracy promotion as an important foreign policy goal compared to the non-decision making elites. The decision making elites' reaction to the event and their stance toward democracy is an important point to note, because it counters the general expectation that democracy promotion became important among elites as a justification for the invasion of Iraq. The graph(Figure 4.5) illustrates the interaction between decision making and non-decision making elites' and the events. As the estimation results demonstrate, there were no significant differences between

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them in their beliefs in democracy promotion in 1998. But 9/11 affected the relationship in a substantial way: the decision making elites increased their support for democracy, while the non-decision making elites became disenchanted with the ideal. After the Iraq war began, the decision making elites showed even higher support for democracy, and the non-decision making elites changed their stance toward the ideal and became more supportive of democracy promotion. This result shows that decision making elites were keener on the idea than non-decision making elites earlier than we might otherwise have assumed. Although the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent failures to achieve the proposed goals of the war contributed to the gap between the decision making elites and non-decision making elites regarding their support for democracy promotion, the gap between the decision making elites and non-decision making elites was larger after 9/11. The external threat had a more significant impact on decision makers than non-decision makers, because the decision makers are responsible for their decisions and protecting the nation from threat. With this pressure, the decision makers were more likely to pursue democracy promotion as a strategic goal than the non-decision makers.

4.4.2.1. The Interaction between Partisanship and Affiliation. There are two further ways the interaction between partisanship and the elites' role in the decision making process need to be noted. I expected that Democrats who participated in the decision making process would have a different level of belief in humanitarianism than Republican decision makers because of their traditional attachment to idealism. The coefficient of the interaction term between partisanship and role in decision making is .15 and statistically significant at the .01 level. The result is consistent with this expectation. Independent decision makers

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had a similar level of support for humanitarianism to that of Democrats in 1998. The coefficient of the two way interaction term between Independent and decision maker is .18 and significant at the .01 level. A further step of investigating how elites' partisanship and the status of their affiliation with government decision making institutions can condition the effect of political events is done by examining the three way interaction terms.

The main point of interest in exploring the three way interaction term is whether Democrats (or Independents) who worked in the decision making process would react differently to the events and in turn change their belief in humanitarianism. Although there are different ways to examine the three way interactions, I pay attention to the question of how the two way interaction effect of "partisanship and events" changed according to elites' affiliation. The two way interaction effect has already been established above. Partisans (both Democrats and Independents) were more likely to be supportive of humanitarianism after they experienced 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. The more important question is whether the elites' affiliation with decision making affected the relationship or not. The sign of the three way interaction term between year 2002, Democrats, and decision makers in the Table 4.2 is -.23. Since there was a significant large difference between Democrats and Republicans in supporting humanitarianism in 2002, the negative sign of the three way interaction suggests that the difference between these partisans is getting significantly smaller among the decision makers as compared to the non-decision makers. This does not mean that Democrat decision makers were less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism but only that the gap has been reduced among the decision makers in 2002. The gap could have been reduced because Democrat decision makers were less likely to be supportive of humanitarianism than the average Democrat elites or because Republican decision makers increased their support

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for humanitarianism after they experienced the 9/11 attacks. This will be clearer when the relevant graph is examined. The same logic is applied to the coefficient of Independent decision makers in 2002 because the coefficient for the three way interaction term is negative (β=-.27) and statistically significant.

The invasion of Iraq and subsequent failure to secure the country affected partisans' support for humanitarianism. Democrats and Independents were more enthusiastic in accepting humanitarianism than Republicans. Would being affiliated with the decision making process influence the relationship? The coefficients of the three way interaction terms of Democrats, affiliation, and year 2004 is -.26 and statistically significant. The coefficient for Independents, decision makers, and year 2004 is an even greater -.34 and statistically significant ($p < .001$). The negative sign of the coefficients, again, suggests that the events made the differences between partisan decision makers smaller than not being a member of decision making organizations in 2004. Similar to the effect of the 9/11 attacks, the invasion of Iraq and unfolding events could lead the partisan decision makers in 2004 closer to each other regarding their support for humanitarianism. It is not clear by just looking at the sign of the coefficients from the Table how the gap has been decreased. The most plausible answer is that Republican decision makers responded to the events sensitively and changed their beliefs in humanitarianism after the events. At least, the estimation result suggests strongly that the Iraq war did affect partisan decision makers' belief in humanitarianism.

The estimation results in Table 4.2 do not provide a full picture of the three way interaction among the variables. The graphs provide a better way of understanding the relationship among partisanship, elites' affiliation and the political events noted. Although there are three different ways to probe the three way interaction terms, I chose this particular

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Figure 4.6. Predicted Values of Humanitarianism by Partisanship and Affiliation



graph to show how the elites' affiliation with decision making in government affects the relationship between partisanship and the political events. [8] While it is difficult to see how the base group, i.e., Republicans, are reacting to the events in the Table 4.2, the variations of these groups are made clear in the Figure 4.6. The left panel of the graph shows the change in the relationship between partisanship and support for humanitarianism along the

[8]Different ways of graphical presentation of the three way interaction effects depend on our interest in a specific variable. For example, if we want to know how the two way interaction between "partisanship and year" varies by "elites' affiliation with decision making organization", we can make the affiliation an independent variable. The graph here is based on this approach. If we want to know how the two way interaction between "year and elite's affiliation" varies by "partisanship", we can set the "partisanship" as an independent variable. Finally, if we want to know how the two way interaction between "elites' affiliation and partisanship" varies by "year", we can set the "year" variable as an independent variable in making the graphs. In all, the graphs are based on the 3(partisanship categories)*3(years)*2(affiliation categories)=18 points of predicted values from the estimation.

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Figure 4.7. Predicted Values of Democracy by Partisanship and Affiliation



years among the non-decision makers. [9] In contrast to the left panel, the right panel shows the same relationship among the decision makers. The three way interaction among partisanship, elites' affiliation and year can be clearly seen by comparing these two panels. We can see that the gap reduction between Democrat decision makers stems from Republicans decision makers. By 2002, Republican decision makers' support for humanitarianism has dramatically increased. The steep slope in the decision makers panel of Republicans from 1998 to 2002 shows this. The sharp increase of support for humanitarianism among decision makers stands in stark contrast to the response of Republican non-decision making elites in

[9]This graph is the same as the graph of the two way interaction between partisanship and year because we get the same result from the three way interaction by assuming that "elite affiliation" is 0, which means non-decision makers

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2002. In reaction to the 9/11 events Republican non-decision makers withdrew their support for humanitarianism. As the graph shows the slope for Republicans in the left panel moves downward. By 2004, Republican decision makers move even further in their support for humanitarianism and their level of support for the ideal converges with the level of Democrat decision makers. Although Republican non-decision makers (see the left panel) increase their support for humanitarianism in reaction to the experience of the invasion of Iraq, the gap between Democrat (or Independent) non-decision makers and their Republican counterparts is not getting narrower.

The pattern of change in the effect of interactions suggest that two contrasting political events - the attacks by Al Qaeda and the invasion of Iraq by the Bush Administration - induced different reactions among elites toward humanitarianism. External events and elites' affiliation types interact with each other in determining their beliefs in humanitarianism. These two events are distinguished by their characteristics of whether America is the target of an illegitimate external power or whether America wields its power to invade another country. The effects of events are filtered by elites' political predispositions, especially their partisanship. At the same time, the elites' affiliation distinguishes how they perceive the external events. Elites who are involved actively in the decision making process would be different from non-decision makers in that they have more access to information on foreign affairs and are under pressure to act in response to external threats or other developments in world politics.

The three way interaction term - year, partisanship, and elite's affiliation with decision making- in the model for democracy shows a very different picture than that for humanitarianism. As has been mentioned above, two interactions between year and partisanship exert

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their influence on democracy promotion. Specifically, partisans responded differently to the 9/11 attacks and showed their different level of attachment to democracy promotion. The three way interaction term demonstrates how those elites who were in the decision making circle reacted to the events differently from those elites who were not members of government decision making institutions. The coefficients of the three way interaction of year 2002, Democrats, and decision makers is negative (-.10), but it is not statistically significant. This means that, while there was a large gap between Democrat non-decision makers and Republican non-decision makers in their support for democracy in 2002, that difference did not show up between Democrat decision makers and Republican decision makers in that year. In other words, participating in the decision making process did not change the impact of the political event of 9/11 on Democrat and Republican decision makers, whose difference on democracy promotion is still maintained. The coefficient for year 2002, Independents, and decision maker is -.19 and close to the significance level at .10 but fails to reach the significance level. Compared to the difference between Independent non-decision makers and Republican non-decision makers, the difference between Independent and Republican decision makers tends to get smaller in 2002 after they experienced the 9/11 attacks, because Independent decision makers withdrew their support for democracy promotion. But that withdrawal was not large enough to switch the positions between Independent decision makers and Republican decision makers after the 9/11 attacks.

The conditional effect of elites' involvement in the decision making process on the relationship between the invasion of Iraq and partisanship on democracy promotion shows a similar pattern. As the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing counter attacks against the Taleban and Al Qaeda did not affect significantly the relationship between Democrat decision makers and

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Republican decision makers compared to the relationship between Democrat non-decision makers and their Republican counterparts, the invasion of Iraq and subsequently unfolding events did not have a substantial effect on the relationship. The coefficient of the interaction term year 2004, Democrats, and decision making elites is -.11, but it fails to reach the conventional significance level. The direction is consistent with the expectation, but the effect is not large enough. Being involved in decision making does not differentiate the impact of the invasion of Iraq and partisanship on democracy promotion. Democrats who participated in decision making institutions and those who did not withdrew their support for democracy promotion after they experienced the invasion of Iraq. But the difference between Independents who participated in decision making institutions and those who did not was large enough after they experienced the events to become statistically significant. The coefficient of the three way interaction term is -.21 and statistically significant ($p < 1.0$). What the results suggest is that the elites' affiliation with decision making institutions have mixed effects, although the direction of the effects of participation in decision making is consistent with the expectation. At least, it is identified that the difference between Independent decision makers and non-decision makers is pronounced over the years.

The graph of the three way interaction effect shows clearly the pattern of change among partisans by the affiliation with a decision making institution along the years. As the estimation results in the table show, the slope of Independents from 1998 and 2004 among decision makers and non-decision makers is significantly different. While the slope in the non-decision makers line is a weak positive, the same slope in the decision makers is a bit steeper and negative. The invasion of Iraq made Independent non-decision makers move along with Republicans. In contrast, Independent decision makers began to move away from

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Republicans in their support for democracy by 2004. Democrat decision makers' responses to the events are not much different from those of Democrat non-decision makers. Al Qaeda's attack on the U.S. made both groups maintain and even increase their support for democracy promotion. Although the absolute level of support for democracy among decision makers is higher than that among non-decision makers, the effects of the 9/11 attacks on Democrat decision makers and non-decision makers are similar.

The most contrasting result is found among Republicans. It was difficult to see how Republican decision makers and non-decision makers responded to the events over the years from the estimation results alone, because they were the baseline groups. The Figure 4.7 makes clear a rather dramatic differential effect of the 9/11 attacks. While Republican non-decision makers retracted from their belief in democracy promotion in 1998 after they experienced the 9/11 attacks, Republican decision makers aggressively moved to accept democracy. This shift counters a general explanation that the Bush administration gave "democracy promotion" as an expedient cause to justify the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. after it failed to find WMD. At least at the top decision making level Republican elites began to realize the importance of democracy in foreign policy. Thus, the difference of slope between Republican non-decision makers and decision makers by 2002 is significantly large. [10] But even after this change, Republican decision makers' aspiration level for democracy promotion still lags behind that of Democrat decision makers, who might have conceived democracy promotion as an important prescription to prevent terrorist attacks like 9/11. The invasion of Iraq

[10]The test for the slope difference in this three way interaction term needs a further step. It is necessary for the test to get the variance and covariance of different coefficients (For the specific steps of testing, see Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson and Richter (2006). The t-test with n-k-1 degrees of freedom shows that the two slopes for Republican decision makers and non-decision makers from 1998 to 2002 are significantly different.

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and subsequently unfolding events led Republican non-decision makers and decision makers both to make a shift. Republican non-decision makers reversed their retreat from espousing democracy and began actively accepting democracy promotion. Republican decision makers maintained their upward movement and even increased their support for democracy promotion after the invasion of Iraq and the U.S. failure to stabilize that country. In the end, the gap between Republican decision makers and other partisan decision makers is far greater than the gap among non-decision makers.

Finally, it is worth noting that the general level of the espousal of democracy promotion between non-decision makers and decision makers differs significantly. Regardless of elites' political partisanship and events, decision makers consistently show a higher level of support for democracy. It is a contrasting finding compared with the elites' support for humanitarianism. In the case of humanitarianism, there is no significant difference between decision makers and non-decision makers in their attachment to it.

4.5. Summary of Findings on Values Change among Elites

The results show that the mass public and elites show different levels of support for the core foreign policy values in question. In contrast to the mass public, elites generally show a higher level of commitment to humanitarianism and democracy. In addition, political events influence elites' attachment to core values. However, the effects of political events depend on the specific characteristics of those events. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the effects of which were captured in the 2002 survey, had a limited impact on the elites' beliefs in the core foreign policy values. Elites had changed their beliefs only in democracy promotion in a meaningful way by 2002. On the other hand,

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the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ensuing fallout from that decision did impact elites' beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy promotion. An interesting finding is that the events boosted elites' attachment to humanitarianism while they had a very limited effect on democracy promotion. The magnitudes of change from 2002 to 2004 are significant for humanitarianism and democracy. With this change, the gap between humanitarianism and democracy increased significantly by 2004. By 2004, support for these two values moved in opposite directions from one another. On average, elites are *selectively* responding to the events.

Political predispositions and positions in the political system do make a difference in reactions to world events. Elites' partisanship influences how elites interpret external events . Democrats remained committed to humanitarianism while they experienced the major political events studied. They tended to increase their attachment to the ideal of helping the needy in other parts of the world. The difference between Democrats and Republicans on humanitarianism did not change much over the years. The experience of the 9/11 attacks did have a negative influence on Republicans' belief in humanitarianism, while it had a positive one among Democrats and Independents. But eventually, Republicans moved to strengthen their commitment to humanitarianism after they experienced the invasion of Iraq and other failures involved in the war. However, the gap between Democrats (and Independents) and Republicans on their level of support for humanitarianism does not change over the years, because Democrats and Independents increased their support for the value after they experienced both events.

As for democracy promotion, elites' partisanship conditions the effect of the political events. While Democrats showed higher support for democracy promotion in 1998 and

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2002, their attachment to the value dropped slightly after they experienced the invasion of Iraq. As Republicans showed a similar level of support for democracy promotion in 1998, the gap between Democrats and Republicans was not so large in that year. However, the 9/11 attacks changed the gap between them. Despite Al Qaeda's attacks on America and heightened concern for national security, Democrat leaders maintained their support for democracy in 2002. But Republican elites moved away from the ideal. The difference is substantial and statistically significant. This difference may come from their interpretation of the 9/11 attacks. Although elites from both sides were surprised by the attacks, they interpreted them differently. While Democrat elites still believed in democracy promotion as a feasible and important goal for the U.S. to pursue in dealing with international affairs in general and with terrorism in particular, Republican elites did not accept the proposition that pursuing idealism should be the main goal of U.S. foreign policy. As the general mood of the average Republican elites was anti-Clinton administration, and as traditionally they are more inclined to be realists, this stance toward democracy promotion is understandable. However, the invasion of Iraq changed the gap again. After the experience of the war and the subsequent fallout from it, Democrat elites withdrew their commitment to democracy promotion, while Republican elites began to support democracy promotion more than they had in 1998. Thus, there is a switch of the stance toward democracy promotion between Democrats and Republicans by 2004.

Elites' participation in the decision making process had a significant influence on their interpretation of events in explaining values. Elites who participated in the administration, the House, or the Senate were more likely to be responsive to the events and change their support for humanitarianism and democracy. As they experienced the 9/11 attacks and

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the invasion of Iraq, they were more likely to be supportive of internationalist idealism: humanitarianism and democracy. It is consistent with expectations that, even though elites are homogeneous enough to share values, the different levels of knowledge or responsibility result in a difference in interpreting the same events and, in turn, change their stance toward the core foreign policy values. Contrary to elitist theory (e.g., Dye 2002; Dye Zeigler 1981) that posits that homogeneous elites would share similar values and react to external conditions in a similar way, elites who were in the decision making circle showed a substantially different stance toward the values in reaction to the events. Elites who took part in the foreign policy decision making process were more likely to become idealists after they experienced the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. As elites who were in the decision making circle might have felt pressure to be more responsible for the events, they took a more comprehensive stance in dealing with the new crises by emphasizing idealism as well as military power. Although elite pools are relatively small compared to the mass public, there are still divisions and differences among elites in choosing their foreign policy goals. It is particularly interesting to see this division become salient when the nation faces serious crises. Usually, it is expected that national crises might produce a united reaction from elites. Significantly, the difference between decision makers and non-decision makers was pronounced after they experienced the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which supposedly united all Americans. Even if the terrorists' attacks were serious and made Americans united, they also provoked divisions among elites over the foreign policy goals according to their status in the government.

Finally, elites' affiliations in the decision making process and elites' partisanship simultaneously condition the effect of political events on their briefs in the values. The interaction model can capture how elites' belonging to a decision making organization and partisanship

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influence their response to the external environment and, in turn, shape their attachment to values. Republican decision makers were significantly different from Republican non-decision makers in their interpretation of the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq and, in turn, their stance toward humanitarianism. Furthermore, Republican decision makers and non-decision makers reacted in sharply different way to the same events. Not only did elites' political predispositions influence how they accepted the events and changed their beliefs in humanitarianism, but also their working status in the government defined their reaction to the events and stance toward humanitarianism.

Although the pattern of change varies across the years among those partisan decision makers and non-decision makers in their beliefs in democracy promotion, elites' political predispositions and affiliations with decision making organizations simultaneously conditioned the effects of political events in shaping their stance toward democracy promotion. The findings show that the differences between Independent and Republican decision makers and Independent and Republican non-decision makers are significantly larger after the experience of the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. As the graph(Figure 4.7) shows, the difference between Independent and Republican decision makers is drastically reduced compared to the substantial difference between the two partisan non-decision making elites by 2002. However, this convergence between Independent and Republican decision makers changed dramatically after the experience of the invasion of Iraq; Independent decision makers responsively withdrew their commitment to democracy promotion. At the same time, Republican decision makers pushed their commitment to democracy promotion even further by 2004. But the difference between Independents and Republicans in the group of non-decision makers is relatively smaller than that of the decision maker group. The same

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pattern, which is expected, is identified between Democrats and Republicans, but the relative difference between them is not large enough to achieve the traditional statistical significance level. Finally, Republican decision makers and non-decision makers demonstrated sharply contrasting responses to the events in holding their belief in democracy promotion after they experienced the 9/11 attacks. While Republican decision makers quickly caught up with Democrat decision makers in accepting democracy promotion as an important foreign policy goal after they experienced Al Qaeda's attacks, Republican non-decision makers reacted differently from their fellow Republicans by withdrawing their support for the ideal.

4.6. Comparative Understanding of Elites and the mass public

In comparison with the mass public, elites' responses to the events and the pattern of changes in their beliefs in the two core foreign policy values share similarities and expose significant differences. One important similarity between them is that both the mass public and the elites are responsive to external events and adjust their beliefs in foreign policy values according to their interpretation of events. Although the specific way that average citizens and elites responded to the events was different, they had changed their stances on humanitarianism and democracy promotion by 2004. The 9/11 attacks had a somewhat limited influence on both elites and the average citizens; but it was the invasion of Iraq that significantly shook the mass public's beliefs in both values and boosted the elites' belief in humanitarianism.

The second similarity is the way that political predisposition, especially partisanship, filters the effects of the two events. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the mass public's political orientation defines the way that individuals interpret events and change

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their beliefs in the values. Specifically, Democrats and Independents were significantly different from Republicans in interpreting the invasion of Iraq and changing their beliefs in democracy promotion. They interpreted the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq and the failure to achieve the proposed goals (e.g., finding WMD and securing the nation in a short time) as a failure related to pursuing the ideal of democracy promotion. On the other hand, Republicans did not at first interpret the event in the way that Democrats and Independents did. Thus, the gap between these partisan groups toward democracy promotion after the invasion of Iraq began to grow. However, even Republican citizens withdrew their commitment to democracy promotion after the event, though their response was slower than other partisans. The way that elite partisans reacted to the events demonstrated some similarities with the mass public's reaction in regard to democracy promotion. Although the absolute level of support for the ideal is different between the mass public and elites over time, after the 9/11 attacks both Democrats and Independents became more supportive of democracy. Only the Republican mass public and elites showed a different reaction to the 9/11 attacks. In parallel to the mass public, elites' partisanship defined how they interpreted the event and formed their values.

The dynamics of values change not only shows the similarities between the mass public and elites, but they also reveal much more pronounced differences. First, as was discussed briefly above, the difference between the mass public and elites regarding the levels of their acceptance of the two core foreign policy values shows that elites are significantly more likely to espouse the values. Especially after they experienced the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq, elites were more likely to adopt both values. While elites' support for these values during the 1990s was still higher than that of the mass public, the events made the difference

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substantially greater. Political crises led to the division between the mass public and elites in regard to their endorsement of the core values. Consistent with theories on values (e.g., McClosky and Zaller 1984; McClosky and Chong 1985), elites are more willing to accept values, probably because they internalize them more effectively through their socialization and education. As they faced serious political crises and threats from outside, they were more willing to engage with the outside world and to be proactive to handle international terrorism. The same pattern of division between elites and the mass public was identified in the studies that addressed the problem of the mass public's spontaneous response to and tendency to swing back to isolationism during World War II (e.g., Lippmann 1955, Almond 1960). The mass public's adherence to the core values is less stable than that of elites. This is similar to the findings from the scholars who were skeptical of the mass public's ability to maintain stable values. What we find here is consistent with those studies. On the aggregate level, elites relatively maintain the stability of their belief in value, while the mass public changes theirs.

Some might ask why political events draw different reactions from the mass public and elites regarding their espousal of humanitarianism and democracy. An educated guess is that the events - especially the invasion of Iraq and the failure to achieve the proposed goal - in time made average citizens withdraw into an isolationist mood. Unlike elites who wanted to push for humanitarianism even after the invasion of Iraq, the mass public began to feel that it was necessary for U.S. to be more discrete on pursuing idealism in world affairs. While democracy promotion suffered most among the mass public, on average elites withdrew their support for it to only a limited degree. Mean support for democracy change among the mass public and elites from 2002 to 2004 was -.16 and -.05 respectively. Although elites observed

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that the invasion of Iraq did not progress as the Bush administration had planned, and the justification of the war in the name of democracy had been prominent, they withdrew from the ideal only slightly. On average, elites may know that democracy promotion is an important value and goal to pursue and that it will take time to achieve this. Also elitist theory (e.g., Dye and Zeigler 1981;Dye 2002) has suggested that elites share democracy promotion as an important U.S. foreign policy goal and differ only on the specific details of how to achieve it. Thus, they tended to be more patient with the short term setbacks in Iraq. However, the mass public reacted differently. As they are influenced by the salience of values, citizens withdrew their support for democracy promotion more quickly than for humanitarianism. Why did elites strengthen their support for humanitarianism while the mass public diminished their support for it? A similar logic applies: on average the mass public responds to external events in a spontaneous way, but elites interpret the events as an opportunity to increase the commitment on international affairs by paying attention to ideals that would appeal to the international audience as well as the domestic audience. Taking an internationalistic stance could be a realistic choice to deal with international terrorism. Thus, pushing for humanitarianism becomes the proper choice to protect national interests. As many realists argue, pursuing ideals does not always go against protecting national interests. If the right condition exits for pursuing ideals, it is necessary to do so to protect national interests. On average, elites interpreted the political crises as a spur to expand humanitarianism in international affairs, and that was consistent with shielding national interests.

The second important difference between the mass public and elites regarding their change of values is in the way that partisanship filters the impact of external events. The

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general proposition that political predispositions determine the ways that individuals interpret events is applicable to both the mass public and elites. But the specific ways that partisanship conditions the effect of political events shows an interesting contrast.

Although Republicans in the mass public changed their stance toward democracy promotion in reaction to the events, the way they changed is significantly different from that of Republican elites. The two graphs Figure 3.3 and Figure 4.3 show how the predicted values for the Republican mass public and elites moved over the years. The Republican public did not change their beliefs in democracy promotion from 1998 to 2002. In contrast, Republican elites reacted to the events rather unstably. In reaction to the 9/11 attacks Republican elites withdrew their support for democracy promotion, but they shifted their stance toward that value after the invasion of Iraq. This contrasting change fits well with the argument that partisan elites, especially Republican elites, did not have a deep commitment to democracy promotion right after the 9/11 attacks, but they began to justify the invasion of Iraq in the name of democracy promotion. The Republican mass public did not exactly follow their own partisan elites. There is a substantial difference between the Republican public and elites in their stances toward democracy in 1998. The predicted value of democracy promotion for the Republican public in 1998 was about .52, but the same value for Republican elites was .60. This difference practically disappeared after the 9/11 attacks, because some Republican elites - non-decision makers- substantially retreated from their stance of 1998. When Al Qaeda attacked the United States and the issue of national security was of the utmost importance, both Republican elites and mass public did not pay much attention to these ideals but both groups began to change their belief in democracy promotion after the invasion of Iraq. This change might have occurred already among the elites before the

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invasion started. It is difficult to detect whether that was the case with these survey data. The notable difference is the rate of upswing movement toward democracy promotion after the invasion of Iraq among the Republican mass public and elites. While the Republican public retreated from their commitment on the value, the Republican elites strengthened their commitment to democracy promotion after the invasion. What we observe here is that Republican elites began actively to adopt democracy promotion as an important value to pursue in U.S. foreign policy. But the Republican public was less supportive of the ideal than their partisan leaders.

The comparison between the Republican mass public and elites shows a contrasting picture. Another way of examining the differences between them is to compare the sophisticated Republican public and Republican elites. The difference found between the Republican mass public and elites is still visible but the difference between the sophisticated Republicans and Republican elites is smaller. The panels in Figure 3.6 and Figure 4.2 show that the predicted values of democracy promotion among college and post graduate Republicans are getting closer to .5 by 2004, while the same values among less sophisticated Republicans are close to .45. The expected value for Republican elites in 2004 is over .6. As the sophistication level goes up the expected values of democracy promotion among Republicans tend to goes up when other things are assumed to be the same. But still there was a definite discrepancy between the most sophisticated Republicans and Republican elites with regard to their belief in democracy in 2004. That difference is bigger than the difference between Republican elites and Democrat elites. This suggests that, even if sophistication level makes a difference in shaping individuals' perceptions on values, being an elite in a specific area (e.g., foreign policy) contributes to enlarging the gap between the public and elites. As noted, the gap

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between partisan elites (e.g., Republicans and Democrats) is smaller than the gap between the mass public and elites. This means that there is a substantial gap between elites and the mass public in their belief in values and policy preferences. [11]

When we further examine the contrast between the Republican mass public and Republican elites who are in the decision making status, the difference is even greater. The graph 4.7 shows the Republican decision makers' change in their belief in democracy promotion over the years. If we compare this to the mass public (Figure 3.6) , the sophisticated Republican public (panel 4-5 in Figure 3.6) , and Republican non-decision making elites (the left panel of the Figure 4.7), the differences become clear. Republican decision makers had a higher level of support for democracy promotion in 1998 compared to Republican non-decision makers' highest level of support over the years. In addition, they stepped up their commitment to the value after the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. As it was noted above, Republican decision makers already took a more internationalist stance and accepted democracy promotion as an important foreign policy value before the invasion of Iraq. This is significantly different from Republican non-decision makers as well as the Republican public. Republican leaders in decision making circles were committed to democracy promotion even before the invasion of Iraq. Moreover, they did not change their minds on this ideal even after they observed the fallout of the invasion and the failure to achieve the proposed goals. Although both Republican decision makers and non-decision makers did show their acceptance of democracy promotion after the invasion of Iraq, the absolute level of difference is great. The expected values of democracy promotion for these groups are .58 and .72. Republican

[11]Jacobs and Page (2005) claim that public opinion does not have a significant impact on that of decision makers when it is compared with the influence of such elites as elites from labor organizations, businesses, and think thanks. However, other studies (e.g., Sobel 2001) suggest that foreign policy decision makers do take public opinion into account . These competing views reveal a lack of conclusive evidence.

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decision makers are the core group of leaders who believe in democracy promotion compared to other groups, and they are the group who will not change their belief in the face of all the negative outcomes of the invasion of Iraq. They maintained their commitment in the face of counter facts.

McClosky and Chong (1985) shows that regardless of ideological tendency, both left and right extremists show a lack of flexibility in their attitudes by disregarding new information. Similarly, Tetlock's (2005) study on the different ways that elites make decisions demonstrates that those elites (e.g., hedgehogs) who are more likely to made decisions by depending on orthodox ideas or principles easily disregard valid information. Once Republican decision makers committed themselves to democracy promotion, they did not change their stance after the invasion of Iraq and in the aftermath of the invasions. This tendency is consistent with the studies that show the lack of flexibility among the decision makers who stick with their orthodox principles or grand ideologies.

Do Democrat and Independent elites show similar differences to those of Republican elites? Unlike the Republican elites and public, Democrat and Independent elites reveal a trend of values change similar to that of the partisan public. For example, the Democrat public maintained their commitment to democracy promotion after the 9/11 attacks, although the level of support receded slightly . They substantially withdrew their support for democracy after the invasion of Iraq . In terms of trends, the Democrat elites and public move similarly, but the rate of change over the years is different between the two. Unlike the Democrat public, Democrat elites withdrew their support for democracy promotion only after they experienced the invasion of Iraq and the failure to stabilize the country, but their

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level of support for the ideal in 2004 is still higher than that of the mass public. This pattern also maintains when Independent elites and public are compared.

The relational difference between partisan elites and public is pronounced in 2002. While the mass public regardless of their partisanship converges to a point in showing their commitment to democracy promotion, elites show significant differences by their partisanship. As the Figure 4.7 shows, Democrat elites supported democracy promotion aggressively, Independent elites followed next, and Republican elites decreased their support for the value. But the magnitude of difference between elite partisans and the mass public partisans is reduced by 2004, although the difference still exists. Among the elites, Republican elites increased their support for democracy promotion, while Democrats and Independents decreased their support. But among the public, all partisans moved away from democracy promotion, with the Republican mass public being slower to do so than Democrats and Independents. It seems that the public becomes more homogeneous in the face of political crisis, but they become more diverse when they face an event like the invasion of Iraq. However, elites tend to take more diverse positions on a value when they face a critical situation like the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq. This result is consistent with the divisiveness of contemporary politics among elites. A more interesting issue is that this intensified division is applied to the foreign policy area too. The commonly held assumption that all politics stops at the water's edge is not valid in regard to this value. Especially this is the case among elites. As elites become more partisan, the mass public becomes more partisan, too. If we examine the Figure 3.6, the mass public who are less sophisticated demonstrate less difference as to their belief in democracy in 2004. But the sophisticated mass public shows a larger difference

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than that of the less sophisticated mass. And the difference becomes still greater among the elites (see Figure 4.7).

Just as there exists a significant difference between the mass public and elites in their reaction to the events in changing their belief in democracy promotion, their belief in humanitarianism also demonstrates a substantial difference between them. First of all, the mass public partisans reveal a great deal of difference in their belief in humanitarianism compared to the elites. As it has been noted in Figure 3.2, the reaction of the partisan public to the events in question and their support for humanitarianism is rather similar from one group to the next; but the reaction of partisan elites shows a great deal of variation (See Figure 4.2). Especially, Republican elites are substantially different from Democrats and Independents. The Republican public tended to decrease their commitment in humanitarianism over the years, but Republican elites fluctuated in their support for humanitarianism. Republican elites retreated from their espousal of humanitarianism after the 9/11 attacks. Soon after the invasion of Iraq, Republican elites returned in their belief in humanitarianism to the level of 1998, while the Republican mass public withdrew their commitment to the value. The difference is even greater when we compare the change of values between the Republican public and Republican decision makers. Figure 4.6 shows the change of support for humanitarianism among Republican decision makers, which moves upward continuously over time. The same responsiveness has already been noted in their belief in democracy promotion. Republican decision makers interpreted the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq as moments to increase the importance of humanitarianism. This sensitive response to the events among Republican decision makers is very different from the response of the Republican public, who did not change their belief in humanitarianism much over the years.

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Elites and the mass public do demonstrate contrasting beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy. The mass public is more responsive to democracy promotion in reaction to the events, while elites are more responsive to humanitarianism in reaction to the very same events. Although the two values represent the core components of American idealism in the foreign policy area, they do not capture the attention of the mass public and elites in a similar way. Once we move closer to the individual level of analysis, the way that partisanship defines the interpretation of the events varies in each group. Partisanship plays more of a role in defining the mass public's belief in democracy promotion, while it has a limited effect in relation to humanitarianism. Similarly, the combined effect of sophistication and partisanship in filtering the effect of the events is limited to the mass public's stance toward democracy promotion while having little effect on its stance on humanitarianism. In contrast to the mass public, elites' partisanship and their affiliation with the decision making process defined the way they interpreted the events in shaping their beliefs in humanitarianism and democracy. Theories of public opinion (e.g., Sniderman and others 1991, and Alvarez and Brehm 2002) suggest that citizens' attitudes toward policies depend not only on explanatory variables like principles, information level, or predispositions but also on the characteristics of the policies. Similarly, individuals' evaluation of values depends on the characteristics of those values and information levels. Possible sources of this difference between elites and the mass public are differences in levels of information and cognitive capacity. As elites can handle more complex values in a more organized way - i.e., they are better at dealing with multiple values trade offs or handling them (see Tetlock 1986) - elites are more responsive to the events in modifying their values. However, the mass public who has limited cognitive ability and information is more likely to be Persuaded and led by elites to pay attention to

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certain values. Thus, when a value is more prevalent or salient in a certain time period, the mass public will be easily caught up with the value. In this case, democracy promotion was the more salient value that had been talked about, discussed, and disputed among the elites and inside the Washington Beltway. Given this prominence, democracy promotion gained salience among the public, and it became more politicized and easily accessed for them but humanitarianism did not have the salient power to grab the attention of the mass public, since there was scant discussion of or dispute about this value among elites and in the mass media.

In contrast to the mass public, elites did catch the importance of both values. Furthermore, elites pay more attention to humanitarianism than democracy promotion. In this sense, elites are capable of perceiving the importance of multiple values. But similar to the mass public, elites' political predisposition- specifically, political partisanship - dictated the impact of the events and influenced elites' belief in both values. Furthermore, elites' affiliation with decision making affected their interpretation of the events. Although cognitive ability makes a difference in perceiving different values, the ways that individual predispositions and affiliations affect the effects of political events are similar.

The major implications of the findings are as follows. While elites are collectively more stable in maintaining their values, they do adjust their values in a *selective* way. The 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq caused elites to embrace humanitarianism more actively, while they withdrew their support from democracy promotion. Unlike the mass public, elites adjust their beliefs in values with stability and instrumental consideration. In reaction to external threats, elites pursued democracy promotion as a proper goal. But when elites began to experience the fallout of the invasion of Iraq, they substantially withdraw their

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support for democracy promotion while stepping up their support for humanitarianism. On average, elites jettisoned their belief in democracy promotion, but the magnitude of change is not so large as with the mass public. At least this shows that elites are more committed to their ideals than the mass public, even in the face of the difficulties in Iraq. They tend genuinely to believe in the idea of promoting democracy in other parts of the world despite the fact that they have to pay a price for it. In this sense, elites distinguish themselves from the mass public in their commitment to the two foreign policy values studied and in their instrumental and cautious response to the events in question. The results of this study on elites' value change support the proposition that elites are more stable and reasonable than the mass public.

In adjusting their values, elites' political predispositions and roles in decision making dictate the way that they interpret external events. Although there is a debate about elites' homogeneity, this study shows that elites' acceptance of values depends on their political views and role in the political system. What this study suggests is that, even though elites are sophisticated and knowledgeable, they also depend on political predisposition in interpreting external events. And the partisan division among elites plays a more significant role than among the mass public in defining their belief in values. In line with those studies (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 2005; Evans 2003) that emphasize the convergence of partisanship and ideology among elites and deepening divisions along ideological line, this finding implies that partisan division over foreign policy values is deeper among elites than among the mass public. Elites are more likely to lead the mass public in a partisan way in accepting values. Especially when the nation faces critical political crises, elites clash over goals. The intensified partisan way of understanding politics

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would have negative implications for democracy in America. As extreme ideologues reveal rigidity in their judgments on political opponents and worlds, there become fewer chances to engage in constructive deliberation and to tolerate others. Furthermore, this trend of polarization along partisan lines spills over into the mass public in accepting a prominent foreign policy value. It is yet to be seen whether or not this partisan polarization will be intensified when the political crises are things of the past.

Finally, the comparison of elites and the mass public in their values change provides us with a clearer picture of how the value of democracy promotion became more salient among the public and how the political predisposition influenced a certain segment of the public to follow the elite's lead. But not all the mass public followed the elite's lead; the way that the mass public followed the elites depended on their partisan loyalty. Furthermore, there is a significant gap between the sophisticated mass public and the elites; and the gap gets larger when we consider the difference between the unsophisticated mass public and elites who are in charge of decision making. What this tells us is that there is a gap that cannot be easily filled between the mass public and elites. Even elites who are in charge of decision making and those who do not participate in the decision making show differences. These serious gaps might be a reflection of the characteristics of current decision making elites: the decision making elites voluntarily behave differently from the mass public because they have more information and knowledge on current world affairs and are under pressure to make right decisions. Even if that is the case, the gap between elites and the mass public has a negative implication for democracy in America. As the constitutional framers argued, leaders may not need to follow the mass public's fickleness; but if policy makers are not responding to the mass public, it goes against the core principles of democracy. The question of how much

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leadership is good or proper is always a debatable one. But it is difficult to ignore the effort to reduce the gap, especially when the stakes and risks are high.

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CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

This study shows that both humanitarianism and democracy promotion have a significant impact on citizens' support for anti-terrorism measures. Furthermore, the analyses reveal that individuals who champion the idea of democracy promotion are more likely to support various militant anti-terrorism measures (e.g., using air strikes to attack terrorist training camps, sending troops to attack terrorists, assassinating terrorist leaders, and toppling unfriendly regimes). However, citizens' devotion to humanitarianism leads them to oppose most of the militant anti-terrorism measures. In addition, their level of sophistication fails to differentiate the use of values in explaining citizens' policy preferences. There is an exception to the lack of interaction between sophistication and attachment to values in accounting for the policy preferences in the case of support for toppling unfriendly regimes.

The findings confirm the proposition that political core values play a significant role in explaining Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy. However, the means that individuals employ to achieve a goal are not always consistent with the values that they espouse. Also the lack of differentiation according to sophistication level suggests that citizens use values universally in defining their attitudes. These findings imply that citizens choose policies that can be incompatible with the values they pursue. This is especially the case when political elites make the values salient and attempt to mobilize the public in the name of certain values. Under these conditions, individuals tend to comply with the elites and are unable to see the disconnection between their attachment to values and their choices of policies to achieve those

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values. This study contributes to our understanding of the role of values by identifying two values that play an important role in shaping Americans' attitudes toward foreign affairs. In addition, it modifies the sweeping argument that citizens can make consistent connections between means and ends by depending on values. Specifically, the strong positive impact of democracy promotion on support for toppling unfriendly regimes with force shows that when political elites make values salient to justify their policies, citizens tend to follow the elites even if those policies contradict their values. Consequently the findings raise a doubt on the positive role of values in defining and holding citizens' opinions.

In Chapter 3 I examined the impact of specific political events on values change among the mass public. The results show that the two events in question had differential effects on Americans' attachment to the values of democracy and humanitarianism. While the 9/11 attack and consequent counter terrorism measures did not have much impact on citizens' attachment to the values, the invasion of Iraq led to citizens' disenchantment with these values, especially democracy. Regarding the differential susceptibility among partisan individuals, Democrats, who originally showed strong attachment to democracy and humanitarianism, lost their enthusiasm for both after the invasion of Iraq. This shift demonstrates that events affect citizens selectively. Ideologically liberal individuals displayed a different pattern of reaction toward the events than did others. While their adherence to humanitarianism got stronger over the course of the events in question, liberals' disenchantment with democracy also grew. Closely related political predispositions showed different reaction patterns in reference to the same events. Finally, political predisposition and sophistication level interact in filtering the effect of political events on values. Sophisticated Democrats and Independents retreated from their commitment to democracy promotion once they observed the invasion

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of Iraq and the following failures of achieving the proposed goals of the invasion, while sophisticated Republicans tended to maintain their commitment to democracy promotion even after they experienced the invasion of Iraq and the aftermath of it.

I found that elites and the mass public responded to the events differently, and in turn followed different patterns in adjusting their commitments to values. The general proposition that elites as a whole will be different from the mass public in reacting to political events has been confirmed. Elites are less likely to change their commitment to values. Even if they do adjust their values, the magnitude of change is less than that of the mass public and they adjust their values selectively. Second, although elites are relatively homogeneous compared to the mass public, their political predisposition and role in the decision making process differentiate them in their interpretation of political events and in terms of changing their values. Furthermore, partisanship and role in decision making work together to filter the effects of events on values. Particularly, Republican decision making elites and Republican non-decision making elites demonstrate very different patterns of reactions to the events and of changes in their values. When these elites are compared to the mass public, the difference grows wider.

Overall the findings from this study support the main theme: it is necessary to be cautious in arguing for the competence of the mass public. While the mass public can depend on values in organizing their attitudes or belief systems, that does not always lead to the choices which are consistent with their values. As it has been shown, democracy promotion is an important source for supporting major militant anti-terrorism measures, including toppling unfriendly regimes. It is still debatable whether employing militant measures is an effective way to handle international terrorism, given that some segments of elites, i.e. neo-conservatives,

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strongly believe that that is the "right" option. But reality in Iraq and previous historical experiences (e.g., interventions in Vietnam and Latin America) show that the strategy is not a right one. A closer argument about using military force to achieve a moral goal in international affairs is the debate about whether humanitarian intervention is necessary and effective to deal with humanitarian crises. This debate in international politics was carried on extensively during the 1990s. Military intervention in the areas where ethnic conflict erupted (e.g., Bosnia in 1992-1995 and Rwanda in 1994) or the democratic process had been disrupted by conflict (e.g., Haiti in 1994) was seen to be justified as a way to solve the problem of ethnic cleansing or to help stabilize political unrest. But even these interventions were made after much consideration of the feasibility of achieving the goals of humanitarian support without having to make a long term commitment. It is revealing to see elites' choices on the same issues. I have estimated the same model of anti-terrorism measures for elites. [1] Although the results are preliminary, they show that elites tended not to invoke democracy promotion as a source for their support for the militant anti-terrorism measures in 2004. What this implies is that elites frequently use rhetoric to justify their choices, whether that is a military attack or diplomatic negotiations to deal with international affairs. But they often use this rhetoric to mobilize people rather than employing the value in making a real choice. It seems that, as realists (e.g., Mearsheimer, Morgenthau) have described, the mass public is easily swayed by rhetorical appeals.

This study shows that there is a substantial difference between the mass public and elites in their ways of responding to external events and of changing their values. While partisanship filters the influence of external events in both the public and elites, it has more

[1]Those results have not been included in this thesis but are available from the author.

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pronounced effect among elites than among the mass public. Furthermore, the decision making elites' reactions to external events and their adoption of values further widen the gulf between elites and the public. This rising discrepancy between elites and the public may come from the crisis-like situation. Especially after the invasion of Iraq, the gap between the public and the elites became even larger. This fractioning, both among elites and between elites and the public, undermines reasoned deliberation and communication, which will result in further weakening of the democracy. It is more likely that this polarization will occur under stressful situations like the 9/11 attacks and the war against Iraq. Whether a democratic institution is working properly or not depends how the democratic polity can handle crises. The blame for a failing system should not fall completely on the public, given that they just follow the elites' lead. And it may be too much to expect average citizens to be able to check elites' decisions when they are under political crisis and information is not shared properly. In this sense, it is difficult to expect that citizens can maintain calmness and engage in deliberation and reasoning under potential threats to lives. We may see more active and competent citizens after this crisis is over.

A caveat of the findings is that, like other studies, this study has its own limits in terms of time covered. Although I used surveys that range over 6 years, and although this is better than other studies in terms of range, it still is limited. Thus, the findings may show only a part of long term changes of values, or the effects of political events that are rare. Furthermore, since the two political events can be described as political crises, the mass public would reveal their weaknesses. In other words, the bar for testing the mass public's competence might have been set too high. As previous studies (e.g., Lippmann 1955; Almond 1960) showed, citizens who faced political crises were more likely to respond to the events

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with haste and moodiness. Given that the 9/11 attacks were unprecedented in their scale and magnitude of casualties in America, the situation was too chaotic and threatening for the public to expect them to respond to the events with calmness or reason.

Another potential question can be raised about the measurement of values. I acknowledge that there are different ways to operationalize the concept of values. For instance, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) distinguish "values" from "postures" by pointing out that "values" are normative questions pertinent to individuals while "postures" relate to governments. According to them, anti-communism or internationalism are defined as postures, while other scholars define them as values. Following their definition, my measures of values are more like "postures." Similarly, Rokeach (1973) measures values by asking individuals to rank important things to them in their life. In this sense, my measure of values does not exactly reflect the characteristics of values. But still, this measure is close to other measures of values suggested by other studies (e.g., Feldman, Sniderman and others, and Kinder). Although there may be some biases involved by asking whether it is good for a society or a nation rather than for the individual to achieve certain goals, those biases will be small. For example, if individuals do not cherish democracy, there is no reason to say that their own government should pursue this goal. Similarly, if individuals do not believe in equality or individualism, they will not argue that government should protect these ideals. In this sense, my measures of values are close to Rokeach's definition of values.

A final remark on this study on changes of values relates to the characteristics of the data. These surveys are not panel data, which ask the survey questions to the same people over the years. Thus, the findings provide a view of a general tendency of values change. Realistically, it is difficult to obtain panel data which would cover such dramatic political

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events. In this sense, the current data may be the best available data to study values change during political crises.

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APPENDIX A

Dependent Variables

Q50. In order to combat international terrorism, please select whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures.

U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps and other facilities (favor 83%; oppose 13%; refused 4%)

Attacks by U.S. ground troops against terrorist training camps and other facilities (favor 75% ; oppose 21% ; refused 4%)

Assassination of individual terrorist leaders (favor 67%; oppose 28%; refused 5%)

Toppling unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups threatening the U.S. (favor 67% ; oppose 28% ; refused 5%)

Independent Variables

Values

Q4. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all?

Humanitarianism

Combating world hunger (very important 41%; somewhat important 48%; Not important at all 9%; not sure/decline 2%)

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Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nation (very important 16%; somewhat important 62%; Not important at all 21%; not sure/decline 2%)

Democracy

Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations (very important 13%; somewhat important 58%; Not important at all 28%; not sure/decline 2%)

Militarism

Maintaining superior military power world wide (very important 52%; somewhat important 39%; Not important at all 7%; not sure/decline 2%)

National Interest

Protecting the jobs of American workers (very important 77%; somewhat important 20%; Not important at all 2%; not sure/decline 2%)

Securing adequate supplies of energy (very important 70%; somewhat important 26%; Not important at all 2%; not sure/decline 2%)

Isolationism versus Internationalism;

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (Active participation 68%; Stay out 29% ; No sure/decline 4%; N=1195)

Threat:

Please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.

International terrorism (critical threat 76%; important but not critical 21%; not important at all 1%; refused 1%)

Political Knowledge:

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Q1035: The countries of the European Union have introduced a common currency. To the best of your knowledge, what is this currency called? (correct 56%; incorrect 44%)

Q 1037. To the best of your knowledge, who is the current Secretary General of the United Nations? (correct 21%; incorrect 79%)

Party Identification:

How would you describe your party affiliation? (strong republican 14%; not so strong republican 12%; leans republican 6%; undecided/independent/other 23%; leans democrat 9%; not strong democrat 17%; strong democrat 18%)

Political Ideology:

How would you describe your political views: as very conservative, fairly conservative, middle of the road, fairly liberal or very liberal? (extremely conservative 3%; conservative 15% ; slightly conservative 14%; middle of the road 41% ; slightly liberal 10%; liberal 12%; extremely liberal 3%: refuse 2%)

Gender: (male 47%: female 53%)

Age: mean= 48.59; S.D.=17.29; min=18; max=95

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APPENDIX B

Three surveys of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), 1998, 2002, and 2004 were used for this chapter. The survey of 1998 was conducted during October 15 – November 10; that of 2002 during June 1- June 30; and that of 2004 during July 6 – July 12. Each survey included the following numbers of respondents respectively: 1507, 3262, 1195. All the variables are included in the three surveys. Face to face interview was used for the survey of 1998, but both telephone survey and face to face interviews were used in 2002, and computer based surveys were adopted for the survey of 2004.

It is necessary to clarify some potential problems of different survey methods that the surveys adopted. The surveys conducted in 1998 used the face-to-face interview method. For the survey of 2002, two different survey methods were used: telephone interview and face-to-face interview. Of 3,262 respondents, 2,862 respondents were interviewed by telephone and 400 respondents with face-to-face interview. In addition, the survey of 2004 was conducted by using computer. There exist some modal effects because of the different survey methods. For example, respondents who were interviewed by telephone tended to choose the first of the possible responses to questions more often than those who were interviewed face-to-face and by computer. Specifically, when they were asked about foreign policy goals which were used to measure values in this study, respondents interviewed by telephone were more likely to say "a very important", thus inflating the aggregate means. To address this potential

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problem of inflation, I used only the respondents who were interviewed in person in the 2002 survey.

While this choice can solve the problem in 2002, the difference between face-to-face interview and the web-based survey can cause a problem. Fortunately, the difference between these two survey methods is very small. According to the Topline report from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (2004, appendix, 55)[1], telephone interview and face-to-face methods are located at the extreme ends, and computer based survey falls between these two methods of survey in terms of the sensitivity to interview methods. The difference between a face-to-face and a computer based survey is smaller than that of between face-to-face and telephone interviews. Thus the comparison between the surveys of 2002 and 2004 is less problematic if I use the sub sample of the 2002 survey which used face-to-face interview.

Although it is necessary to be cautious when drawing generalizations from the comparison between face-to-face method and computer based method, the modal effect from the computer based survey is not so serious as with the telephone interview. Furthermore, given the direction of values change in the hypothesis - change in negative direction, the potential inflation (potential bias) will not seriously undermine the study. Specifically, if the expectation of change is in a negative direction and the result shows that the change of direction is substantially and statistically negative, that result shows the lower bound of the magnitude of change in the negative direction. If there was not measurement error and no inflation, the magnitude of change would be greater than the findings. Thus, it is relatively safer to generalize the finding under this scenario. The estimation results in this chapter show that

[1]This document is available at. ¡http://www.thechicagocouncil.org¿ It is being accessed on 18 October 2007.

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this is the case. Thus, the results are based on solid ground despite the potential bias in the survey method in the 2004 survey.

Dependent Variables

For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all?

Humanitarianism:

Combating world hunger. Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations. The correlations between these two items in each year are .40, .45, and .56 in 1998, 2002, and 2004. The items are linearly added to construct the measure.

Democracy:

Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations

Independent variables

Party Identification:

How would you describe your party affiliation? : Republican=1, Independent=2, Democrat=3

Political Ideology:

How would you describe your political views: as very conservative =1 , fairly conservative =2, middle of the road=3, fairly liberal=4 or very liberal =5?

Gender: (male =1: female =0)

Age: mean= 48.59; S.D.=17.29; min=18; max=95

Sophistication: Education level was used as a proxy for sophistication. less than high =1 high school =2 some college =3 college =4 post-graduate=5

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Income: Family Income less than $20,000 =1 ? over $100,000=19 (The range of income varies by year. In 1998 it is measured on a 15 point scale; in 2002, an 11 point scale; and in 2004, a 19 point scale.)

Religiosity: having any religion =1 not=0

Race: non-Hispanic whites =1 blacks=2 other=3 Latinos=4

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APPENDIX C

The surveys were conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, 2002, and 2004. The surveys were conducted by using a telephone survey. There are 9 categories from which elites are drawn: House of Representatives and Senate, Administration, business, media, labor leaders, educators, religious leaders, special interest groups, and private foreign policy organizations. As these members were selected in a similar way for each survey, I will provide an example of how they were selected by using the CCFR Leadership Topline 2002 survey (See Topline Report for each year from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations for the details.). The respondents for each group are selected in the following way. All **Representatives**' names were selected from the Congressional Yellow Book, published by Leadership Directories, Inc., 2002. If the House or Senate member was not available, the interview was conducted with the legislative assistant responsible for foreign affairs. The names of those assistant secretaries and other senior level staff in the **Administration** who were interviewed were selected from various agencies and offices dealing with foreign affairs: The Federal Yellow Book, published by Leadership Directories, Inc., 2002. In the **business sector**, vice presidents in charge of international affairs were interviewed. The top industrial corporations in the Fortune 1000 list were included. Respondents' names were provided by idEXEC, a leading supplier of sampling of business executives. In **the media**, interviews were conducted with television and radio news directors, network newscasters, newspaper editors and columnists. The following publication was used for the sample: News Media

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Yellow Book, published by Leadership Directories, Inc., 2002. **Labor Leaders** consisted of some of the presidents of the largest labor unions. The following directory was used to obtain the sample: The Capital Source, published by the National Journal Group Inc., 2002 and Dun and Bradstreet, 2002. **Educators** included presidents and faculty who teach in the area of foreign affairs from a list of universities provided by Market Data Retrieval, 2002, a firm specializing in sampling for educational institutions. **Religious leaders** included religious leaders representing all faiths, proportionate to the number of Americans who worship in each faith. The following directory was used to obtain names: Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches, published by Abingdon Press, Nashville, 2000. For **Special interest groups** interviews were conducted with presidents from large special interest groups relevant to foreign policy. The following directory was used to obtain names: The Capital Source, published by the National Journal Group Inc., 2002. For **private foreign policy organizations**, interviews were conducted with presidents from major private foreign policy organizations. The following directory was used to obtain names: The Capital Source "The Who's Who, What, Where in Washington: Think Tanks", published by the National Journal Group Inc., 2002.

Dependent Variables:

Humanitarianism: I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. How important a foreign policy goal should "combating world hunger" be? (Very important, somewhat important, not important at all)

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How important a foreign policy goal should "helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations" be? (Very important, somewhat important, not important at all)

Democracy promotion: How important a foreign policy goal should "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations" be? (Very important, somewhat important, not important at all)

Independent Variables:

Partisanship: How would you describe your party affiliation? : Republican=1, Independent=2, Democrat=3

Political Ideology:

How would you describe your political views: as very conservative =1 , fairly conservative =2, middle of the road=3, fairly liberal=4 or very liberal =5?

Elite's Affiliation: Dichotomous variable. Members of House of Representatives or Senate or Administration =1, otherwise (i.e., members of business, the media, labor leaders, education, religious organizations, special interest groups, and private foreign policy organizations) =0.

Gender: (male =1: female =0)

Age: (min=28, max=88, mean=47.9)

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